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In this book I present what seem to me (at the moment) to be right answers
to some of the main philosophical questions about the topics mentioned in
the title, and I argue for them where I can. I hope that what I say may be of
interest both to those who have already studied these questions a lot and to
those who haven't. There are several important topics in epistemology to
which  I  give  little  or  no  attention  here  —  such  as  the  nature  of  a
proposition,  the  major  classifications  of  propositions  (necessary  and
contingent, a priori and a posteriori, analytic and synthetic, general and
particular), the nature of understanding a proposition, the nature of truth,
the nature and justification of the various kinds of inference (deductive,
inductive, and probably others) — but enough is covered, to one degree or
another, that the book might be of use in a course in epistemology.
Earlier versions of some of the material in Chapters II, III, and IV were
some of the material in Ginet (1970). An earlier version of the part of
Chapter VII on memory-connection was a paper that I profited from
reading  and  discussing  in  philosophy  discussion  groups  at  Cornell
University, SUNY at Albany, and Syracuse University in 1972—73.
I do not like to admit how long I have been working on this book. I don't
remember all the sources from which I have derived ideas, and I am fairly
sure that I have forgotten with respect to some of the ideas used here that
they did come to me from others. I have, of course, acknowledged the
sources I do remember. I have also tried to mention treatments by others
that are significantly similar to my own, arrived at independently, where I
am aware of them. My apologies to those whom I should have remembered
or known about but didn't.
I am grateful to many teachers, colleagues, students, and friends from
whom I have received valuable stimulus relevant to this book. My thinking
on  matters  I  treat  here  has  had  especially  great  help,  through  their
discussions  with  me  and  their  writings,  from  Keith  Lehrer,  Norman
Malcolm, Sydney Shoemaker, and the students in several epistemology
courses I have given, at the University of Michigan, the University of
Rochester,  the  University  of  Washington,  and  Cornell  University.  I
appreciate the special encouragement that the editors of the Philosophical
Studies  Series  in  Philosophy  have  given  me  in  getting  the  book  toVIII PREFACE
publication. I am grateful to Vanda McMurtry for the bulk of the work in
preparing the Index.
I thank my children, Lisa, Alan, and Greg, for the encouragement I've
derived from their interest in the fact of this project and for their never-
failing tolerance of my fits of abstraction.
Finally, I want to express my gratitude to Sally McConnell-Ginet. I've
gained much from the many times I've discussed points in the work with
her.  She  has  read  the  entire  manuscript,  made  a  large  number  of
suggestions for stylistic improvements, and saved me from more than one
error in the content. In this as in all my endeavors I have been supported





1.   What is it to know that something is the case? What am I saying when I
say, 'I know that the temperature outside is below freezing' or 'I know that
the money was in my pocket when I left the house' or 'Now we know that
the moon has a great deal of dust on its surface' or (to my son while helping
him with his arithmetic) 'Now, you know that six tens are sixty'? What sort
of thing would make one of these propositions, or any other of the form 'S
knows that p'
1, true? What will constitute a case of knowing that a certain
proposition is true, that is, a case of propositional knowledge?
I intend this as a philosophical question. Thus the sort of answer I want
will be an a priori, conceptual truth. How do we understand knowledge
claims like those mentioned above? What do we mean by 'know' in such
constructions? The answer to the question of what constitutes a case of
propositional knowledge is, at least in part, an elucidation of the concept of
knowing.
One way of going about answering the question would be to say 'This sort
of case, that sort of case, and this other sort of case are all cases of
propositional knowledge', specifying for each case the factors in it that
seem to make it a case of knowledge. Case by case, one could try to
delineate  minimally  sufficient  conditions  for  particular  varieties  of
propositional knowledge. (A condition sufficient for the truth of some set
of instances of 'S knows that p' is minimally sufficient if nothing weaker —
entailed  by  the  given  condition  but  not  entailing  it  —  is  sufficient.)
Although  such  detailed  analyses  of  particular  cases  or  kinds  of
propositional knowledge could be extremely interesting, they would not
adequately  answer  the  general  question  of  what  it  is  to  know  that
something is the case. When we have finished the inventory of special
cases, we are still unsatisfied. We want to construct a unified account of
what it is to know that something is the case that will embrace all the2 CHAPTER I
special instances, an abstract definition of propositional knowledge that
will be satisfied by any adequate account of particular cases.
Belief that such a general account can be given is wide-spread and
deeply rooted, but I am well aware that it is not shared by all philosophers.
Many have doubted that the construction 'S knows that p' has a sense for
which there is an interesting general analysis (even given the restriction
that  'p' must  express  a  true  or  false  proposition).  Some  suggest  that
although our uses of that construction in various cases interconnect and
overlap in such ways as to prevent our saying that the construction is
simply ambiguous, those uses are so diverse that it is futile to try to specify
a set of conditions that will in general be necessary and sufficient for a
person's knowing that a proposition is true.
2 One can make a case that a
general definition is possible, and make clear what it is supposed to define,
only by offering one and defending it against objections. This is what I
propose to do.
There are two major dichotomies within the whole of propositional
knowledge  that  I  will  distinguish:  that  between  inferential  and  non-
inferential knowledge and that between fallible and infallible knowledge. I
will  discuss  at  some  length  each  of  two  more  specific  categories  of
propositional knowledge: perceptual knowledge, which is one's knowledge
that  one  perceives  a  certain  sort  of  thing,  and  memory  knowledge,
knowledge  that  p that one can justifiably claim to have because one
remembers that p. These are important because one's knowledge in these
two categories contains virtually the whole basis of one's knowledge of
contingent truths about the world beyond the present content of one's
consciousness. (I am confident that this is true of every actual person;
whether it is necessarily so is another question, to which I think that the
answer is no.) Trying to say what perceptual and memory knowledge are
will naturally involve me in trying to say what perception and memory are,
what it is to perceive something and what it is to remember something.
All these categories of knowledge have been distinguished and much
discussed,  in  one  guise  or  another,  by  other  philosophers;  but  my
definitions of them (like my general definition of propositional knowledge)
will not necessarily be the same as anyone else's. On my account, the
division  between  inferential  and  non-inferential  knowledge  does  not
coincide with that between fallible and infallible knowledge, contrary to
the  way  in  which  some  philosophers  have  viewed  those  divisions.INTRODUCTION 3
Perceptual and memory knowledge are both species of fallible knowledge;
and, while all memory knowledge is non-inferential, perceptual knowledge
does not fall entirely on either side of that divide.
 (Perceptual knowledge is peculiar in that it is distinguished by the kind of
proposition known, rather than, as with the other categories I've mentioned,
the kind of justification one has for claiming that one knows.)
2.     'Know' is the main verb in many forms of proposition other than 'S
knows that p'. For instance:
(1) 'S knows whether or not p'
'S knows what/who/when/where ... is' 'S knows which.. . is---'
'S knows why p'
(2) 'S knows R' where 'R' is a name or definite description of someone
or something.
'S knows what it is like to...'
'S knows what it would be like to...' (3) 'S knows how to...'
In confining my investigation to conditions for the truth of propositions of
the  form  'S  knows  that  p'  am  I  ignoring  all  these  other  forms  of
proposition? No, not most of them, not entirely.
Propositions of the forms indicated in (1) all ascribe to S knowledge of
the truth of some proposition of a certain sort or range without specifying
which particular proposition it is. To assert a proposition of the form 'S
knows whether or not p' is to assert that either S knows that p or S knows
that it is not the case that p. A proposition of the form 'S knows what/
who/when/where... is' is true if and only if S knows to be true some
proposition that is a satisfactory answer to the question 'What/who/when/
where is . . . ?'. Similarly a proposition of the form 'S knows which... is- --'
is  true  if  and  only  if  S  knows  to  be  true  some  proposition  that  is  a
satisfactory answer to the question 'Which... is---?', and a proposition of the
form 'S knows why p' will be true if and only if S knows to be true some
proposition that answers the question 'Why is it that p?'.
Which  classes  of  propositions  will  serve  as  acceptable  answers  to
questions like these can not be determined without reference to the interests
involved in raising them. For the questioner's concerns really determine4 CHAPTER I
what question is being asked, which of the formally possible answers are
actually relevant. For example, one who asks 'Where is Jones?' may want
to find out 'In which room is Jones?' or  'In which country is Jones' or any
of an indefinite number of other things; and one who asks 'Who is Jones?'
may mean 'Which incident of my meeting someone was my meeting
Jones?' or 'What unique and important position in the community does
Jones hold?' or 'What role is Jones playing in the play?' or any of an
indefinite number of other things. Likewise, which propositions are such
that S's knowing one of them to be true will establish the truth of a
proposition expressed by an utterance of any of the forms in (1) that
contain  blanks  or  'why'  will  depend  on  the  interest  of  the  person
entertaining that proposition, the corresponding question he has in mind;
this really determines what proposition he would intend to express with
such an utterance.
The forms indicated in (2) all have to do with the 'acquaintance' sense of
'know'. The first, 'S knows R', is found in such examples as 'Cindy knows
chemistry', 'Brenda knows San Francisco', 'It is a rare father that knows his
own child', 'Lucille does not really know her own husband', 'Sam used to
know Nixon when they were students at Whittier', 'Do you know that
French restaurant in McGraw?' The attributions of knowledge involved in
these examples (whether asserted, denied, queried, or something else)
imply that S is acquainted with R. But sometimes such a proposition
implies more than mere acquaintance; sometimes, as in the first four of the
examples just given, it implies that S knows a significant number of the
significant truths about R. What 'significant' means here is, of course, rather
vague and will depend on what R is and on the context of the utterance,
especially the intent of the utterer.
What  suffices  for  being  acquainted  with  R  will  vary  a  good  deal,
depending on what R is. Being acquainted with a person is different from
being acquainted with a restaurant. In general, S's being acquainted with R
seems to require some sort of interaction with R (usually involving S's
having perceived R, if R is a perceivable thing, but not necessarily: one can
become acquainted with a person by corresponding with her). No matter
how much I may know about George Washington, it is impossible for me
to know him (or to have known him): the dates of his death and my birth
preclude the required sort of interaction. Being acquainted with a person
seems to require more than having merely perceived that person; one must
also have had some sort of social interaction with the person, but howINTRODUCTION 5
much and what sort is required would be hard to say. That not just any sort
or amount will be enough is suggested by remarks like 'I have met him but
I don't actually know him'. And perhaps being acquainted with a restaurant
requires more than having perceived it once: perhaps one needs to have
observed it closely enough to know some of the distinctive salient facts
about it.
In order to know R in the acquaintance sense one must, besides having
had a certain amount and sort of interaction with R, now recall a certain
amount  of  this  interaction  from  the  time  of  its  occurrence:  a  person
suffering from amnesia for his experience prior to a certain time no longer
knows the people with whom he was acquainted only prior to that time, no
matter how much information he may have been given in the meantime
about his experiences with those people. And this interaction cannot have
been so long ago that R is likely to have changed significantly in the
interval: I do not now know my childhood friends whom I have not seen
since  childhood,  no  matter  how  much  I  may  recall  of  my  childhood
experiences with them. In these sorts of cases we can say that one used to
know  R but  no  longer  does.  All  this  suggests  that  knowing  R in  the
acquaintance sense may always consist in a certain sort of propositional
knowledge, knowing in a certain way certain sorts of truths about one's
experience of R: one knows R (in the acquaintance sense) if and only if one
has had experience of R that is of the right sort and knows that one has had
this experience by remembering it from the experience itself. (There is a
special use of 'S knows R' — as in, for example, 'Even with my new beard
he knew me at once' — that implies, not only acquaintance of the sort we
have been discussing, but also an occurrent recognition of R.)
A proposition of the form 'S knows what it is like to VP' where 'VP' refers
to some action or experience — for example, 'S knows what it is like to feel
the most intense kind of pain', 'S knows what it is like to shoot down white-
water rapids in a canoe', 'S knows what it is like to snap the wrist in the
proper fashion in the forehand squash stroke' — seems to imply that S has
VP-ed, or else has done something else that is like VP-ing in the respect
intended by 'what it is like to VP', and remembers what it is like to do it;
that is, it implies that S is acquainted with the particular kind or property of
experience intended by 'what it is like to VP'. Knowing a property (of
experience,  or  a  perceivable  property  of  external  things)  in  the
acquaintance sense is, however, propositional  knowledge, even if the
property known cannot be put into words but must be expressed with6 CHAPTER I
the aid of demonstration or oblique reference: 'That is what it is like to VP'
or 'What it was like to... is what it is like to VP'.
A proposition of the form 'S knows what it would be like to VP', seems to
imply that S does not have acquaintance with the property in question but
that he would be able to recognize the property should it occur in his
experience. Though he's never had the experience itself, he has a well-
founded accurate idea of it and, should he have it, he would be able to say
honestly, 'Yes, that is what I thought it would be like'. Knowing how to
recognize what it is like to VP is also propositional knowledge, though if
one is asked to say what it is that S knows when he knows what it would be
like to VP, the best one may be able to do is to say, 'S knows that it would
be like this: if this were to happen to him he would be able to recognize it
as what it is like to VP'. How could one be justified in thinking that one can
recognize a certain property of experience if one has never been acquainted
with it? Well, one may have been acquainted with an essentially similar
property: I may know what it would be like to have one's left leg in a cast if
I have had my right leg in a cast. Or one may have a particularly vivid or
informative description to which one's imagination is able to respond; I
have never felt as if the upper half of my body were floating away from the
lower half but I think I know what it would be like to have such a feeling.
3.     With respect to propositions of form (3), 'S knows how to...', I am
inclined to think (although I am not perfectly confident) that they do
nothing more than ascribe certain sorts of propositional knowledge to S. It
does  seem  clear  that  such  a  proposition  always  implies  that  S  has
propositional knowledge of a certain sort. It implies that he knows the truth
of some proposition that gives a satisfactory answer to the question 'How
can one...?' or 'How should one .. . ?', a proposition that will take the form
'A (the) way to... is to ---')~ But it may also seem that at least some such
propositions attribute to S certain abilities that are beyond any that are
involved in knowing the truth of any propositions.
Ryle appears to suggest that this is the case.
4 But all that he actually
brings out, as far as I can see, is that the exercise (or manifestation) of one's
knowledge of how to do a certain sort of thing need not, and often does not,
involve any separate mental operation of considering propositions and
inferring from them instructions to oneself. But the same thing is as clearly
true of one's manifestations of knowledge that certain propositions are true,INTRODUCTION 7
especially one's knowledge of truths that answer questions of the form
'How can one...?' or 'How should one...?' I exercise (or manifest) my
knowledge that one can get the door open by turning the knob and pushing
it (as well as my knowledge that there is a door there) by performing that
operation quite automatically as I leave the room; and I may do this, of
course, without formulating (in my mind or out loud) that proposition or
any other relevant proposition.
Moreover, one may have and exercise knowledge of truths as to how
various  sorts  of  things  can  be  done  or  should  be  done  without  ever
formulating those truths in any way or even being able to formulate them.
It may be that no one can — even that no symbols exist with which it
would be possible to — formulate a fully detailed description of the sorts
of things one must know to do in order to ride a bicycle (smoothly) or play
a certain piece on the piano (well) — all the complex and subtle responses
that one must know to make in the various subtly changing circumstances
and  at  the  various  points  in  the  operation  that  one  must  be  able  to
discriminate. Indeed, the nature of the moves, responses, features to be
discriminated,  etc.  required  in  the  successful  performance  of  many
operations is very likely to be such that it is quite impossible to know what
they are without having done or experienced them; one must know what
they are like. In this case knowledge of such truths about how the operation
is performed, even if they could be expressed in symbols, could not be
learned by means of them alone but only by training and practice aimed at
becoming acquainted with the sort of thing one must do or recognize, that
is, training aimed at acquiring the ability to perform the operation. For
example, in order to know that a particular sounding of a certain note on a
violin is flat one's hearing must have been trained to discriminate the
difference; in order to know that pressing the string in this way, but not in
this other, slightly different way, will yield the sound one wants one must
learn to feel and demonstrate the difference.
When there is, at least in practice, no other way for a person to acquire or
show that he has knowledge of important truths as to how to do a thing
except by acquiring and showing the ability to do it (properly) then of
course we are not likely to think that he knows these truths — knows how
it is done, knows how to do it — unless he is able to do it. Thus, though we
are very often entitled to infer from 'He knows how to...' to 'He is able to...',
and to think that he cannot know how unless he is able, it does not follow8 CHAPTER I
that 'He knows how to...' ascribes abilities beyond what are involved in
knowing sufficient truths about how to...
Two further considerations support my inclination to deny that any such
further abilities are ever required for knowing how to.... One is that in the
case of every ability that I can think of with respect to which it is clear that
there can be a case of a person who lacks that ability but knows all the
same truths about how to do the thing as one who has the ability knows, it
would sound very odd to characterize the difference between such a person
and one who has the ability by saying that the latter knows how to do the
thing but the former does not. For example, it would not be right to report
the fact that I am able to lift a hundred pounds off the floor but my eight-
year-old son is not by saying that I know how to do this but he does not
know how. Insofar as there is any knowing how involved he knows how as
well as I; he just doesn't have the strength to do it.
The other consideration is very similar. When someone knows how to...
and has the ability to... (for example, ski expertly, play the violin well, read
English, parallel park a car) but then suddenly loses the ability to... through
a cause that clearly cannot change (at least not immediately) the truths he
knows about how to do... (for example, he suffers a sudden paralysis or
takes a drug that disturbs his muscular control or becomes blind) it would
certainly not be right to report this sudden loss of ability to... by saying that
this person suddenly no longer knows how to.... An expert skier who in the
course of a downhill run gets a bad case of stomach cramps and is able to
complete the run only very clumsily still knows how to ski very well even
while temporarily unable to do so. The only sort of case where 'S no longer
knows how to...' is clearly appropriate is one where it is also appropriate to
say 'S no longer remembers what to do in order to...'. If a violinist cannot
be said to have forgotten (or otherwise lost his memory of) what all the
subtle right moves are for fingering a certain piece, but he is no longer able
to make them all simply because of damaged fingers, then he still knows
how to finger that piece. Indeed, it may be because he knows how to finger
it that he can tell from a few tentative movements of his fingers that he
won't be able to finger it. Loss of knowing how to... requires loss of
memory of what must be done in order to... and is not entailed by mere loss
of physical ability to....  We should not be led to overlook this by the fact
that very often one may not be able to show that one still knows how to do
a thing except by doing it and may discover that one no longer remembers
how to do it by trying and failing.INTRODUCTION 9
If, however, despite these considerations that suggest the contrary, there
are some correct and strict applications of 'S knows how to...' that ascribe
abilities to S beyond any entailed by his knowing sufficient truths about
how to..., then there is a use of 'know' that will be neglected hereafter in
this study.
4.     I have set myself the (somewhat formidable) task of proposing and
defending a general definition of the concept of propositional knowledge.
Indeed, my claims in Sections 2 and 3 suggest that the restriction to
propositional knowledge may be no real restriction at all. So to understand
knowledge in general, it may be enough to consider a set of conditions
necessary  and  sufficient  for  the  truth  of  propositions  expressed  by
sentences of the general form 'S knows that p'.
Before turning to that job in the next chapter, I need to introduce a
stipulation as to how I will interpret such knowledge claims. I will take 'S
knows that p' as equivalent to the claim that S knows to be true all of the
obvious content of the proposition that p. The obvious content of p includes
every proposition q such that p entails q and no one could understand p
without understanding q and knowing that p entails q.
5 The most important
consequence of this stipulation is that if the sentence replacing 'p' contains
a name or definite description 'A' of a particular individual —so that 'p'
could be represented as 'F(A)' — then 'S knows that p' is to be taken to
imply that S knows that it is A of which 'F(...)' is true.
Usually it is taken for granted that if 'S knows that p' expresses a true
proposition  then  'I  know  that  p', if  uttered  by  S,  expresses  a  true
proposition, but this need not always hold. Given the right sort of context,
one may say 'S knows that p' without misleading, even though, as one
knows, S does not know all of the obvious content of the proposition that p
in the sense spelled out above. For instance, if someone describing her
sister's adventures in a foreign land says, 'This shopkeeper knew that my
sister was an American', she will not be taken to be implying that the
shopkeeper knew that it was her sister who was an American.
6 If she had
said, 'The shopkeeper knew that this woman he was dealing with was an10 CHAPTER I
American', we probably would take her to be claiming that the shopkeeper
knew the obvious content of the proposition that this woman he was
dealing with was an American. Her second report is from the point of view
of the knower (that is, the shopkeeper), whereas the first was from her own
viewpoint (that is, the speaker's). In its context the first utterance, 'This
shopkeeper knew that my sister was an American' must be interpreted as a
loose, convenient way of expressing what might more strictly be put in
terms like 'Of this person, who was in fact my sister, this shopkeeper knew
that she was an American', that is, as saying that the shopkeeper knew to be
true some proposition in which being an American is ascribed to that
person, without saying which proposition it is.
7
Anyway, I will be considering only those uses of 'S knows that p' that are
intended to imply that S knows the obvious content of the proposition that
p to be true. And it will be useful to extend this stipulation to cover all
sentences of the form 'S ATTs that p' where 'ATT' covers any verb or verb-
phrase of positive propositional attitude or positive propositional act. Thus
'S believes that p'. 'S claims that p', 'S wishes that p' will be taken to imply
that S's belief, claim, or wish is with respect to all the obvious content of
the proposition that p.
NOTES
1.  I shall use the phrase 'a proposition of the form "S knows that p"' as short for 'a proposition that could
standardly be expressed by utterance of a sentence of the form "S knows that p"'; and a sentence of that
form is one that is obtainable from the schema 'S knows that p' by replacing 'S' with some expression that
designates a person (name, definite description, pronoun, demonstrative phrase) and 'p' with a sentence
that would in the standard utterance of 'S knows that p' express a true or false proposition.
A proposition is what is true or false, also what one believes, desires, asserts denies, wagers, etc., to be
true or false, and what one intends, offers, promises, requests someone, etc., to make true or false. A
proposition is the bearer of truth-value and the object of propositional attitudes and illocutionary acts. A
proposition is distinct from any particular sentence, clause, or phrase used to express it and from any
particular utterance in which it is expressed, since the same proposition may be expressed by different
utterances of different sentences (where there may be no more reason to identify the proposition with any
given sentence or utterance than with any other). (A detailed argument for distinguishing propositions,
the bearers of truth-value, from sentences, utterances of sentences, and speech acts is to be found in
Cartwright (1966).) What a proposition is would be explicated, I take it, by giving criteria for when an
utterance of a sentence or sentence-part expresses a proposition and for when two different utterances of
sentences or sentence-parts express the same proposition. I will not attempt such an explication here but
will just rely on the understanding of the term 'proposition' that my readers already possess, hoping that what I
have to say does not depend on any mistaken assumptions about what exactly propositions are.
2.   On this view 'know' is, in Wittgenstein's phrase (1958, p. 44), one of the 'odd-job' words in our
language. See also Saunders and Champawat (1964).
3.  The two forms of 'how' question are importantly different, as D. G. Brown (1970) brings out. 'How
can one... [for example, prove this theorem, get this trunk open]?' inquires after some means to..., whereasINTRODUCTION 11
'How should one...?' inquires after the correct or proper or required manner to... where this is to be
distinguished from other manners in which one might... Corresponding to each of these two sorts of
question is a different interpretation of 'S knows how to...' and 'S knows that a (the) way to... is to—-', that
is, these constructions are ambiguous. If S does not know how to... in the sense of not knowing any
correct answer to 'How can one...?' then it follows that S is unable to...; but if S does not know how to...
in the sense of not knowing any correct answer to 'How should one...?' then it does not follow that S is
unable to...: he may still be able to... in some improper way. For the thesis that knowing how to... is
always just knowing some correct answer or answers to a question of one of those forms, Brown offers
arguments based largely on considerations of English syntax. While these arguments are welcome
reinforcement, they do not seem conclusive. In the text I offer some inconclusive arguments of a different
kind.
4.   Ryle (1949), Ch. 2.
5.    For the sake of brevity I shall permit myself to use the letters 'p', 'q', etc. not only as sentential
variables (as in 'S knows that p'), but also as variables for names of propositions (as in 'p entails q') and,
combined with quotation marks, as variable names of sentences (as in 'the singular terms in "p"'). I shall
also use quoted sentences or sentence-forms sometimes as sentence names or variable sentence names
and sometimes as proposition names or variable proposition names. Which of these varied uses is being
made will always be clear from the context. In contexts where different uses are made of the same
variable letter or quoted sentence (or sentence form), the context will make clear whether or not they are
dummy names or expressions of the same proposition or sentence throughout.
6.   This example bears significant resemblance to one given by Dretske (1970), which he uses to support
the claim that a person's knowing the truth of a proposition does not necessarily require him to know the
truth of every obvious consequence of that proposition.
7.   This is not to say that the speaker's use in this context of 'This shopkeeper knew that my sister was an
American' was such that the position occupied by 'my sister' was referentially transparent in the sense of
Quine (1953). If the speaker's sister was the long-lost daughter of the shopkeeper but the shopkeeper did
not know this, then the speaker could not but have misled if she had uttered instead, in the same context,
'This shopkeeper knew that his daughter was an American'. It is hard to imagine any context in which this
sentence could be uttered without seeming to imply that the shopkeeper knew that it was his daughter
who was an American.12CHAPTER II
THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE:
TRUTH AND CONFIDENCE
1. The general definition of propositional knowledge that I propose to defend is
along traditional lines and can be expressed as follows:
S knows that p if and only if
(1) p,
(2) S is confident that p, and
(3) S's being so is supported by a disinterested justification for being so
(4) that is externally conclusive.
The  traditional  lines  here  are  conditions  (1),  (2),  and  (3).  They  or  some
conditions very like them have long been thought necessary for knowing that
something is the case (though the necessity of (2) and (3) has recently been
disputed). Some philosophers have also thought that (1), (2), and (3) are jointly
sufficient. Only since Gettier (1963) provided clear counter-examples to this
claim has it been widely recognized that some fourth condition is needed; but
there has been no general agreement as to what it should be.
I will explain each of the four conditions and argue that each is necessary to
the definition. My reason for thinking that these conditions are jointly sufficient
is, in the end, simply that I cannot see what else could be required. I am unable to
think of any counter-example in which a proposition of the form 'S knows that p'
would be disproved by something other than the absence of one or more of these
four conditions. This is not a very interesting argument but it is, I think, the only
sort of reason one can have for thinking that a proposed definition is adequate to
an already established concept (where sufficiency cannot be just stipulated).
2.    Condition (1) needs little comment. If anything is obvious about the literal
use of 'know' it is that one cannot know to be the case what is not the case. This
does not mean that it is always unacceptable and pointless for a speaker to say
(of some person S and some proposition p) that S knows that p when the speaker
knows that his hearers know that it is false that p. But such uses of 'know' must
be interpreted as ironic. In a magazine article about Christopher Columbus I
encountered the sentence "In 1492 most people knew that the earth was flat".14  CHAPTER II
Here there is an attempt at wit that there would not be had the author written
'were sure' or 'confidently believed' instead of 'knew'. One would not have been
surprised had 'knew' here been put in quotation marks. If one reads the sentence
aloud it is quite natural to deliver 'knew' with a slightly mocking intonation. A
similarly ironic use of 'know' might be made in another sort of case — for
example, someone's ruefully declaring 'I knew he would come' after he has not
come — not so much for amusing effect but to point up the fact that though the
speaker's case resembled knowing in all the ways recognizable to him at the time
it still fell short in one crucial respect:  the suggestion conveyed by the irony
would be: 'How silly/vain/poignant my thinking that 1 knew looks now'. In all
such cases the point of the ironic ascription of knowledge depends on the hearers'
being aware that, speaking literally and straightforwardly, one cannot know that
something is the case unless it is the case.
3.   One can see that condition (2), that S is confident that p, is necessary for S's
knowing that p by considering the case of S's having an uncertain memory of
what he once knew. Suppose A and B are doing a crossword puzzle and A goes to
S with the question 'Do you know who was President between Cleveland's two
terms?' It would be perfectly intelligible and natural for S to respond: 'I used to
know that — used to know all the Presidents in sequence in fact — but I'm not
sure I do anymore. Let's see now, was it Garfield? or was it Harrison? I'm just
not sure anymore, but I'm inclined to think it was Harrison. Well, I'm sorry that I
don't know who it was, but I think it was probably Harrison.' Suppose A returns to
B and tells him that S thinks it was Harrison. B might well ask 'Does he know that
it was Harrison?' to which it would be only honest and straightforward for A to
reply 'No, he's not at all sure'. This demonstrates that a person's not being
confident that p is conclusive ground for saying that he does not know that p (at
least when one is called upon to be scrupulous in one s use of 'know'). For in this
case the only reason that A has for denying of S, and that S has for denying of
himself, that he knows that Harrison was the one is that his memory on the point
falls short of being confident.
Curiously, the case of uncertain memory has been thought to show that
being confident that p (or even believing that p) is not necessary to knowing that
p. Cohn Radford (1966), for instance, has pointed out that even in a case where a
person's memory of what he once knew is a good deal more uncertain than in the
case sketched in the previous paragraph (even where, for example, he doesn't
know that he ever knew the answer to the question and thinks he is just guessing)
it might be acceptable, in the right sort of context, to say that he knows, or still
knows, the thing in question.
1 But to infer from this to the unqualified conclusion
that being confident is not necessary to knowing is to overlook the difference
between strict and loose uses of 'know'. This distinction explains why it is thatTRUTH AND CONFIDENCE  15
S's not being sure gives us (and him) a conclusive reason in one sort of context to
say that he does not know that p but that in another sort of context, without any
change in him, it seems unobjectionable to say that he still knows that p. One can
see how it is that the fact that S's present uncertain belief that p represents his
retaining to a degree his former knowledge that p and the fact that his present
state is as good as knowledge for some purposes — for example, for being able
to give the right answer to certain questions —make it natural to speak loosely of
his 'still knowing' that p. (And it will be still more natural, and perhaps speaking
somewhat less loosely, it' — as in one of Radford's examples — S's uncertainty
represents a more or less unreasonable distrust of his memory: it seems to him
that he clearly remembers that p but he is, for no good reason, unsure that this
memory impression is correct.) But that it is a loose use of 'know' is shown by
the fact that it will not bear emphasis. Though it would not be misleading in
some contexts to say of the S of our previous example 'It's remarkable:  although
he hasn't thought of it for years, S still knows who was President between
Cleveland's terms', one could not but mislead if one stressed 'know' and said of S
'He still knows — really knows — that the President between Cleveland's terms
was Harrison'. (Where 'know' is used thus loosely and will not bear emphasis one
can insert 'in effect' without really weakening the intended assertion. Compare:
'She did not really say that p but she in effect said that p' and 'She does not really
know that p but she in effect knows that p'.)
It is plainly absurd to say 'I know that p but I am not sure that p' and this might
be thought to be evidence that knowing entails being confident. But Radford
thinks that this absurdity can be explained in another way, and indeed it can:
since 'I know that p' obviously entails that p, if I am not sure that p I cannot be
sure that I know that p and so cannot assert without reservation that I do while at
the same time confessing uncertainty about p. But this does not explain why it is
also absurd to offer, along with the confession that one is not sure that p, the
uncertain conjecture that one knows that p. If our use of 'know' were such that
the proposition that one knows that p, strictly understood, does not imply that
one is confident that p, but would be made true merely by one's having known
that p in the past and having a present uncertain memory that p, then it should be
perfectly acceptable with nothing odd about it at all to respond to the question
'Do you know that p?' with 'Well, yes, I think that I know that p, but since I'm not
sure that p I can't be sure that I know it.' But this is clearly not an acceptable
response to that question, in which, as its emphasis indicates, 'know' is intended
quite strictly and to which the only honest answer is 'Well, no, I don't know that
p'. (This is different from the momentarily uncertain response to 'Do you know
who was President between Cleveland's terms?' that I allowed in my example.
Being unsure whether or not one knows something must, as in that example, be a
matter of being temporarily unsure whether one can after reflection and effort
come up with an answer that one can be sure of and claim to know.) So, in the16  CHAPTER II
strict sense, knowing that p requires being confident that p; and it is the strict
sense that interests us here.
Some philosophers have suggested that knowing that p cannot imply believing
that p because to say of someone that he believes that p is normally (at least
outside epistemological discussion) to imply that he does not know that p.
2
Presumably, the same could be said of saying of someone that he is confident
that p: normally one would not say this if one thought that the person in question
knew that p; one would say instead that he knew. But the explanation of this is
not that the proposition expressed by 'S is confident that p' or 'S believes that p' is
incompatible with the proposition expressed by 'S knows that p'. It is rather that
normally it is a reasonable presumption, given the sorts of purposes normally in
view in discourse, that a person will not say less than what he knows if it is
relevant. So that if someone says 'S is confident that p' without any indication
that this is not the strongest statement he is prepared to make, his hearers may
infer from his so saying that it is the strongest he is prepared to make, that he
does not think that S knows that p. And in most contexts this is reason to think
that the speaker believes that S does not know that p and is aware that his
believing this is likely to be inferred from his saying (merely) that S is confident
(or believes) that p. And this, that the speaker believes that S does not know that
p, will in turn normally give his hearers good reason to think that S does not
know that p; for if S did know that p, then the speaker would, ordinarily, be in a
position to know it if he were in a position to know that S is confident that p.
Thus in saying merely that S is confident that p in a normal sort of context a
speaker may reasonably expect or intend his hearers to infer from his so saying
that S does not know that p and in this sense he may imply that S does not know
that p. He would be implying this in the same way that a speaker who remarks 'S
has completed two years of college' may, in a normal sort of context, imply that
S has not completed four years of college: this would be implied, not in virtue of
being entailed by what the speaker said (which it plainly is not), but in virtue of
the general conversational principle mentioned, that in the absence of obvious
reasons for doing otherwise one says the strongest thing one knows that is
relevant (and also the presumption that if the stronger proposition were true the
speaker would not be likely to be ignorant of it while knowing the weaker
proposition). A speaker's saying 'S is confident that p' or 'S believes that p'
normally suggests at least a doubt that S knows that p simply because normally
there would be no point in asserting the weaker 'S is confident that p' rather than
the stronger 'S knows that p' if one knew the latter to be true.
3'
4
4.    I want to call attention to two other circumstances that resemble the
circumstance that the speaker doubts or believes it false that S knows that p in
the respect that they are typically present when a speaker asserts of someone thatTRUTH AND CONFIDENCE  17
he is confident that p and are typically needed to give point to his so asserting;
namely: (a) the question as to whether or not S is confident that p has somehow
become relevant to the current interests of the speaker and his hearers and the
speaker thinks his hearers do not realize that S is confident that p or need to be
reminded of it; (b) the proposition that p is such that it is at least conceivable that
S should have been in doubt or ignorant that p (even though it were true that p).
Likewise, neither of these circumstances is entailed by the proposition that S is
confident  that  p. It may be that the presence of (a) and (b), or at least the
speaker's belief that such circumstances are present, is necessary for the act of
asserting (or stating or telling someone) that S is confident that p. But from this it
does not follow that the presence of either of these circumstances is required for
it to be true of S that he is confident that p.
5 I have been uninterruptedly confident
that my name is 'Carl Ginet' for some time now, even throughout long periods
when neither (a) was true with respect to that proposition, nor anything else that
could have given point to my asserting it or (as perhaps it should be put) given
anything I might do the function of asserting it. And I am now confident that I
am conscious even though (b) does not hold with respect to the proposition that I
am conscious; and I can be so in a context in which my uttering the words 'I am
confident that I am conscious' does not function as an assertion that I am
confident that I am conscious, or even as an expression of that proposition
(because not surrounded by the right sort of train of thought).
What  is  entailed  by  the  proposition  that  S  is  confident  that  p  —  as
distinguished from the proposition that someone has asserted or expressed or
thought  that  proposition  —  is  just  what  is  necessary  in  order  that,  ~
circumstances were to arise making it possible (giving it point) to assert or
express or think that S is confident that p, so asserting or expressing or thinking
would be asserting or expressing or thinking a true proposition. In fact (2) may
be regarded as equivalent in its truth conditions to the following:
(2') If there had now arisen any sort of situation that would make it possible
for S to act confidently as if p (for example, by firmly asserting that p),
then his doing so would be a sincere manifestation of his present
attitude towards the proposition that p.
(2') spells out a bit how I think we should understand (2). On this understanding,
I am now confident that I do not have an intense pain in my leg, even though (b)
is false of that proposition and (a) is false of it with respect to my present
circumstances, because if occasion were now to arise for me to assert confidently
that I do not now have such a pain then I could do so sincerely, and that is a fact
about my present attitude towards that proposition.18  CHAPTER II
5.   From what I have said it is clear that being confident that p does not require
being currently engaged in confidently asserting that p or otherwise confidently
acting as if p. This is a feature that must also be shared by knowing that p. For all
of us at any given time there are a great many propositions whose truth we
currently  know,  and  very  likely  even  more  whose  truth  we  are  currently
confident of, that we are not currently contemplating or having anything to do
with. Knowing and being confident of things, like capacities and abilities, are
enduring states of persons that are manifested or used when occasion arises.
It may give some light on the nature of the state of being confident that a
certain proposition is true to consider a bit further the sort of thing that manifests
it. A situation that makes it possible for S to manifest confidence or lack of
confidence that p will be a situation such that S's other currently active beliefs
and desires make the question of whether or not p relevant to the choice among
acts then facing S and they do so in such a way that S's doing some among the
things open to S will manifest confidence that p (though perhaps insincerely)
whereas S's doing others will manifest the absence of confidence that p, provided
that S then realizes the relevance of the question whether or not p. One such
occasion, for example, would arise if S is asked 'Are you sure you mailed that
letter?', S understands the question, has no desire at all to keep the questioner
from knowing the answer, and takes 'yes' to be an affirmative and 'no' a negative
answer to such a question; then S's saying 'yes' with the intention of answering
that question would manifest confidence, and S's saying 'no' would manifest lack
of confidence, that he mailed that letter. For another example, suppose that S
wants to put sugar in his coffee. If the family sugar-bowl is before S and S
unhesitatingly puts some of the white grains it contains into his coffee then S
manifests confidence that those white grains are sugar but if S tastes some of the
white grains first then S manifests lack of confidence that they are sugar, ~ it is
also true that S dislikes sugar straight, thinks that there are substances other than
sugar that look like it but taste different, and is not acting entirely automatically
without awareness of what he is doing. On the other hand, if I fail to release the
emergency brake before driving off this may not manifest a lack of confidence
that driving a car with the emergency brake on will result in damage to it; I may,
even then, be quite confident, know perfectly well, that this proposition is true
but  just  fail  to  think  of  it  and  its  relevance  to  what  I  am  doing.  Or  if  I
unhesitatingly sit on the sturdy looking chair that recently collapsed when I sat
on it, this does not necessarily manifest confidence that this chair will not
collapse this time if I sit on it; I may not be at all confident of that but just fail at
the time to think about whether or not this chair will hold me.
When I speak of acts that manifest confidence that p, or acting confidently as if
p, or the like, I do not mean just physical acts. One can act mentally  as if
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('private',  'internal')  train  of  thought  raise  the  question  whether  the  word
'oxymoron' has the meaning one wants in a sentence that one is composing and
conclude to oneself after slight reflection that it definitely does not. That mental
act would, obviously, show confidence in that proposition as much as an overt
assertion of it would.
The factors relevant to determining that an act manifests confidence that p are,
it is clear, often very complex, involving many facts about the subject's other
beliefs, desires, conscious processes, and relations among them. And the relation
between the state of confidence that p and its manifestations is no simple matter.
It seems right to classify confidence, and belief generally, as a dispositional state,
taking that to mean merely that, according to the concept of it, the primary
criteria by which its presence is determined are findings that the subject would in
various circumstances do various (physical or mental) things that would manifest
it.
6
But confidence is not the simplest, most straightforward kind of dispositional
state, not like the fragility of fine china or my allergy to cats. If we seek to
construct  a  subjunctive  conditional  that  is  equivalent  to  the  ascription  of
confidence that p and that specifies in its antecedent a certain sort of situation for
the subject and in its consequent a certain sort of act that the subject would
perform in that situation — a proper disposition-ascribing conditional — then we
must come up with one essentially like the following:
   (2”) If there had now arisen any sort of situation that would make it possible
for S to act confidently as if p, S realized the relevance of whether or not p
to the choice of acts facing him in that situation, chose an act that
manifests some doxastic attitude toward p. and in so doing had no intent
to deceive, then he would have chosen to act confidently as if p.
There are some peculiarities to note about this conditional. For one thing, its
antecedent is not limited to specifying circumstances that are quite separate from
the act specified in the consequent; the antecedent also specifies a certain class
within which that act must fall, one manifesting either confidence that p or lack
of it. This marks confidence that p as a special sort of dispositional state, but not
any more peculiar logically than the disposition of certain material to break in a
certain pattern of fractures when struck hard enough to make it break at all.
Another peculiarity is the occurrence in both antecedent and consequent of the
phrase 'act confidently as if p' which is synonymous with 'act as if confident that
p" which (in turn) contains the predicate 'confident that p' the ascription of which
the whole conditional is equivalent to. The Variety of circumstances in which it
is possible to act as if confident that p and the variety of such acts, each sort20  CHAPTER II
associated with a sort of circumstance that would give it that character, are so
large — indeed uncircumscribed — that a broad characterization of this sort is
the only sort that can logically guarantee that all possibilities are covered.
Because it employs this construction that contains the predicate 'confident that
p', it may seem that (2") gets us nowhere as an explication of the concept of the
state ascribed by that predicate. But (2") does advance the analysis. The concept
expressed by 'being confident that p', when this is taken to be a predicate that a
subject may satisfy at a time when he is acting in no way to which it is relevant
whether or not p, is secondary and derivative relative to the concept expressed by
'acting as if confident that — or rather by 'acting as if confident that p while
realizing the relevance of whether or not p to one's act and without intent to
deceive' or, for short, 'knowingly and sincerely acting as if confident that p'. The
latter is primary despite the fact that our expression of it contains a phrase that
expresses the former, logically derivative concept. This is only an accident of our
language that could have been otherwise though the concepts were the same. The
primary notion here is of a kind of act in a context (of intentions, other beliefs,
conscious processes, etc.) that endows that act with a certain kind of significance.
We must grasp this concept, if we are to grasp the notion 'being confident that p',
and not vice versa.
We do not first have the concept of the unmanifested state of confidence or
belief that p' employing criteria for this that have nothing to do with how it is
manifested, and then derive from that a concept, which we might or might not
have had in addition, of ways in which that state can explain or cause or be
evidenced in various sorts of (mental or physical) act. It is not like the relation
between the state of a material object's being hollow and its hollowness being
evidenced in such behaviors as floating in certain solutions or giving off a certain
sound when struck. To explain a particular act of S's in a particular situation (or
partly explain it) by reference to S's state of being confident that p is not to imply
that there is a state of S's that is ascertainable independently of any of S's acts
that it might explain and is linked by causal law to that sort of act. It is, rather, by
suggesting a range of subjunctive conditionals that are true of S, to place his act
in a certain sort of familiar pattern of dispositions to act. (Compare explaining an
act by saying that it was a certain sort of move in a certain sort of game: the
significance this gives the act consists not only in the kinds of categorical
propositions, but also in the kinds of subjunctive conditionals, that such an
explanation implies about the agent and surrounding events.)
We could not have the concept of the enduring state of being confident that p
without having the concept of sincere and knowing action as if confident that p.
But we could have had the latter concept without having the former, though we
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p' or 'believes that p' to signify a property of actions ('There he was confident that
p' 'There he lacked confidence that p'), in a way analogous to that in which
'intends that p' is often used, the property that, as things are, we can describe as
the subject's showing or, perhaps better, living confidence that p. And then we
might or might not have added the concept we could then have expressed by
'being dispossed, if circumstances were appropriate, to be confident that p'. Our
actual language is misleading as to this relation among these concepts. It is as if
we lacked a word for the concept expressed by 'breaks' and had only some
expression for the notion 'behaves as if it fragile under such stresses as it is
currently subject to'. If this possible arrangement of our language were the actual
one,  it  would  not  make  it  any  the  less  the  case  that  the  concept  of  the
dispositional property of fragility under such-and-such stress was derivative from
the concept of the occurrent behavior of acting as if fragile under such-and-such
stress.
It ought to be pointed out that, contrary to first appearances, neither (2") nor
(2') entails that a person's knowing and sincere action as if confident that p can
never be misleading as to that person's state of confidence that p. Both allow us
to make sense of such a remark as 'Though he confidently hays that p and is quite
sincere in so saying, this does not show his true state: he does not really believe
that p (or he is not really as confident as that)'. What such a remark must mean is
that, though he knowingly and sincerely acts as if confident that p in this
situation, this bit of behavior is not an accurate guide as to what his knowing and
sincere action would be throughout the whole range of situations that might arise
in which it would be possible to manifest confidence or lack of confidence that p.
There are some other situations of that sort such that, if one of them had now
arisen and he made some choice of action for which he was aware that the truth
of p was relevant and did so without intent to deceive, he would have acted as if
lacking confidence that p. Of such a person one might be inclined to say that he
is in a way confident that p and in a way not. Or one might think of him as like
two distinct subjects with respect to being confident that p. But he is not a plain,
clear case of having, or lacking, confidence that p. And he satisfies neither (2")
nor (2'), both of which begin 'If there had now arisen any sort of situation...'. In
this context 'any' clearly means a universal quantification of wide scope, not an
existential one. If (2") were changed to begin 'There are at least some among the
sorts of situations that would make it possible for S to act confidently as if p that
are such that if one of them had now arisen, S realized the relevance... etc.
[continuing as in (2")]', then we would have specified a disposition that we could
express as S's being at least in some ways confident that p.
None of what I have said implies that being confident that p requires at some
time manifesting confidence that p or thinking of the proposition that p. The
proposition that I do not own a giraffe is one that I have been confident of for a22  CHAPTER II
long time without (as far as I remember) ever having manifested that confidence
or thought of that proposition until just now.
Nor does what I have said take us far in elucidating the concept of confidence
in a proposition. This concept must be understood in terms of a whole system of
concepts of psychological states and their capacity to explain and be manifested
in behavior and conscious mental processes of saying to oneself, imaging, and
the like. This is a system that we all do grasp, more or less, but an adequate
philosophical elucidation of it would be a large task.
6.   Let us return to the point that (2) does not entail either (a), that the question
of whether or not p is somehow currently relevant, or (b), that the proposition
that p is such that S might conceivably have doubted or been ignorant of its truth.
If (2) did entail either of these it could not be entailed by S's knowing that p.
That (a) cannot be entailed by S's knowing that p is fairly obvious as soon as
we see the distinction between conditions necessary for the truth of a proposition
and conditions necessary for the speech act of asserting that proposition. Just as I
do not cease to exist in circumstances that deprive me (or someone else) of the
opportunity of telling someone that I exist, and it does not cease to be the case
that  I  have  never  been  on  Mars  in  circumstances  that  deprive  me  of  the
opportunity of telling someone that (even though such circumstances are the
norm), so also I do not cease to know that these things are so merely because
circumstances usually or always deprive me (and others) of the opportunity of
asserting that I know them.
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It is perhaps not so obvious that (2) should not entail (b) if (2) is to be entailed
by 'S knows that p'. There do seem to be substituends for 'p' such that the
sentence 'S doubts that p' (in the sense that S is uncertain whether or not p) fails
to express an intelligible proposition or one that could possibly be true (if it is
assumed that 'S doubts that p' entails that S understands the proposition that p,
which seems plausible since the latter is, as we shall see, entailed by 'S is
confident that p'). Such substituends for 'p' seem to include 'he [S] is conscious',
'he [S] feels an intense pain in his leg', as well as '1+1=2'. Some philosophers
have inferred from this that for such substituends for 'p' the sentence 'S knows
that p' also fails to express an intelligible proposition. Wittgenstein (1951), for
example, remarks (I, 246):
It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am
in pain. What is it supposed to mean — except perhaps that I am in
pain?..,  it  makes  sense  to  say  about  other  people  that  they  doubt
whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.
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The argument here seems to be that it is always pointless to say of a person
that he knows that he is in pain (rather than just saying that he is in pain),
because  so  saying  never  conveys  information  in  the  sense  of  ruling  out
alternatives that were possible a priori (other than the alternative that he is not in
pain). But this reasoning overlooks another way in which saying 'I know that I
have a pain' could have a point: namely, as part of a program of listing things one
already knows that are, or might be, relevant to some particular question one is
currently interested in (for example, the question as to whether or not one has a
certain disease or bodily injury, or the question as to what can be deduced from
such facts as one cannot possibly doubt). The point would be to assemble, not
just a number of facts relevant to the question, but facts that one already knows,
so as to see where what one already knows of the facts puts one with respect to
the inquiry one wants to make and what further sorts of facts, if any, one might
need to know to settle the question. This sort of purpose could give point to a
person's saying 'I know that I feel pain in my leg' (or 'I know that 1+1=2' or even
'I know that I still exist') or to someone else's saying such a thing of him. Hence,
we do not want condition (2) interpreted in such a way that its being necessary
for S's knowing that p would entail that S cannot be said to know such things as
that he has a pain or that he is conscious.
7.   Another feature of the meaning of (2) that should be noted is that S cannot be
confident (or even believe) that p unless he understands the proposition that p.
He need not understand it as fully as it might be understood. He might, for
example, believe that the University owns a cyclotron without understanding
very well what a cyclotron is. But he cannot believe what he does not understand
at all. He must have at least enough understanding of the proposition to have
some idea of how it may be determined whether or not it is true. It is perhaps
enough to know that a cyclotron is some sort of instrument used by physicists (or
just scientists) in some of their experiments. If he did not know whether a
cyclotron is a scientific instrument or a vehicle with wheels or an animal, but
only that it is some sort of material thing capable of being owned, then it would
be very odd to say of him that he is confident that the University owns a
cyclotron. To assert that he is confident that the University owns a cyclotron
certainly suggests that he has a fuller grasp of what a cyclotron is than that. It is
quite certain that if he also did not know whether a cyclotron was a material
object or a kind of repeating decimal or what 'the University' refers to or what
owning is, then he could not be confident that (or believe that or assert that or
wonder whether) the University owns a cyclotron.
He could, however, believe that the proposition asserted by someone who has
said 'The University owns a cyclotron' is true, because that is not the same thing
as believing that the University owns a cyclotron. Here is an example from real24  CHAPTER II
life: I find in a mathematics textbook (Kelley, 1955, p. 146) after the word
"THEOREM" the following sentence: "If X is a locally compact topological
space which is either Hausdorff or regular, then the family of closed compact
neighborhoods of each point is a base for its neighborhood system". I am quite
confident, and with plenty of justification, that the proposition that the author
asserts with that sentence, whatever it is, is true. But if I were to say in a
confident manner (to someone who didn't know me well), "If X is a locally
compact topological space ... etc." or "I am sure (or I conjecture) that if Xis a
locally compact etc.", I would thereby pretend to a much greater comprehension
of the concepts of topology than I in fact possess. Thus, although one can
identify a particular proposition that one does not understand at all — say, by
means of a sentence 'p' that someone has used to express it — and one can be
confident that this particular proposition, the proposition that p, is true, one is not
thereby confident that p.
Although being confident that p entails understanding the proposition that p (at
least to a significant degree) it does not in every case entail being able to express
that proposition in symbols of any sort. An animal that lacks altogether the
capacity for putting things into symbols, for example, a dog, is yet able to show
by his behavior that he confidently remembers or recognizes or expects certain
things to be the case — for example, that stepping on glowing coals v~ill hurt
him, that someone is about to throw the stick he wants to fetch, that the stick is
travelling through the air in a certain direction. And we ourselves know many
things that we would be at a loss to put into words, for example, just how one
must hold one's mouth and force air through it in order to whistle. I know what
the characteristic appearance of a certain person is that one may go by in
recognizing him, as I show by recognizing him, or pictures of him, very well; but
if I am asked to say just what that characteristic appearance is I am able only to
point to him, or a picture of him, and say, 'Well, it's what can be seen there'
(though this might be fairly regarded as saying what he looks like). There are, to
be sure, many sorts of propositions that a person could not be supposed to know
or be confident of or understand unless he knows how to express them somehow
in symbols, for example, propositions of higher mathematics or theoretical
physics. But since this is not true of all propositions, the ability to formulate the
proposition that p in symbols is not a generally necessary condition of being
confident or knowing that p. Whether creatures altogether lacking in competence
to  symbolize  any propositions can, nevertheless, know some truths (strictly
speaking) is a different question. There is no reason in the necessity of (2) for
knowing truths to deny that they can, but perhaps there may be in the conditions
still to be discussed.TRUTH AND CONFIDENCE  25
NOTES
1.  See also Woozley (1952) and Armstrong (1973), p. 141, where 'The Case of the Unconfident
Examinee' is taken to show that knowing does not entail being confident.
2.  Moore (1962), p. 115, says, "There certainly is a common use of belief in which 'I believe'
entails 'I don't know for certain'."
3.  The distinction between that which is implied by what the speaker says, by the proposition
he  asserts,  and  that  which  is  implied  by  the  speaker,  in virtue of general conversational
principles and his saying what he does in the particular circumstances, has been introduced and
put to very good use in Grice (1961) and elaborated in Grice (1974). One test of whether we
have a "conversational implicature" or a logical implication of what is asserted is whether or not
the implication is "cancellable" (as Grice puts it). This test reveals that S's not knowing that p
cannot be more than a conversational implicature of someone's asserting that S believes that p,
as is made clear by Lehrer (1968), pp. 493—494.
4.  Vendler (1972), Ch. V, contends that the object of knowledge is never the same as the object
of belief, that what one believes is a proposition but what one knows is a fact, and he appears to
conclude from this that an analysis of knowledge that p in terms of belief that p must  be
mistaken, that (confidently) believing that p could not be a conceptually necessary conditon of
knowing that p. This inference, as far as I can see, is just a non sequitur. What reason is there to
think that 'S knows that p' can entail 'S believes that p' only if 'that p' signifies the same object in
both cases? Nor do I find Vendler's argument that knowledge and belief have different objects
very convincing. It is based on such considerations as that, although 'I believe what you say'
means 'I believe to be true the proposition you assert', 'I know what you say' does not mean 'I
know to be true the proposition you assert' and that, although one can say 'I know what
happened', one cannot say 'I believe what happened'. Some considerations that muddy the
picture a good deal are ignored, however, such as the possibiliLy of saying things like 'Is what
you said at that point in your testimony something you know or something you merely believe?'
5.   Searle (1969),  pp.  141—146,  calls the  failure to  distinguish  conditions  necessary  for
asserting that p from conditions necessary for its being true that p the "assertion fallacy".
6.  Armstrong (1973), pp. 16—19, argues that the state of belief is not a disposition. But the
considerations he offers have to do mostly with how belief differs from a simple disposition like
brittleness and seem to me to show at most only that belief and brittleness are different kinds of
dispositions. One argument he offers uses the premise that the belief state must have a structure
that corresponds to the structure of the proposition believed, a contention that his remarks fail to
make plausible to me.
7.  Contrast Wittgenstein (1969), 208, 260, 352, 464—468, 552—554, and elsewhere. But see also 431.
8.  Compare Wittgenstein (1969), 504—505.26 CHAPTER III
THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE:
JUSTIFICATION
1.  To know that p it is not enough to be sure that p and happen to be
right. One's confidence must be justified and that justification must be
disinterested.
I shall take 'S has justification for being confident that p' (or 'S is justified
in being confident that p') to mean 'S is in a position such that if he is, or
were to be, confident that p then he is, or would be, justified in being so.'
One is justified in being confident that p if and only if it is not the case that
one ought not to be confident that p: one could not be justly reproached for
being confident that p.
If one is justified in being confident that p, is it the case that one should
be confident that p? In general, from its being false that one ought not to do
something it does not follow that one ought to do it. But in certain cases the
gap between these amounts to very little. Accepting a gift is (perhaps) such
a case: if it is not the case that one ought not to accept a gift one has been
offered (there is no reason why one ought not to) then one ought to accept
it; exceptions to this are going to be rather special cases. Being confident is
perhaps similar. Circumstances that justify a person in being confident that
something is the case are generally also enough to oblige him to be
confident in the sense that he will be open to a certain sort of criticism if he
is not confident. When a person is justified in being confident that p but he
is not so then he is being (at least a bit) unreasonable, unless there is some
special explanation (perhaps he very much wants it not to be the case that
p).  A  position  is  not  generally  considered  to  be  such  as  to  make  it
reasonable (to provide sufficient reason) to be confident that p unless it is
also  thought  to  be  such  as  to  make  it  unreasonable  (lacking  in  any
acceptable reason) not to be confident that p. Generally we think that
confidence is not quite fully justified as long as there remains something
that can rightly be regarded as a reason for still hesitating. But there are
exceptions.28 CHAPTER III
One  clear  sort  of  case  that  falls  between  being  justified  in  being
confident and not being justified in not being confident (where a person
may be said to be justified whichever he is, confident or not) is that for
which the distinction between interested and disinterested justification is
useful. By a disinterested justification for being confident that p I mean one
that does not involve wanting it to be the case that p. That is, S has a
disinterested justification for being confident that p if and only if there is
true a proposition that entails that Sis justified in being confident that p but
does not entail that S has reason to desire that p. If one can have a
justification  for  being  confident  that  p  that  is  not  a  disinterested
justification, then of such a case it could be appropriate to say that although
one's special interest in p may justify one in being confident that p one is
also, from a disinterested point of view, justified if one is not confident that
p.
And one clearly can have (interested) justification for being confident
that p although one lacks disinterested justification. Consider the following
possible case: S regards R as his only close friend in the world. S is
dismissed from his job by his boss who tells S that R has reported that S
has been lifting cash from the till, although S has actually done no such
thing. Now, ifS has no good reason to think that his boss would want to lie
about this particular matter then S has some reason to suspect that R did tell
the boss a malicious falsehood about him; S now has some reason to doubt,
to lack confidence, that R would never do such a thing. Indeed, we may
suppose that, apart from S's strong desire that R should not have done this
most unfriendly thing, S does not have sufficient reason for being sure that
R has not done it. S does not have a case for confidence that will survive
impartial scrutiny. Yet S's strong desire that R should be his trustworthy
friend, and S's reasons for having that desire (of a sort most of us have for
wanting dependable friends), may justify S, in a perfectly good sense, in
maintaining his confidence that R would not do such a thing. As long as the
case against R is not too overwhelming, who can blame or reproach S for
this faith in R? One would not have to think S unreasonable to think that he
would need much stronger evidence against R for his trust to waver. S's
natural and reasonable dependence on the conviction that R is his friend
makes it quite reasonable for S to maintain his trust in the face of some
contrary evidence.
But it does not make it correct to say, even supposing that S is right in his
belief that R did not do the nefarious deed, that S knows that R did not do it.JUSTIFICATION 29
For we may suppose that another person who was not thus emotionally
related to R and who knew as much about R that is relevant as S does might
well not be justified (in any way) in being confident that R did not do it and
thus certainly not justified in claiming to know that. A person who claims
to know that p purports to give his hearers a special sort of assurance that p,
a sort that he does not purport to give if he asserts merely that he is
confident that p or even that he has reason sufficient for him to be confident
that p. When I say of someone (whether myself or someone else) that that
person knows that p I imply that that person's position is such that were my
hearers (or anyone else) in such a position they too would be justified in
being confident that p, regardless of whether or not they want it to be the
case that p. In this way the assertion that someone knows that p — if the
audience can believe the assertion is justified — can transfer the subject's
warrant for being confident that p to that audience. It can transfer the
subject's knowledge that p, provided that the receiver of the assertion
knows that its maker asserts what he knows. But we can rely on another's
justified confidence only if that person's justification for confidence is
independent of his desires. S's strong desire that p may properly weigh for
S as a reason for believing that p but it cannot serve another person as a
reason for doing that (unless, of course, this other person sympathizes with
S); whereas, for example, S's confidence that he has seen a certain thing
can serve another (to whom this confidence is known) as well as S as a
reason for believing that p. This is why S's special desire that p (and S's
reasons for having that desire) cannot make the difference as to whether or
not S is justified in claiming to know that p, although it can make the
difference  as  to  whether  S  is  justified  or  to  be  reproached  in  being
confident that p. If the disinterested person possessing all the same relevant
evidence would not be justified in claiming to know that p, then neither
would the interested person, despite the fact that the latter's special desire
that p may be reason enough in the circumstances for that person to be
confident that p.
So justification for being confident that p is justification for claiming to
know that p only if it is disinterested.
1 I shall take up the question whether
the converse of this is true as well, after I've said a bit more about the
nature of justification for confidence. Hereafter, in order to make the prose
a little easier on the eye, I shall frequently use 'justification' and its
cognates,  unmodified,  as  short  for  'disinterested  justification'  and  its
cognates; it will be clearly indicated when the more general understanding
of 'justification' is intended.30 CHAPTER III
2.    Incidentally, the features of assertion that S knows that p to which I
have just called attention in order to explain why such assertions entail that
S has a disinterested  justification, are the features that have led some
philosophers to say that 'I know that p' is like 'I promise that p' in being a
performative utterance (roughly equivalent to 'I assure you, cross my heart
and hope to die, that p'). To claim to know that p is, as noted, to give one's
hearers a special sort of strong assurance that p, different from what would
be given by simply asserting that p or that one is sure that p. But this is
completely explained by the fact that to claim to know is to claim to have a
disinterested justification for being confident that p, one that would justify
that confidence whether or not a person has a special interest in its being
the case that p. If one claims to know that p without really recognizing
one's position as one that thus disinterestedly justifies being confident that
p one is liable to special censure. For then, even if one is confident that p
and it happens to be the case that p' one is still being deceitful in implying
that one is disinterestedly justified in one's confidence when one has not
recognized this to be the case. This is to try to lead someone else into
confidence that p through misrepresentation, through implying, contrary to
what one really thinks, that were anyone else in one's position he would
(regardless of whether or not he desires that p) be justified in being
confident  too.  Thus  the  act  of claiming  to  know  is an act of giving
assurance that makes appropriate special censure should it be performed in
the wrong conditions. In this it does resemble the act of promising, which is
an act of giving special assurance that one will do something, making
appropriate  special  censure  should  a  promise  be  given  in  the  wrong
conditions (for example, without fully intending to do the thing or without
being justifiedly confident that one will be able to do it). But from this
similarity between claiming to know and promising it does not follow that
'know' is like 'promise' in being a performative verb, so that to say 'I know
that p' is merely to perform an act of giving assurance. Promising and
claiming to know are linguistic acts. But knowing is not an act (linguistic
or otherwise); it is a condition or state that one comes into or achieves
(perhaps by means of certain acts). 'I know that p' ascribes the same state to
its subject as 'He knows that p', which clearly reports no act, ascribes to its
subject. And, because knowing entails having disinterestedly justified
confidence, the third-person report gives its hearers the same reason for
being assured that p as does the first-person report. But the act-reporting
'He promises that p', if it gives a hearer any reason at all for being sure that
p, does not give him as much reason, or in the same way, as does 'I promise
that p.' 'He promises...' differs from 'I promise...' with respect to purportingJUSTIFICATION 31
to give reason for assurance about as much, and in the same way, as 'He
claims to know...' differs from 'He knows... '
2
3.   Condition (3) resembles condition (2) in that loose uses of 'know' may,
at first glance, seem to show that this condition is not necessary for
knowing that p. Consider, for example, the case of the adulterous wife who
overhears her husband express the suspicion that she is being unfaithful
and hurries to tell her lover that her husband 'knows' of their affair. It must
be admitted that it would be silly in such circumstances for the lover to
object to her remark on the ground that, for all they know, the husband may
not have evidence that disinterestedly justifies him in being sure that they
are having an affair. For their purposes (we may suppose) the husband a~
good as knows it if he so much as suspects it and so it is quite natural for
them to speak loosely of his knowing it. We can see that this is a loose use
of 'know'. and that respect for condition (3) is required when 'know' is
being used strictly, by considering the case of the friend of the husband
who tries to restrain him from rash action by saying, 'You don't know that
she has been unfaithful. All you really know is that that notoriously
untrustworthy gossip down the street says that she has. You ought at least
to have better evidence than that, to know that she is guilty, before you
make up your mind to do something that you may later regret.'
Another sort of case that might be thought to show that being justified in
one's confidence is not necessary to knowing is the case of creatures of
whom we comfortably say that they know things but of whom it seems
absurd to say that they are justified or unjustified in being confident of
them. I may say of my dog, on the basis of her excited behavior as she sees
me taking down her leash, that she knows that I am going to take her for a
walk. But, since she altogether lacks, and is incapable of acquiring, the
concept of being justified or not in believing such a thing and, so, the
concept  of  being  influenced  in  her  belief  by  the  consideration  of
justification, it makes no sense to raise the question whether or not she is
justified in her belief, whether or not she merits reproach for having that
confident  belief.  Owing  to  the  limitations  of  her  "form  of  life"  (in
Wittgenstein's sense) the whole category of appraisal in terms of being
justified or reasonable or not in having a belief is simply inapplicable to her
(as is also the category of moral appraisal as honest or dishonest, selfish or
unselfish, conscientious or not, etc.). But I am inclined to say that my
application of 'know' to my dog is in an extended sense of the term, based32 CHAPTER III
on similarities of my dog's case to those human cases where the term has
primary application. This extended sense just eliminates consideration of
the dimension of justification in which the dog cannot participate, but this
dimension must be considered in the primary application. (The extended
application of 'know' to my dog is, of course, encouraged by a counterpart
in the dog's case to justification in the human case, the similarity between
the  fact  that  my  dog's  belief  results  from  her  having  had  several
experiences of seeing the leash taken down and immediately thereafter
being taken out for a walk and human justifications for claims to know
what is about to occur that involve the subject's remembering that there has
been a certain correlation of phenomena in his experience.) My interest
here is in the primary sense, or application,
3 of 'know' — to human beings
in the context of the human form of life.
Must creatures who do possess the concept of justification, and so can be
appraised in terms of being justified or not in their beliefs, also be ones
able to use language, to express things in symbols? It is far from clear that
there is a logically necessary tie here.
4 It is, however, very hard to see how
a being intelligent enough to have the notion of being justified or not in
one's beliefs, to make judgments on that sort of question, could fail to be
capable of acquiring some sort of language of roughly the same order of
sophistication as ours. So it seems extremely unlikely that there ever have
been or will be creatures possessing the concept of justification but lacking
anything that could be called language.
4.   What features must a person's position have if it justifies him in being
confident that p? Many and various, of course, are the specific sorts of
positions that do this. The features they need to give them this power will
partly depend on the nature of the proposition that p. Some of them I will
detail later for particular classes of propositions. But there are two quite
general points about the nature of positions that justify confidence. I will
discuss the first of these in this section and consider the second in the
section that follows.
The first general point to be made is this: Every one of every set of facts
about S's position that minimally suffices to make S, at a given time,
justified in being confident that p must be directly recognizable to S at that
time. By 'directly recognizable' I mean this: if a certain fact obtains, then it
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that time has the concept of that sort of fact, S needs at that time only to
reflect clear-headedly on the question of whether or not that fact obtains in
order to know that it does. A fact can be part of what justifies S in being
confident that p only if it is a fact that can directly influence S's doxastic
attitude towards that proposition. That is, S's doxastic attitude at any given
time towards any given proposition can be justified or unjustified only on
the basis of what at that time requires only S's effort of attention or
consideration in order to influence his attitude. It is not the fact that there is
smoke rising from the forest that justifies S in being confident that there is
fire in the forest but rather such facts as that S is con-ft dent that he sees
smoke, S has no reason to mistrust his sight on this particular matter at this
particular time, and S seems to remember that he has come to know that
virtually always when there is smoke of the sort he sees there is fire. It is
not the fact that the sum of the angles of a triangle is always 180° that
justifies a person at a particular time in being confident that if two of the
angles of this particular triangle are 90
o and 45
o then the third must be 45
o,
but rather such a fact as that he then confidently remembers having learned
in  some  way  (perhaps  by  having  proved  it,  perhaps  from  a  reliable
authority) that the angles of a triangle always sum to 180
o. The first sort of
fact mentioned in each case cannot possibly influence a person's doxastic
attitude towards a proposition except through the influence of the second
sort, to which the first sort may give rise. (Indeed it is not clear that an
abstract, mathematical fact, such as that the angles of the triangle sum to
180
o, can intelligibly be said to enter into the relation of influencing  a
person's doxastic attitude at all, directly or indirectly.) It is only what can
directly influence a person's doxastic attitudes at a given time, through his
then  simply  attending  to  it,  that  can  be  relevant  to  evaluating  the
reasonableness of his doxastic attitudes for him at that time.
This  requirement  of  direct  recognizability  means  that  every  fact
belonging to a set that minimally suffices for S's having justification for
being confident that p must be such that if it obtains then the only possible
way in which S could fail to know that it obtains would be through either
(a) failure to consider sufficiently carefully the question whether or not it
obtains or (b) failure to possess the concept of that sort of fact. A position
that gives one justification for being confident of a proposition must be
such that, given sufficient intelligence, one could acquire an ability to
recognize that position whenever one is in it.34 CHAPTER III
Thus, for example, the fact that S once came to know that Harrison was
President between Cleveland's terms is not now directly recognizable to S
because S may now fail to know of this fact through failure of memory
and, in that circumstance, no amount of understanding of that sort of fact
and clear-headed reflection on the question of whether it obtains could
bring him to know that it does. Or, for another example, the fact that S now
sees snow falling is one that S could fail to know owing to having good
reason to think that what he sees that looks like snow falling is actually
something else or that he is hallucinating, circumstances that no amount of
clear-headed reflection on his position or understanding of what it is to see
snow falling could remedy.
On the other hand, such facts as that S is now (at least in a way)
confident that the President between Cleveland's terms was Harrison, or
that it now seems to S that he remembers having come to know that
Harrison  was  President  between  Cleveland's  terms  or  that  S's  visual
experience now is as if he were seeing snow falling are facts of a sort
which S must know if he understands them and reflects sufficiently on the
question of whether or not they obtain; they are directly recognizable to S.
Facts directly recognizable to S will, pretty obviously, all be current mental
states or occurrences of which S is the subject. 'It seems to S that he
remembers...' and 'S is confident that...' express dispositional mental states
of S that are directly recognizable to him. It is now true of S that he is
confident that... (or seems to remember...) if and only if, were he now to
consider carefully the question whether he is confident that... (or whether it
seems to him that he remembers...) and try to answer it for himself, his
answer would be 'yes'. (In light of the possibility noted earlier that a
person's knowing and sincere action as if confident that ... could be in a
way misleading as to his actual dispositional state of confidence, 'confident'
[or 'believes'] should be read here and in later chapters as 'at least in a way
confident' ['at least in a way believes']. This reading makes no difference to
the claims I make with respect to the relations among being confident,
having justification for being confident, and knowing, if 'knows' is read
similarly.)
The requirement of direct recognizability on justification for confidence
(or justification for any other degree of belief) — that is, the requirement
that any minimally sufficient condition for S's having justification for being
confident that p be directly recognizable to S — can be seen to hold by the
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Assuming that S has the concept of justification for being confident that
p, S ought always to posses or lack confidence that p according to whether
or not he has such justification. At least he ought always to withhold
confidence unless he has justification. This is simply what is meant by
having or lacking justification. But if this is what S ought to do in any
possible  circumstance,  then  it  is  what  S  can  do  in  any  possible
circumstance. That is, assuming that he has the relevant concepts, S can
always tell whether or not he has justification for being confident that p.
But  this  would  not  be  so  unless  the  difference  between  having  such
justification and not having it were always directly recognizable to S. And
that would not be so if any fact contributing to a set that minimally
constitutes  S's  having  such  justification  were  not  either  directly
recognizable to S or entailed by something directly recognizable to S (so
that its absence would have to make a directly recognizable difference). For
suppose it were otherwise suppose that some part of a condition minimally
sufficient for S's being justified in being confident that p were not entailed
by anything directly recognizable to S. Then S's position could change
from having such justification to lacking it without there being any change
at all in what is directly recognizable to S. But if there is no change in
directly recognizable features of S's position, S cannot tell that his position
has changed in other respects: no matter how clear-headedly and attentively
he considers his position he will detect no change. If it seemed to S before
that he had justification for being confident that p then it must still seem so
to him. So this sort of justification would be such that it would not always
be possible for its subject to tell whether or not he possessed it, which is
contrary to what we noted is an obvious essential feature of justification.
So there can be no such justification. That is, there can be no set of facts
giving S justification for being confident that p that has an essential part
that is neither directly recognizable to S nor entailed by something directly
recognizable to S.
The requirement on justification of direct recognizability does not mean
that  one  who  can  recognize  a  certain  sort  of  position  as  justifying
confidence that p and discriminate it from any other sort of position that
does not do so — who understands that such a position does justify
confidence that p — must be able to describe all the features that go to
make it a justifying position, or even that he must have concepts of them
all. One can learn to recognize a characteristic complex of features without
acquiring  distinct  conceptions  of  all  the  parts  on  which  the  overall36 CHAPTER III
characteristic depends. A child can learn to discriminate and identify
square figures before he realizes that a square has to have four equal sides
forming four equal angles, even before he has a concept of what an angle
is. Similarly we can learn to recognize various sorts of positions that justify
confidence in various sorts of propositions — to discriminate them and
identify them as such, to back our confidence and our claims to know by
appealing to the fact that we are in a position that puts to rest or prevents
reasonable doubt — before we know (if we ever do) how to give any sort
of interesting analysis of such positions.
5.   Can we say anything interesting of a completely general nature as to
what features make a directly recognizable position one that justifies its
subject in being confident of a proposition? Just a little (and this is my
other general point about the nature of such justifying positions).
Insofar as positions directly recognizable to a person can be objectively
ranked as to how strong a belief in a given proposition, p, they justify that
person in having — that is, insofar as we have a concept and practice of
objective justification of degrees of belief — the ultimate authority for this
ranking must be the concurring judgments of reasonable, experienced
people who have the notion of and an interest in the practice of rational,
objective justification of degrees of belief and who give the positions in
question their thoughtful consideration. If we say of two sorts of directly
recognizable positions that one would clearly justify a stronger belief in p
than the other (or, as it may be, that clearly neither would justify a stronger
belief in p than the other) we are right if and only if this would be the
overwhelming judgment of reasonable, experienced people who knew what
they were considering (so that their judgment would not be changed by
their attending better to the nature of the positions in question or their
having more experience or more rational intelligence). Similarly, to say of
a certain sort of position that it clearly justifies confidence that p is to say
that reasonable, experienced people when fully aware of the nature of the
position will overwhelmingly agree in treating it as one in which lacking
confidence that p is practically silly in normal circumstances (for a person
with no particular desire that p be false). That is, aware and reasonable
persons do, or would, share a policy of regarding such a position as
offering no motive to hesitate about p, at any rate not normally, not unless,
for example, far worse consequences than normal seem likely to ensue if
one were to be confident that p and it turned out to be false that p.JUSTIFICATION 37
According  to  such  a  general  criterion  for  positions  that  justify
confidence, I am, for example, justified in being confident that I see my
younger son when my position is (roughly) the following: I am confident
that I remember having seen that son's face many times before and that on
those occasions it looked closely like the face that I am confident that I
now see; I have no beliefs or impressions about this particular occasion that
would, despite my having the visual and memory impressions implied in
the preceding statement, give me reason to doubt that I see my son; I am
confident that I remember having never seen nor heard of anyone else who
looks so closely like my son and that I remember having come to know that
such  close  look-alikes  are  very  rare  in  general.  Thus  described,  this
position does not entail that I see my son, but it justifies me in being
confident that I do. In the ordinary course of life, to lack confidence in a
proposition of that sort when in that kind of position with respect to it — to
follow a policy of hesitating over such propositions and protecting oneself
against the possibility that they may be false even in such circumstances
would seem to virtually anyone to involve an unreasonably great cost in
inconvenience and unpleasantness. For a reasonable person could find no
adequate motive to incur such costs. It would be practically absurd, indeed
practically impossible; scarcely anyone could actually follow such a policy
over a significant period.
This general criterion for positions that justify confidence — the criterion
of the generally agreed judgment in practice of reasonable, experienced
people who know what they are judging — is unquestionably a vague one.
There are several ways in which cases can fail to fall clearly on one side or
the other of the line it draws. Take the notion of general agreement. What
proportion agreeing is enough to make agreement general? Who will count
as reasonable, experienced persons? And some cases will be controversial
or else generally agreed to be unclear (that is, not clearly ones where
confidence is justified and not clearly ones where it is not justified). But we
should  not  expect  the  concept  of  justification  of  confidence  in  a
proposition, or the concept of knowing a truth, to be any less vague.
To reject this criterion in favor of some stricter or looser one is to make a
recommendation that has no chance of being followed by reasonable,
experienced people and one they could be given no motive to follow. For it
would be a recommendation that they ought to respond to certain kinds of
positions (those included by a looser criterion or excluded by a stricter one
that are not included or excluded, respectively, by the criterion of general38 CHAPTER III
agreement among reasonable, experienced people) in a way different from
that which in fact they are, or would be, led to respond to them by the
fullest influence of their reason, experience, and attention to the nature of
the positions. Such a recommendation cannot be taken seriously.
6.    The  following  claim  is  suggested  by  my  general  definition  of
propositional  knowledge:  if  one  is  (disinterestedly)  justified  in  being
confident that p then one is justified in claiming to know that p (provided
that one is confident that p: one ought not to claim to know that p, even if
one has justification for being confident that p, if one is not actually
confident that p); everything that we should regard as reason for saying that
a person who is confident that p should not have claimed (or thought) that
he knew that p is also something we should regard as reason for saying that
he was not, from a disinterested point of view, justified in being confident.
How can this claim be made out?
Well, the only arguments there seem to be to show the possibility of a
case in which a person is disinterestedly justified in being confident that p
but is not justified in claiming to know that p appear to be seriously flawed.
Many of them are arguments for thinking that the (directly recognizable)
facts that justify a person's claim to know that p must also be such as to
entail  that  p. From  this  it  would  follow  that  a  person  could  have
justification for being confident that p that was not also justification for
claiming to know that p, since a justification for being confident that p need
not entail that p, given the considered practice of reasonable people as the
primary criterion of such justification.
One way in which one might be led to think that a justification for
claiming  to  know  that  p must entail that p would  be  simply  through
overlooking  the  distinction  between  knowing  and  being  justified  in
claiming to know, between what is claimed and what justifies the claim.
One might fail to see that it is logically possible for someone to be justified
in claiming to know what he does not in fact know (because, for example,
it is false). If one fails to distinguish knowledge from justification for
knowledge claims, then one is in the position of having to say that most of
the  kinds  of  propositions  that  we  ordinarily  talk  of  knowing  —  for
example, propositions entailing the existence of external objects or events
in the past — are ones that no one could ever conceivably know.
5 Since no
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possibly entail such propositions and his having a justification at a given
time for claiming or believing that he knows must, like justifications for
doxastic attitudes generally, consist in facts that are directly recognizable to
him at that time, one who insists that one is justified in claiming to know
just  when  one  knows  is  forced  to  severe  limitations  on  the  class  of
propositions that can be known.
But why embrace such an awkward consequence if we can account for
the actual use of 'know' by supposing that being justified in claiming to
know that p entails neither p nor knowing that p? We frequently do affirm
that a person knows a certain proposition to be true without hesitating at all
over the fact that no facts directly recognizable to him could entail that the
proposition is true, and we do so without any sense of looseness or irony in
our use of 'know'. I know, for example, that I am older than my wife
(whereas I merely believe that R. N. is older than his wife). Since I must be
entitled to think that I know this if I do know it and since only directly
recognizable features of my position can contribute to my being so entitled,
if such an ascription of knowledge is even possibly true, then my being
entitled to think that I know does not entail that I know. That p and that S is
justified in claiming to know that p are quite independent entailments of' ‘S
knows that p.'
One still might be tempted to think otherwise by the following sort of
reasoning: Since my knowing that p entails that p, how can I consistently
claim to know that p and at the same time allow that everything that
justifies me in that claim leaves it still possible that p is false? The apparent
force of this derives in large part from equivocation on 'possible.'
6  If one
uses, for example, 'It is possible that he will not come' (as such a sentence
often is used) to mean that it is not out of the question that he will not
come, not certain that he will come, his not coming is a possibility that one
ought to be prepared for, his not coming is compatible with all that one
knows (it is epistemically  possible, as it is often put by philosophers
nowadays), then of course one simply contradicts oneself if one adds 'but I
know that he will come'.
The sentence 'I know that p, but it is possible that not-p' has other
interpretations, however. It could mean the same as 'I know that p. but the
proposition that not-p is logically possible (that is, the proposition that p is
not logically necessary).' It is quite clear that sentences of this form can
express logically possible states of affairs; consider, for example, 'I know40 CHAPTER III
that I am now conscious, though it is logically possible that I should
(instead) have been unconscious now.' Or it could mean the same as 'I
know that p, but the proposition that not-p is logically compatible with
every fact that now justifies me in thinking that I know that p'. This does
not seem absurd on its face, and in fact it expresses a common state of
affairs.
But  it  is,  perhaps,  less  clearly  non-absurd  than  the  preceding
interpretation. Against its possibility the following might be claimed: if all
the facts available to justify any of my beliefs — which, we have seen, are
just those facts that are directly recognizable to me — are such that they are
logically compatible with not-p as well as with p, then p and not-p are
equally open possibilities as far as those facts go, and so, those facts cannot
justify me in believing one to be true rather than the other or, therefore, in
claiming to know one to be true rather than the other. Two things should be
observed about this claim. (1) Since it entails that justification for any
belief must entail what is believed it would, even if true, open no gap
between  justification  for  confidence  and  justification  for  thinking  or
claiming one knows. (2) It would be irrational, in a certain way at least, to
try to satisfy the principle laid down by the claim, since to do so would
require holding back at all times from believing anything beyond what is
then directly recognizable to one or is entailed by what is then directly
recognizable  to  one  and  that  policy  is  one  that  fully  rational,  alert,
experienced people have no adequate motive to follow, indeed, could not
bring themselves to follow in practice. (I will return to this second point in
the final section of the book.)
Another seemingly plausible argument leading to the conclusion that
what justifies one in claiming to know that p must entail that p (and, hence,
that  one  can  know  only  what  is  entailed  by  what  one  can  directly
recognize) derives from the consideration that one who knows that p and
who understands what it is to know that p needs only to reflect attentively
and clear-headedly on his (directly recognizable) position in order to know
that he knows that p. If I know that p and, hence, my directly recognizable
position justifies me in claiming to know that p, then I need only to see this
about my position in order to know that I know that p3 This observation is
quite correct if properly understood, but it can easily be misunderstood and
taken to imply that I can know only what is entailed by what I can directly
recognize. For it may seem to say that whenever 1 know that p I can
directly recognize that I know that p. simply through directly recognizingJUSTIFICATION 41
that I am justified in claiming to know that p; that is, the fact that I know
something is a fact that I can directly recognize in all its components
whenever it occurs. But actually that observation, when interpreted so as to
be true, implies nothing of the sort. This becomes clear if it is paraphrased
as follows:
If I know that p, then I can, merely by
attentive  and  clearheaded  reflection  (provided
that I understand the proposition that I know that
p),  directly  recognize  that  I  am  justified  in
claiming to know that p and, hence, that if I claim
to know that p and this claim is true then this
claim expresses something that I know.
8
7.    Further arguments for a gap between disinterested justification for
confidence and justification for claiming to know arise from the thought
that it might be possible to be justified in being confident of each of an
inconsistent set of propositions. It might be said that, in contrast, it should
not be possible to be justified in claiming to know an inconsistent set of
propositions, since what one knows must be true and an inconsistent set of
propositions cannot all be true. But this again fails to distinguish knowing
from being justified in claiming to know. The set of all propositions that a
person knows, or truly claims to know, must indeed be consistent; but from
this it does not follow that all the propositions that he justifiedly claims to
know must be consistent, since being justified in claiming to know does not
entail knowing. So something else must be adduced in support of the
contention that one cannot be justified in claiming to know an inconsistent
set of propositions.
I can think of nothing that would not also be an equally good reason for
saying that one cannot be justified in being confident of an inconsistent set
of propositions. We must distinguish, of course, between being justified in
claiming to know (or being justified in being confident of) each of an
inconsistent set of propositions and being justified in claiming to know the
conjunction of an inconsistent set of propositions. What is true of the one
may not be true of the other.
Could  one  ever  be  justified  in  claiming  to  know  an  inconsistent
proposition? I don't see why not, if one could be justified in being confident42 CHAPTER III
of one. If a person arrived at confidence in an inconsistent or necessarily
false proposition (one that was not obviously so) in such a way that we
would not want to say that he ought not at the time to have been confident
of it, we do not want to reproach him for having been confident in the
circumstances then directly recognizable to him — for example, he has
made an unnoticed slip in the course of calculation — then I don't see how
we could say that he ought not to think that he knows the proposition, how
we could reproach him for thinking that he knows it. Of course, if he
recognizes the inconsistency or necessary falsehood of a proposition then
he cannot possibly at the same time be justified either in being confident of
it or in thinking that he knows it.
What about being justified in being confident of each consistent member
of an inconsistent set of propositions while at the same time knowing that
the set is inconsistent? This is not an obvious impossibility.
9 Consider the
case of a large lottery.'
0 Suppose one is justifiedly confident that there are a
million tickets in the lottery and that out of them just one will be selected
by a completely random procedure guaranteeing that each ticket has an
equal chance of being drawn, that is, one in a million. Given this, it might
be suggested, one has no reason not to be confident with respect to any
single ticket that might be designated that it will not be the one drawn
(since the chances are 999,999 to 1 against it). Yet at the same time one is
hardly likely to fail to see that the million different propositions, each of
which one feels justified in being confident of, plus the proposition that one
of the million tickets will be drawn, which one is also justified in being
confident of, form an inconsistent set.
However, I believe that there is a reason why the fact cited — that one is
confident with justification that there are a million tickets in the lottery and
that out of them just one will be selected by a random procedure that gives
every ticket an equal chance — does not give one justification by inference
for claiming to know that, say, ticket number 10 will not be the one drawn.
This reason is connected with the notion of external conclusiveness —
condition (4) of the general definition of knowing — and can be adequately
explained only after that notion has been explained in the next chapter. (In
outline, the point will be that the fact cited does not give justification by
inference for claiming to know that ticket 10 will not win because it does
give justification by inference for believing a proposition that entails that it
itself is not externally conclusive justification for being confident that
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fact cited does not give one justification for being completely confident
that ticket 10 will not be drawn. And intuitively it seems right that it should
not. Intuitively it does seem that if a person is confident with justification
that the lottery drawing will be fair then (no matter how many tickets he
knows are in the lottery) he ought not to be completely confident that a
particular ticket will not be the winner: his justified conviction that there
are  n tickets and that the lottery will be fair does not justify him (by
inference from it alone) in being sure, for example, that his buying ticket
10  out  of  no  other motive than the hope  of  winning  would  be  quite
irrational  or  stupid  (though  this  might  be  justified  by  the  different
conviction that the cost of the ticket to him is too high for the chance that it
will win); it does not justify him in confidently regarding ownership of the
ticket as of absolutely no value at all, of no more value than not owning
any ticket; it does not justify him in taking no interest whatsoever in the
announcement of the winning ticket on the ground that only the winning of
ticket 10 would interest him. It does not, in short, justify him in taking
quite the same rejecting attitude towards the possibility that ticket 10 is the
winner as he would be justified in taking by such facts as would justify him
in being confident that he has seen some other ticket drawn or has seen
ticket 10 removed from the lottery before the drawing.
Or consider the question whether among all the propositions that you
now justifiedly think that you know to be true there is not at least one that
will turn out to be false. Does not what you know of your own experience
and that of other men justly convince you that there must be? In this case, I
do not think the sort of argument I suggested for the lottery example
applies. There is no apparent reason why the subject may not be justified in
claiming to know or in being confident of each of the members of the
inconsistent set of propositions in question, namely; the set containing (a)
all those propositions he currently has justification for claiming to know
and (b) the proposition that at least one of those propositions specified in
(a) other than the one hereby being expressed is false.
1' So I am inclined to
think that this is a specification of an inconsistent set of propositions such
that a person can have disinterested justification for being confident of and
claiming to know each member of the set while also knowing that the set is
inconsistent.
Thus a limited examination of particular examples of inconsistent sets of
propositions, concerning which it might seem prima facie plausible to think
that a person could have justification for being confident of or for claiming44 CHAPTER III
to know each member of the set (while knowing the set to be inconsistent),
gives one reason to think that in all such examples justification for claiming
to know and justification for being confident will stand or fall together: as
the one turns out to be possible or not in the particular case so will the
other.
I can see no line of thought other than those I have considered that holds
out promise of opening a gap between being justified in being confident
that p and being justified in claiming to know that p (if confident that p).
Since we saw earlier that the latter entails the former, I conclude that these
two descriptions are equivalent.
8.   Now for some classifications of positions that (disinterestedly) justify
confidence that p.
There are conjunctions such that S can have a justification for being
confident of the conjunction that is a compound of parts each of which is a
justification for being confident of just one of the conjuncts. To put it
another way, many conjunctions of logically independent propositions (for
example, 'The switch is on but the light is not') are such that if S has a
justification  for  each  conjunct  then  he  has,  in  that  compound  of
justifications, a justification for the conjunction. S can have a similarly
compound justification for being confident of a proposition that is not itself
such a conjunction but is equivalent to one, provided that the equivalence is
so obvious that one who understands both propositions must see it (as it is,
for example, between 'S's hand is a straight flush' and 'The cards in S's hand
are all of the same suit, and the cards in S's hand form a consecutive
sequence', and as it is not, for example, between 'The number of people in
the organization is equal to 4
3 minus 2
3' and 'The number of people in the
organization is greater than the product of the smallest prime greater than 3
and the smallest prime greater than 7; and it is less than 3 times the greatest
prime smaller than 20').
It cannot simply be assumed, however, that for any two propositions, p
and q, if S has at the same time a justification for claiming to know that p
and  a  justification  for  claiming  to  know  that  q  then  he  has  in  their
compound a justification for claiming to know that (p & q). There may well
be pairs of propositions and justifications for them for which this does not
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probability calculus, according to which the probability that both of two
events, a and b, will occur (relative to some body of evidence) equals the
probability  that  a will  occur  times  the  probability  that  b will occur,
provided that there is no reason to think that whether or not the one occurs
has any influence on whether or not the other does. In this case, if the
probability of a's occurence is less than 1 and so is the probability of b's
occurrence then the probability of the occurrence of both a and b will be
less than the probability of a's occurrence and also less than the probability
of b's occurrence. If there were a situation in which S knew evidence
relative to which such probabilities for such independent propositions were
assignable,  so  that  the  product  theorem  applied,  and  in  which  these
probabilities could correctly be regarded as measures of the degrees of
belief in those propositions that S was justified in having by inference from
that evidence, then it might be that the degree for p and the degree for q
were each just enough for confidence but the lesser degree for (p & q) was
not. For example, suppose that S knows that a certain test for detecting in
people the incipient stages of a certain disease has proved correct in 99% of
the thousands of cases to which it has been applied, and also that the test
has given a negative result for 100 new cases to which it has just been
applied. It is not very implausible to suggest that S might on this basis be
justified in being confident and claiming to know, with respect, say, to any
15 of these 100 cases that might be singled out at random, that none of
those 15 has the disease, but not justified in being quite confident or
claiming to know this with respect to any 30 of them that might be
selected. Or consider that it does seem plausible to suggest that a typical
adult's (remembered) experience may give him good reason to believe that
at least one among all the propositions that he now has justification for
claiming to know is false. If he does, then the set of propositions that he
has justification for claiming to know might contain two disjoint subsets
such that each is a small enough portion of the whole set so that his well-
founded belief that the whole set contains at least one false member would
not be sufficient reason for him to lack confidence that all the members of
that subset are true, but the union of the two subsets is a large enough
portion of the whole that this belief is sufficient reason to be at least
somewhat less than confident that all the members of the union are true.
Although these observations hardly constitute a conclusive argument for
the contrary, I think it wise to refrain from affirming that a justification for
claiming to know that p and a justification for claiming to know that q
together will always yield a justification for claiming to know that (p & q).46 CHAPTER III
9.    Non-compound  justifications  (to  which  I  will  confine  attention
hereafter, except where otherwise noted) divide into the inferential and the
non-inferential. A non-compound (and minimally sufficient) justification
that S has for being confident that p is inferential just in case it entails that
there is another proposition q such that (i) S has justification for being
confident that p can be inferred with confidence from q and (ii) S has
justification for being confident that q. Otherwise it is non-inferential.
It  is  fairly  obvious  that  condition  (ii)  is  essential  for  inferential
justification. The fact (i), that S has justification for being confident that p
can be properly inferred with confidence from q, obviously cannot by itself
suffice to give S justification for being confident that p. Nor can that fact
plus the mere fact that S is confident that q. One's confidence in a given
proposition can by inference from it justify one's confidence in another
proposition only if one's confidence in the premiss is justified; and having
justification for confidence in the premiss can give one justification for
confidence in the conclusion even if one unreasonably lacks confidence in
the premiss.
It is true that if I am confident that q and also confident that if q then p,
then I am unreasonable if in addition I lack confidence that p. But what is
unreasonable in virtue of the nature of the three propositions involved here,
and hence not justifiedly held, is the trio of doxastic attitudes and not
necessarily  any  single  one  of  them.  The  logical  relations  among  the
propositions that are their objects entail that this set of doxastic attitudes is
unreasonable, hence unjustified to hold all at once, without implying
anything about which particular members of the set are unjustified in a
particular case. It could be that, given all the facts directly recognizable to
me, my lack of confidence that p is justified but my confidence that q is
not; or it could be the other way around.
It is true also that in a case where S satisfies our definition of inferential
justification, is confident of the conclusion p, but lacks confidence in the
premiss, q, and has no other justification for being confident that p there is
a sort of relative, second-order unreasonableness: although S is entitled to
be confident that q, given (ii), since he is not confident of it and has no
other justification for being confident that p' there is something odd and out
of joint about his being confident that p. Still we can say flatly that, were S
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that are directly recognizable to him, he would be confident of both q and
p. It would be misleading to say that this entails the simple proposition that
S is entitled to be confident that p, if this were taken to mean that (given
the facts directly recognizable to S) S's being confident that p would be
irreproachable no matter what his other doxastic attitudes might be. But I
recommend our taking it to mean instead that p is among those propositions
that are such that S would be justified if he were confident of all of them,
given the facts directly recognizable to S.
One  may  wonder  why,  given  (ii),  we  must  have  (i)  (S's  having
justification  for  being  confident  that p can properly be inferred with
confidence  from  q)  in  order  to  get  inferential  justification  for  being
confident that p. Why not instead simply the fact that p can be properly
inferred with confidence from q?   Well, the proposition that I owe the
grocer  $6.85  can  be  properly  inferred  with  confidence,  because  it  is
deducible, from the proposition that I owe the grocer $1.49 for one item, $
2.75 for another, and 87¢ apiece for three others; but if I am confident
without justification that the one is deducible from the other (perhaps I
have unjustified faith in the hasty computations of my seven-year-old
child),  then,  though  I  may  be  confident  of  the  first  proposition  with
justification, I am not justified in being confident of the second.
Or consider the case of the detective who has collected a number of
pieces of evidence about the murder but as yet has failed to survey them, to
fit them together, in the right sort of way to see that altogether they point
very strongly to the conclusion that Professor X is indeed the murderer: he
doesn't yet see that this conclusion can be (nondeductively) inferred with
confidence from their conjunction. Clearly the detective is not yet justified
in being confident of that conclusion merely by his justified confidence in
the conjunction of his evidence and the fact (unknown to him) that the
conclusion is properly inferrable from that conjunction. Nor would it
suffice to make him justified in being confident of Professor X's guilt if it
were added that he is confident of the inferential connection but is so
without justification (for example, although he doesn't see it himself he has
been told that his evidence clearly points to Professor X by a comparative
stranger with a French accent who resembles Hercule Poirot and this,
unreasonably, makes him sure that the stranger must be right).
The fact that p can be properly inferred with confidence from q is not
only not sufficient, when accompanied by S's confidence with justification48 CHAPTER III
that q, it is also not necessary to give S inferential justification for being
confident that p. If, for example, S is confident that p is deducible from q
and is so with justification — based, for example, on his having been told
this by an authority whom he is justified in trusting — then, whether or not
p is in fact deducible from q, S has inferential justification for being
confident and claiming to know that p, provided that he has justification for
confidence in q. But he won't thereby know that p, even if p is true, if it is
not a fact that p is deducible from q; for then his justification will not be
externally conclusive, as will be seen.
Note that my characterization of inferential justification does not entail
that S has justification for being confident that p when S has justification
for  confidence  that  q1,  justification  for  confidence  that  q2,...,  and
justification for confidence that qn, and also justification for confidence that
p can properly be inferred with confidence from 'q1 &... & qn'. This is as it
should be in view of the possibility of cases where S's having justification
for confidence that 'q1  &  ...  &  qn'  is  true  does  not  follow  from  the
conjunction  'S  has  justification  for  confidence  that  q1  &...  &  S  has
justification for confidence that q~', such as the sorts of cases mentioned in
Section 8.
In order to have an inferential justification for being confident that p it is
not necessary to have gone through a corresponding process of inference,
any more than it is necessary for being confident of a proposition that one
have  formulated  it  for  oneself.  My  inferential  justification  for  being
confident that I now see my younger son before me may lie in my having
justified confidence that I have seen my younger son close up many times
before, that on those occasions he looked closely like the person I now see
close at hand, that I have never seen nor heard of anyone else who looks so
closely like this son, etc., without my ever having put to myself those
propositions and thought 'therefore, this is, for sure, my younger son that I
now see'; because I would appeal to my justified confidence in those
propositions if I were to try to justify my confidence that I now see my
younger son: that is what I have to offer should the question of my
justification for that confident belief arise.
The study of the sorts of relations between two propositions that make it
the case that one can be properly inferred with confidence from the other is
a main concern of logic, deductive and non-deductive. Deducibility is, ofJUSTIFICATION 49
course,  one  of  these  relations,  extensively  studied  and  fairly  well
understood, but it is only one among others.
The non-deductive inferential relations almost certainly include a number
of significantly different sorts, some different from the paradigms of what
is properly called induction. Consider the sort of inference that takes a
person from justified confidence in the proposition that he sees and hears
something that looks, sounds, and behaves as would a human being having
sense-experiences, beliefs, intentions, etc., to justified confidence in the
conclusion that he sees and hears something that is a human being having
sense-experiences, beliefs, intentions, etc.; or the inference that takes one
from justified confidence that in the vicinity of a certain metal bar iron
filings behave as they would if the bar were magnetized (and that many
other such consequences of the theory of magnetism have been borne out)
to justified confidence that the bar is magnetized; or the inference that takes
a person from justified confidence that someone has asserted that p in a
confident and sincere manner to justified confidence that p. Clearly none of
these inferences is deductive, and none seems to fit the inductive pattern of
inference from a correlation in observed instances to a like correlation in
unobserved ones. (The last example could be forced into the inductive
mold  by  the  addition  of  the  premiss  that  in  the  subject's  extensive
experience of such testimony it has generally turned out to be truthful; but
the question whether it could possibly have turned out otherwise raises a
doubt as to whether this is genuine induction.) But what precisely is
involved in such inferences and how (if at all) they do differ from induction
proper are matters of much difficulty and controversy. Even working out
the nature of clearly inductive inferences, and the properties of them that
determine the degree of confidence they properly transfer from premiss to
conclusion, is an enormous problem.
I will not try to sort out, characterize, and analyze the various sorts of
inferential relations. I will only try to state what must be true of any
relation between two propositions if that relation is to make it the case that
one can be properly inferred with confidence from the other, that is, that a
person's justified confidence in one can, in virtue of his justified confidence
in this relation, be justifiedly transferred to the other. One might be tempted
to say simply this:
A relation between two propositions, p and q, is such
as to make it the case that p can be properly inferred50 CHAPTER III
with confidence from q if and only if one who has
justification  for  confidence  both  that  this  relation
obtains and that q, thereby has justification for being
confident that p.
But this will not do, because, although p's being deducible from q nicely
satisfies the definiens here, not all the non-deductive inferential relations
that justifiedly transfer confidence will satisfy it. It is a well-known fact
about non-deductive inference that there can be three propositions, p, q,
and r, such that p can be non-deductively inferred with confidence from q
but not from the conjunction of q and r. (For example, let p be 'Cornell lost
its  game  to  Columbia  last  night,'  q  be  'Today's  newspaper  under  the
heading "Last Night's Scores~~ carries the line "Columbia 89 Cornell 56'',
and r be 'The coach of Cornell's team has just told me that the newspaper
made an error and the scores were actually the other way round'.) In such a
case, one who was confident with justification that q and that p can be non-
deductively inferred with confidence from q would not thereby be justified
in being confident that p if he also happened to believe justifiedly that r, or
to have justification for believing that r (whether or not he did believe it).
We  may,  however,  obtain  a  characterization  that  captures  all  the
nondeductive inferential relations we want, as well as deducibility, if we
complicate the one given above in the following way:
A relation R between two propositions, p and q, is
such  as  to  make  it  the  case  that  p can be properly
inferred with confidence from q if and only if one who
has justification for confidence both that R(p, q) and
that  q,  needs  to  have no justification for any other
particular sorts of beliefs, though he may need to lack
justification for certain sorts of beliefs, in order thereby
to have justification for being confident that p.
The points of the last few paragraphs can be incorporated in the following
fuller definition of inferential justification:
S has inferential justification for being confident that
p if and only if there is some other proposition q such
that S has justification for confidence that q and either
(a) S has justification for confidence that p is deducible from q, orJUSTIFICATION 51
(b) (i) S  has  justification  for  confidence  that  p  can  be  non-
deductively inferred with confidence from q and
     (ii)there is no set of one or more propositions {r1,..., r~} such
that S has justification for believing that r1, that r2,..., and
that r~, and p cannot  be  non-deductively  inferred  with
confidence from the conjunction of q, r1,..., and rn.
Note that the definiens here could be true although it were false that q or
false that p is deducible or non-deductively inferrable with confidence from
q. Clearly, in such a circumstance such an inferential justification for being
confident and claiming to know that p would not make it the case that S
knows that p, even if it happened to be true that p. This is because such a
justification is not externally conclusive.
We shall see later that non-deductive inferential justification is not the
only sort of justification that requires a condition like (b) (ii), the absence
in  the  subject  of  any  countervailing  justifications.  So  also  do  all
noninferential justifications that are fallible (a term to be explained in the
next section).
Inferential justifications can, of course, be linked together in chains:  S is
justified in being confident that p1 by inference from p2' is justified in being
confident that p2 by inference from p3, and so on. It is a cardinal point
about any such regress of inferential justifications, however, that it cannot
come round in a circle and cannot have more than a finite number of
different links: it cannot, in short, have no beginning. It would be absurd to
say, for instance, 'I know that p1 because I know that it follows from p2,
which I know because I know that it follows from p3, which I know
because I know that it follows from p4, and so on without end: I know
every one of a beginningless sequence of propositions just by knowing that
it follows from the preceding one in the sequence which I know in the same
way.' This is absurd whether or not the beginningless sequence is circular,
and for essentially the same reason (which has nothing to do with the
finitude  of  human  cognitive  capacity).  A  beginningless  sequence  of
inferential justifications is impossible because it gives no source or origin
for the justification. Inference can only transfer justification of belief from
one proposition to another; it cannot create justification. So a beginningless
chain of inferential justifications (circular or not) would contain nothing to
create justification for anything in the chain. The impossibility here is52 CHAPTER III
analogous to the impossibility of a beginningless regress of desires for
things only as means to other things — desiring x1 because it is a means to
x2, which one desires because it is a means to x3, and so on — which would
never come to anything that explains why anything in the chain of means is
desired.
12   Similarly, a beginningless regress of inferential justifications
would never come to an explanation of why any belief in the chain is
justified.
Hence, if a person has inferential justification for being confident that p
then he must also have non-inferential justification for being confident of
some other proposition. There can be no inferential justifications unless
there are non-inferential ones. Every justification is either non-inferential
or part of an inferential chain that goes back to non-inferential justification.
It is compatible with this that actual processes of inquiry and inference
probably seldom appeal to non-inferential justifications but usually begin
well up in the inferential structure of the inquirer's justifications.
10.   Let me now explain my other major division among justifications:
between the fallible and the infallible. A kind of justification for being
confident that p is fallible just in case it is possible to have the same kind of
justification for being confident of a proposition that is false. Otherwise, it
is infallible.
If a person is confident that p with an infallible justification then it
follows that he knows that p. For an infallible justification for being
confident that p cannot obtain unless it is true that p, and if it is infallible it
must also be externally conclusive, as will be clear when we come to
explain that condition. Whereas if a person is confident that p with a
fallible justification, though it follows that he is justified in claiming to
know that p, it does not follow that he does know it; since it could still be
false that p or, even if it is true that p, the fallible justification could fail to
be externally conclusive.
It is possible to have an infallible justification only for certain special
sorts of propositions. These all fall into (but do not exhaust) one or the
other of two classes: (a) a priori truths'
3 and (b) contingent propositions
about the intrinsic nature of the subject's current conscious state. In each of
these classes there are propositions for which it is possible to have an
infallible  justification  that  is  non-inferential,  and  also  an  infallibleJUSTIFICATION 53
justification that is inferential. The inference involved in any inferential
justification that is infallible must, of course, be deduction, since it is the
defining mark of non-deductive inference that it is logically possible for it
to lead from a true premiss to a false conclusion. In each of classes (a) and
(b) there are also propositions for which ordinary mortals, at any rate, can
have only fallible justifications.
An a priori truth is one for which one can have an infallible and non-
inferential justification just in case it is so simple and obvious that no one
could be said to understand it who does not see and fully accept that it is
true (with a remotely possible exception to be noted below), the sort of
truth of which one can say 'I can see just by grasping the content of this
proposition — getting clearly before my mind what it is — that it is true:
understanding it and seeing its truth cannot be separated.' It seems clear
that there are such self-evident truths. If a child, say, is seriously inclined to
deny or doubt the proposition he takes to be expressed by 'A triangle has
three sides' or 'A sister is a female' or 'If your birth happened the day before
mine then mine happened the day after yours' or 'Every integer has a
successor,' then that is an absolutely sure sign that he does not understand
that sentence to express the proposition that it would be standardly used to
express. (Perhaps he takes it to express a different proposition; perhaps he
has no clear understanding of it at all.)
To the dictum that to understand truths like these is to be confident of
them it is no objection that it is (apparently) possible to profess sincerely
that one is not certain of anything. Such professions are usually based on an
unsound argument to the effect that certainty can never be justified (for
example,  the  argument  in  Descartes'  First  Meditation).  But  sincere
profession  to  doubt  is  not  the  same  thing  as  genuine  doubt.  The
philosophical skeptic who, without intending to deceive, says that he is
certain of nothing nevertheless manifests an attitude of confidence that 2+2
= 4 when he is checking the addition on the grocery bill, or figuring out
what he has left in his checking account, or measuring for his carpentry, or
in any practical context where something more than what he says hangs on
his attitude. Then he does not hesitate or refuse to proceed because he fears
that 2 + 2 may not, after all, be 4. Anyone whose behavior convinced us
that he really was reluctant to proceed as if 2 + 2 = 4 would rightly be
regarded as one who needs to have that proposition, the fundamentals about
numbers and addition, explained to him. (One could no doubt imagine such
cases where therapy might need to involve more than arithmetic lessons.)54 CHAPTER III
It may be wondered, however, whether a person would not have reason to
lack confidence in an a priori truth that he well understands and that is
among the simplest and most obvious, if he thinks that he (or someone
else) has deduced a contradiction from it and other equally obvious a priori
premisses by apparently self-evident steps. Of course, it is not logically
possible that there should be a valid deduction of a contradiction from such
self-evident a priori truths if they are true; and we all (infallibly) know that
they are true and, hence, that no such deduction is possible. But suppose
that someone believed that he or someone else had constructed just such a
deduction, would not that belief provide an explanation for his lacking
confidence in a self-evident a priori truth, an explanation compatible with
his understanding it? Perhaps so. Yet it seems to me that if we were
confronted with a person who in every pertinent situation really acts,
without intent to deceive, as if he were not sure of the simplest truths of
arithmetic then, no matter what reason he gives for acting this way, it
would always be at least an equally plausible explanation that he no longer
really understands those truths. If he is not disposed to act confidently in
the ways that assume them, then it is hard to see what else could show that
he is nevertheless still sure what those propositions are. Certain simple
obvious, a priori truths seem to be such that in order for it to be beyond any
reasonable doubt that S understands them S must be confident of them in
practice. At any rate it is clear that S cannot understand such a proposition
without at least having fully accepted it at some time. If S has never been
disposed to act confidently in the ways that assume it, then there has never
been any ground for saying that he understands it. So, more cautiously, we
can say this: there are simple, obvious a priori truths such that any one who
fully understands one of them must be confident of it, unless, as may be
possible, he was at one time confident of it but now believes that it and
other apparently equally obvious propositions constitute a deduction of a
contradiction.
If it is in the nature of a self-evident necessary truth that one who
understands  it  (and,  perhaps  we  should  add,  does  not  believe  that  a
contradiction  can  be  deduced  from  it  and  other  equally  self-evident
propositions) must be confident of it, then confidence in it on the part of
one who understands it (and satisfies the other condition) can never be
unjustified, can never be confidence that he ought not to have. To say a
person ought not to be confident of such a proposition, ought despite his
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confidence in it, is to say that he ought to be doing what is, in the nature of
the proposition, impossible, which is absurd. This means that, with respect
to an a priori necessary truth of this extremely simple and obvious sort,
merely  to  understand  it  (and,  perhaps,  to  satisfy  the  other  condition
mentioned) is to be non-inferentially justified in being confident of it. And
we must regard this sort of justification for being confident of a proposition
as an infallible sort because we cannot allow it to be possible to have just
this sort of justification for being confident of a false proposition: only with
respect to propositions we take to be self-evident a priori truths can we
allow that merely understanding them (and, perhaps, not believing that a
contradiction is deducible from them) is sufficient to give justification for
being confident of them. My certainty that it is impossible to have such a
justification for being confident of a false proposition is, really, just the
same as my confidence that it is impossible for those propositions, with
respect to which I am confident that we have such justification, to be false.
What of those a priori truths that it is possible to understand fully without
yet seeing that they are true? Must a justification for claiming to know any
such truth be fallible? No. Such a justification must always be inferential
—  either  one  by  deduction  from  self-evident  truths  or  one  by  non-
deductive  inference  from  the  testimony  of  a  reliable  authority  (or
calculating machine). But a deductive justification for being confident of an
a priori truth will be infallible if it consists in the subject's having before
his mind all at once — actually seeing clearly all its parts at the same time
— a thoroughly self-evident proof of the truth in question; that is, a proof
that proceeds entirely from self-evident premisses by steps each of which is
validated by a self-evident conditional But when he has such a deductive
justification, the subject, in understanding all the parts of the proof, having
the premisses and the conditionals representing the steps therefrom clearly
before his mind, ipso facto sees all at once the truth of the premisses, the
conditional steps, and (by a certain 'movement of the mind', as Descartes
puts it) the conclusion: his doing the latter cannot be separated from his
doing the former. So we can no more allow that a person might have such a
deductive justification for confidence in a proposition that is false than we
can allow that a person should have the justification of mere understanding
for confidence in a false proposition. To postulate the possibility that a
subject sees all at once such a proof for a proposition that is false would be
to postulate the possibility that some proposition that is part of the proof
could be self-evident to him, necessarily seen to be true in the mere
understanding of it, and yet false.56 CHAPTER III
A deductive justification for confidence in an a priori proposition will
clearly be fallible, however, if it essentially involves confidence that has
only justification that is itself fallible: for instance, confidence in the
testimony of others as to the truth of some of the premisses or some of the
conditionals that validate the deductive steps, or confidence in either of
these things that depends on the subject's memory that he has previously
proved them. Memory is fallible. A person could be the victim of an
erroneous memory-impression that he has constructed a thoroughly self-
evident  proof  of  a  certain  proposition  (he  may  actually  have  proved
something else and be misremembering the conclusion or he may be
deluded in seeming to remember having done anything of the sort at all)
and thereby be (fallibly) justified in being confident that he has proved it,
and what he now sees to be a consequence of it, when in fact both are false.
But even supposing that the proof the subject has in mind is based on
correct  memory-impressions  of  what  he  has  already  proved,  his
justification will be just as fallible, since the same possibility for the
justified conclusion to be false — namely, through an incorrect memory-
impression
— is allowed by the directly recognizable facts of the justifying position
whether the memory-impression is in fact correct or not, because the
correctness of a memory impression is not directly recognizable.'
4
Whether or not a given person at a given time relies on his memory in
going through the whole of a thoroughly self-evident proof depends, not
only on the length of the proof and the number of different ultimate
premisses involved, but also on how much that person does in fact keep in
his mind and see all at the same time. Since this may vary from occasion to
occasion and person to person we cannot say that the nature of certain
propositions is such that justifications for being confident of them are
always of the deductive but infallible sort. However, examples of a priori
truths, of which there are thoroughly self-evident proofs that it is within the
capacity of at least some people at least some of the time to see all at once,
can be found, perhaps, among the simpler propositions of arithmetic or
geometry that it is possible to understand without seeing to be true, for
example, 'The sum of any two odd numbers is an even number' or 'The sum
of the internal angles of a plane triangle is equal to two right angles.' These
and others may be propositions for which it is possible that there exist both
infallible and fallible deductive justifications but no non-inferential ones.
There are, of course, many other a priori truths such that it is hardly likelyJUSTIFICATION 57
that any ordinary mortal can muster an infallible deductive justification for
claiming to know them. Many of these are, however, truths that any








11.   The other class that I said contains propositions that it is possible to
claim to know with infallible justification was (b) those that are about the
subject's own current conscious state. Hence, no two people, and no single
person on two different occasions, can have infallible justification for
claiming  to  know  the  same  proposition  of  this  sort.  Examples  of
propositions about my own current conscious state that are also such that I
am infallibly justified in being confident of them are 'I am conscious', 'I am
having visual experience', 'I am thinking about infallible justification', 'I am
confident that I was born more than 30 years ago',
15, 'I want the weather to
warm up’
15, 'My visual experience is as if I were seeing a surface the color
of yellow ochre in good light'. Each of these propositions is such that I can
be justified in being confident of it if and only if it is true. That is, it is such
that if I am confident of it and it is false then my confidence must be
unjustified and the only circumstance in which my being confident of it
could be unjustified is that it is false. Some of these propositions may be
such that it is possible for me to be confident of them even though they are
false. (The last example is, perhaps, the most likely.) But this is possible
with such a proposition only through avoidable carelessness or inattention
on my part and never through my being the unwitting victim of unnoticed
slips  in  calculation  or  delusory  impressions  of  sense  or  memory  or
misleading appearances or evidence. Hence, my confidence in such a
proposition as 'My visual experience is as if I were seeing a surface the
color of yellow ochre in good light' cannot be justified if the proposition is
false; if I am justified in my confidence in it then it must be true. A subject
has justification for confidence in such a proposition about himself only
when the proposition is true, so justification for confidence in such a
proposition about oneself is infallible. Conversely, a person's confidence in
a proposition of this special sort about himself must be justified if the
proposition is true. Given that I am having visual experience as if seeing
the color yellow ochre in good light and 1 am confident that I am, what
circumstance could possibly make it the case that, nevertheless, I ought no
to be confident that I am? Since all that is required for my confidence in
such a proposition to be justified is that it be true, its being true gives me
non-inferential (as well as infallible) justification for being confident of it.58 CHAPTER III
Not all propositions about a subject's current conscious state are of this
special sort, but for those that are, justification of confidence in them is
infallible and non-inferential.'
6
There is a possibility that could cause some confusion here. It is possible
for a person sincerely to say 'My visual experience is as if I were seeing
yellow ochre' and be expressing a false proposition, not through avoidable
and careless haste or inattention, but through erroneous but justified belief
as to what color 'yellow ochre' is standardly used to designate. But this
person does not have justified but false belief in the proposition expressed
by 'My visual experience is as if I were seeing yellow ochre' that I claim it
is  possible  to  have  infallible  non-inferential  justification  for  being
confident of. That sentence can be used to express a different proposition,
one that would be more strictly expressed by "'Yellow ochre" is standardly
used to designate this color that my visual experience is as if I were seeing'.
And this of course, is not a  proposition  for  being  confident  of  which
anyone  can  have  infallible  justification.  But  his  having  (fallible)
justification for being confident of this proposition — even supposing (as
seems  correct)  that  his  being  confident  of  it  is  necessary  for  his
understanding and, hence, for his being confident of the other proposition
(that his visual experience is as if he were seeing yellow ochre) — is not
necessary for his having justification for being confident of the other
proposition. If he is in a condition such that if he were to be confident that
the color it is as if he sees is yellow ochre then he would be justified in
being so — whether or not he actually is confident of or even understands
that proposition — then he has justification for being confident that the
color it is as if he sees is yellow ochre; and such condition is its simply
being the case that the color it is as if he sees is yellow ochre.
Color-designating terms like 'yellow-ochre', 'red', 'magenta', etc., not only
refer  to  a  particular  kind  of  color  but  mean  that  kind:  that  'yellow'
designates the color it does is a matter of meaning conventions. Whereas,
in contrast, other terms that might be used to designate colors, such as 'no.
17 on Kemtone's chart of blues' or 'the present color of our house', merely
refer to a particular kind of color: that 'the color of my true love's hair'
refers to the color it does depends crucially on a fact beyond any meaning-
conventions. Thus, unlike 'The color it is as if I am seeing is yellow ochre',
the  proposition  expressed  by  'The  color  it  is  as  if  I  were  seeing  is
approximately the same as the color of John's bicycle' is one that I could
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to know that it is true I cannot rely merely on my understanding of it and
my present visual experience but must also rely on my perception, or my
memory of my perception, or someone else's report, of John's bicycle. (An
expression like 'corn-flower blue' or 'robin's egg blue' might be imaginated
to have shifted from the status of merely referring to a kind of color to that
of meaning it. This would involve a shift from using comparison to a
particular object or sort of object (where 'sort' does not refer to color) as the
conclusive criterion of application to using memories of the color itself,
freed from reference to the particular samples from which they were
acquired, whose identity and other natures may be forgotten. 'Robin's egg
blue' has acquired the status of meaning a certain shade of blue if it is
conceivable  that  all  those  who  think  they  know  what  color  the  term
designates and agree in picking out samples of it could discover, or even be
led by plausible evidence to think, that robin's eggs are not and never have
been of that color.)
The  propositions  about  the  intrinsic  nature  of  a  subject's  current
conscious state that are such that he could have justified confidence in them
when they are false are ones in which confidence could be justified only by
deductive inference. For example: 'I am having a visual experience as if
seeing three distinct star-shapes, each with a different number of points,
whose total number of points is 15' or 'I am having a visual experience as if
seeing three distinct star-shapes, each with a different number of points and
such that the sum of the squares of the squares of the three numbers of
points is 2117.' For the first of these, it might be possible for someone to
see all at once, without counting or adding, the total number of points on
the three star-shapes and thereby be infallibly justified in his confidence in
that proposition (one could not be justified in that sort of way in being
confident of the wrong number). But nothing like that is possible for the
second. In either case it is possible for someone to have a fallible deductive
justification for being confident of the proposition — by going through a
sequential process of counting and performing arithmetical operations on
the numbers arrived at — when it is false.'
7   There is then room for the
justification arrived at to be misleading, through errors of memory or in
other ways. When deduction is performed, not by thinking the propositions
and  attending  to  the  relations  between  them,  but  by  the  mechanical
manipulation of signs — as it often is in arithmetical calculation — there
intrudes another sort of possibility of error in one's justifying memory-
impression  that  one  has  deduced  certain  consequences  from  certain
premisses, not an error of memory but error arising from unnoticed slips in60 CHAPTER III
the manipulations of the signs. In such a case the erroneous belief to which
the slip immediately gives rise at the time it is made is not justified. It then
could have been and ought to have been avoided. But the erroneous
memory-impression with which it leaves the subject does later justify his
erroneous belief that he has found a certain operation to yield certain
results.
The classifications of justifications for knowledge claims that we have
been discussing — inferential and non-inferential, fallible and infallible —
can obviously be applied also to cases of knowledge, according to the kinds
of  justifications  they  contain:  a  minimally  sufficient  condition  for  a
person's  knowing  that  p  is  inferential  knowledge  just  in  case  the
justification for his claiming to know that p that it includes is inferential or
compound with an inferential component; a minimally sufficient condition
for a person's knowing that p is fallible  knowledge  if and only if the
justification for his claiming to know that p that it includes is a fallible
justification; and so forth.
12.   There is one last thing to note about condition (3). The fact that it is
phrased 'S's being confident that p is supported by his having disinterested
justification  for  being  so',  rather  than  simply  'S  has  disinterested
justification for being confident that p', is not without significance. This
phrasing is required in order to rule out the following possibility'
8: S has
two different justifications for being confident that p and only one of them
is externally conclusive (for example, S remembers having been told, 'I
know that p', by each of two different people whom he had no reason to
distrust, but only one of these people was speaking the truth and the other
really had no belief at all as to whether or not p); but the other justification
is the only one on which S's confidence that p is based. If S's confidence
thus fails to be based on a justification of the sort required for knowledge,
then S fails to know that p.
What would it be for a person's confidence that p to be based on one but
not on another justification that he has for being confident that p? This
possibility is not as easily realized as one might at first think. Bear in mind
that a person's having a justification means that the justification is directly
recognizable to him, needing only clear-headed reflection or an effort at
recall and no further calculation or investigation in order to be consciously
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that  the  one  justification  be  the  only  one  the  subject  has  explicitly
articulated (out loud or to himself) or be the only one he would think to
articulate if he tried to answer the question of how he knows. For if it is
also  true  that  he  would  come  up  with  the  other  justification  if  the
deficiency of the first, on the matter of external conclusiveness, were
exposed to him, then his confidence that p is supported and sustained, in
the  relevant  sense,  by  the  fact  that  the  other,  externally  conclusive
justification is there in his field of direct recognizability. It is not supported
by it, I think, only if it is the case that he would not move to the conclusive
justification if the deficiency of the other one were exposed, but would
instead lose his confidence that p (perhaps because of some more or less
temporary confusion he has that would prevent him from recognizing the
conclusive justification, or because of an unreasonable reluctance to trust
that particular justification). If the subject's conclusive justification is
inferential and he unreasonably lacks confidence in its premiss, then he
could  not  coherently  appeal  to  that  premiss  in  order  to  justify  his
confidence in the conclusion; if his justification for being confident that q
fails to make him confident of it, then he can hardly be taken seriously if he
says that, because he knows that p can be properly inferred with confidence
from q, his justification for confidence that q does nevertheless make him
confident that p. So we can say S's being confident that p is supported by a
particular justification he has for being so if and only it he would turn to
that justification, and could coherently do so, if he were trying to justify his
being confident that p and had lost all other justifications he now happens
to have for that confidence.
NOTES
1  It might be argued that an exception to this must be made for justified claims to know arising out of
intention. It might be said that if S fully intends to do a certain thing in certain circumstances it follows
that (a) he is confident, and justified in being confident and claiming to know, that he will try to do that
thing in those circumstances if further circumstances then permit him to try to do it and also that (b) he
wants it to be the case that he will try... etc. So we seem to have a condition that both justifies a claim to
know a certain proposition and also involves the subject's wanting that proposition to be true and, so, is
not disinterested.
It may be correct to answer this by saying that a proper analysis of fully intending to do a thing will
show that it is one part of this state that entails that its subject is confident with justification that he will
try to do it... etc. and another independent part that entails that he wants it to be the case that he will try...
etc.; so that the minimally sufficient condition here for being justified in claiming to know that one will
try... does not entail the subject's wanting it to be the case that one will try... (I heard such an analysis
proposed by H. P. Grice in a paper read at the University of Washington in Spring 1970, according to
which fully intending to do a thing is broken down into something called willing to do it and confidence
that one's willing will issue in one's trying to do it if circumstances permit. I am doubtful, however, that
willing can be distinguished from mere wanting or desiring — as it must be if willing, in conjunction with62 CHAPTER III
the other condition, is to be necessary and sufficient for intending — except by importing into willing
confidence or belief that one will (or would) try to do the thing if...) If, however, such an analysis is not
correct and it must be allowed that there is a special intentional mode of confidence, and of being
justified in being confident and claiming to know, that one will try to do a thing if..., then we seem to
have a choice of two alternatives. We might just allow this sort of case to be an exception to the principle
that disinterestedness is necessary for a justification for confidence to be also a justification for a claim to
know; or we might amplify the explanation of interestedness so as to exclude this sort of case, by saying
that in that explanation I mean by "wanting it to be the case that p" something stronger than the sense of
"wanting" implied by intending:  I mean "wanting" in that sense in which it makes sense to say "Although
he intends to do it, he does not want to do it". Since in this work I am not much interested in this special
sort of intentional confidence or knowledge it makes little difference here which alternative I choose.
2.   Harrison (1962) gives a sound critique of the performative treatment of 'I know that p'.
3.    There may be good reason to object to talk of an 'extended sense' here and to think it better to use
'sense' in such a way that 'know' does not have a different sense when applied to my dog. If so, I would
put my point by saying that I am interested in the necessary conditions of knowing in those cases of the
appropriate application of 'know' where the question of the subject's being justified or not in his
confidence is also appropriate, and in such cases justification is necessary for knowing. A somewhat
analogous case: 'wants' & 'desires' do not, we are very much inclined to say, apply in a different sense to a
dog; nevertheless, their application to a mature human being differs from their application to a dog in the
respect that the question of what the mature human being would say if giving an honest answer to the
question whether he desires X or not is applicable and, necessarily, relevant: that he would give an
affirmative answer is, necessarily, some reason to think (although not necessary for its being the case)
that he does desire X. Here would seem to be a clear example of a term such that, although it is true a
priori that certain considerations are relevant to its application in certain sorts of cases and also true that
they cannot be relevant in other sorts of cases where it is sensibly applied, it does not follow that the term
has a different sense in its application to the two sorts of cases. 'Knows' and the consideration of whether
or not the subject is justified in being confident may be like that.
4.   For argument that there is see Bennett (1964). For what looks to me like an effective effort to describe
what would be counter-examples see Kirk (1967).
5.    Malcolm (1952a) has suggested, I think rightly, that the denial that it is logically possible to know
such propositions is either necessarily false or else fails to use 'know' to express the concept that it is
ordinarily used to express.
6.   As Malcolm (1950) has effectively pointed out.
7.   Cf. Prichard's (1950) well-known remark (p. 88) that "whenever we know something we either do, or
at least can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it..."
8.    We obtain a paraphrase of the incorrect interpretation of the observation, which leads to the absurd
conclusion that when one knows something one can directly recognize that one knows it, if we omit from
the above paraphrase the words 'and this claim is true' and replace the last occurrence of 'it' with 'this
claim'. One might be tempted to do this by the thought that the claim's being true has already been
postulated in ~he initial clause, 'If I know that p', and it is redundant to say something of the form 'If q,
then if q then r'. But this overlooks the fact that the conditional 'if I claim to know that p and this claim is
true then this claim expresses something that I know' is not asserted in the paraphrase to be itself
consequent upon my knowing that p, but rather it is the availability of that conditional to my direct
recognition that is asserted to be consequent upon my knowing that p. It involves no redundancy to say
something of the form 'If q, then I can directly recognize that if q then r'.
9.   That it is not impossible has been argued by Kyburg (1965 and 1970). That it is impossible has been
argued by Hintikka and Hilpinen (1965), by Hilpinen (1968), by Swain (1970a), and by Lehrer (1970).
10.   This example, often referred to as "the lottery paradox," was suggested by Kyburg (1965).
11.    Why not here the simpler proposition that (b') at least one of the propositions specified in (a) is
false? The assumption that (b') is either true or false, together with the assumption that it is a member of
(a)  and  that  no  other  members  of  (a)  are  false,  (as  Keith  Lehrer  pointed  out  to  me)  leads  to  a
contradiction: (b') is true if and only if (b') is false.
12.    A point made by Aristotle: "... we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at
that  rate  the  process  would  go  on  to  infinity,  so  that  our  desire  would  be  empty  and  vain)..."
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a19~20, translated by W. D. Ross).JUSTIFICATION 63
13.   I do not have a satisfactory characterization of what it is for a truth to be a priori, but I hope that one
might be worked out along the following lines: a truth is a priori just in case it is necessary and either it
can be demonstrated a priori or it is formally related to a truth demonstrable a priori in such a way
(which I don't know how to define generally) as to make it reasonable to hope, in the absence of an a
priori demonstration to the contrary, that it is demonstrable a priori if it is true. For example, Goldbach's
still unproved conjecture that every even number is the sum of two primes (which mathematicians
generally believe to be true) may or may not be demonstrable a priori, but it is a universal generalization
every instantiation of which we know to be such that either it or its negation is demonstrable a priori; the
proposition (if it is one) that never in the expansion of x would there occur the sequence '777' may or may
not be demonstrable a priori, but it is the negation of a proposition that, if it were true, would be
demonstrable a priori by the same method by which many truths as to what occurs in the expansion of x
have been demonstrated a priori.
A proposition is demonstrable a priori just in case it is either self-evident, that is, such that merely
understanding it is enough to be justified in being confident of it, or deducible from self-evident truths,
where deducibility is defined as follows: p is deducible from q if and only if there is a sequence of one or
more conditional propositions such that q is the antecedent of the first, p is the consequent of the last, the
consequent of each is identical with the antecedent of the next in the sequence, and all the conditionals in
the sequence are self-evident.
Where 'If p then q' is self-evident but neither 'p' nor 'q' is, it is natural to think of a justification for
being confident that p as equally, and equally directly, a justification for being confident that q. The
interesting thing, of course, is that 'self-evidently follows from' does not express a transitive relation: 'If p
then q' and 'If q then r' may be self-evident when 'If p then r' is not.
14.   Descartes, in his discussion of Rules VI, VII, and XI of his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, finds
important  the  difference  between  deduction  that  depends  on  memory  and  deduction  that  the
understanding is "able to apprehend as a whole and all at once"; he affirms that to approach nearer the
latter sort of deduction (through the rapidity and uninterruptedness of the mind's movement through the
whole deduction, so that it becomes less clear that there is dependence on memory) "affords a more
certain knowledge of the conclusion we have in view". (Kemp-Smith (1957), pp. 52—53).
15   In counting these two examples as reporting current features of my conscious state I do not suppose
that they report states or processes of which I could be said to be consciously aware throughout the period
that they are states of mine, in the way that I am consciously aware of a headache or a sequence of
thoughts while I am having it. Yet I am aware that I am (at least in some ways) confident of this and that,
that I want this and that, etc., in the sense that I could not, were I to consider the question, sincerely deny
that these propositions are true. They report dispositional properties of mine that I can directly recognize.
16.   After I had arrived at this explication of how one's justification for confidence in certain propositions
about one's current conscious state is infallible I discovered that Alston (1971, p. 234) offers the
following as one plausible candidate for what might be meant by saying that a subject has 'privileged
access' to his own current mental states:
Each person is so related to propositions ascribing current mental states to himself that it
is logically impossible both for such a proposition to be true and for him not to be
justified in believing it to be true; while no one else is so related to such propositions."
Alston says, p. 236, that he regards this version of the privileged access thesis as less defensible than a
version that requires all of a person's beliefs about his own current mental states (not just those that are
true) to be justified; but it is not clear to me why he does so.
17.   A justification for confidence in a proposition like the first that is arrived at simply by counting may
be regarded as deductive: the premiss of the deduction is some such proposition as 'I have just completed
a correctly executed process of counting all the points (that is, I correlated with each point in succession,
omitting none and taking none twice, a number, beginning with 1 and successively taking the next in the
standard order, omitting none and taking none twice) and the last number I arrived at was 15' and the
subject's memory-impression that he has done so gives him his justification for being confident of this
premiss.
18.   Which I thank William Alston for pointing out to me.64CHAPTER IV
THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE:
EXTERNAL CONCLUSIVENESS
1. If all justification of confidence had to be infallible then conditions (1),
(2), and (3) of our general definition would be sufficient for knowing that
something is the case. But the possibility of fallible justification for a claim
to know brings with it the possibility that conditions (l)—(3) should be
satisfied and yet S fail to know that p, because the facts giving him his
fallible justification do so only because they are protected by his ignorance
of, or false but justified beliefs about, certain other facts, ones such that
were he to learn of them the question of whether or not p would be entirely
reopened for him (if he were being reasonable), his justification for being
confident that p would be wiped out. Condition (4) must rule out just all
such possible circumstances in which (1) and (2) are satisfied and (3) is
satisfied by a fallible justification for claiming to know that p and yet S
does not in virtue of that justification know that p. Let us speak of a
circumstance  that  falsifies  condition  (4)  with  respect  to  a  particular
justification for claiming to know that p as defeating that justification for
claiming to know that p. Let us consider first kinds of circumstance that
can defeat non-inferential justifications and then kinds that can defeat
inferential ones.
A non-inferential justification that is fallible entails, besides some
positive  conditions,  the  negative  condition  that  the  subject  lacks  any
justification for a belief that would give him reason, despite the presence of
the positive conditions, to lack confidence that p. Suppose, for example, p
is the proposition that I have come to know that Harrison was President
between Cleveland's terms and the positive condition of my non-inferential
justification for being confident that p is that it seems to me that I definitely
remember  having  learned  that.  Then  a  good  example  of  the  kind  of
proposition that the negative condition says that I must not at the same time
have justification for believing is the proposition that I have recently had a
very great many strong and clear memory impressions as to facts I have
learned about American history that turned out to be mistaken. Notice that
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confidence in the proposition in question far from justified, definitely
unreasonable, just on the basis of the positive condition; they are not
merely such as to make a slight doubt reasonable (as would, in the example
just given, the belief that lately I have confidently misremembered one or
two things about American history
1).
Now the sort of proposition that the negative condition of a given
fallible non-inferential justification says that the subject must not have
justification for believing is also just the sort of proposition that if true will
prevent that non-inferential justification from giving its subject knowledge
that p even if it is true that p and he is confident that p. For if such a
proposition is true then it is too much of an accident that in having that
non-inferential justification for being confident of p the subject has a
justification for being confident of a truth.
Suppose, for example, that I am confident that I see something that
looks as would an elephant on the snow outside my living room window
and am non-inferentially justified in being so because I have a visual
experience as if seeing something that looks as would an elephant... etc.
and have no special reason to lack confidence that I see something of that
sort. If it happens also to be true that I have (unsuspected by me) ingested a
drug that typically causes hallucinations of animals then, even though it
may be true that I see something of that sort, it is, in that circumstance (and
having no other justification than the one mentioned), too much a matter of
luck that what I have that justification for being confident of is true for my
confidence backed by that justification to be said to be knowledge. Or
consider again the example where S's justification for being confident that
he has learned that Harrison was President between Cleveland's terms is his
strong memory-impression that he has learned that and this memory-
impression happens to be correct (S does remember that he learned that). If
a great many other similarly strong memory-impressions about similar
matters that S currently has are incorrect then, even though this is unknown
to him, it becomes too accidental that this one among S's current memory-
impressions is correct for his confidence justified only by this impression
to be knowledge.
2  In  general  we  can  say  that  for  any  (fallible)  non-
inferential justification (that is, any condition minimally sufficient for such
justification) condition (4) entails that therefails to be true any proposition
such that the justification in question entails that the subject does not have
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2. Consider now inferential justifications. S has an inferential justification
for being confident that p, we said, if and only if there is a proposition q
such that (i) S has justification for being confident that q and (ii) either (a)
S has justification for confidence that p is deducible from q or (b) S has
justification for confidence that p can be non-deductively inferred with
confidence from q and there are no propositions r,..., rn such that S has
justification for believing each of r1,..., rn and p cannot be nondeductively
inferred with confidence from the conjunction of q, r1,..., rn.   We may
speak of q here as the premiss  of the inferential justification and the
proposition that p is deducible from q, or the proposition that p can be non-
deductively inferred with confidence from q, as its inference rule; and we
may speak of such a justification as justification for being confident that p
by inference from q. It is easy to see that S's having a (fallible) inferential
justification will not make his confidence that p into knowledge that p,
even if p is true, if the premiss or the inference rule is false. It is clear, for
example, that if S is confident with justification of the truth that R flew to
California  today  by  inference  from  the  proposition  (of  which  he  is
confident with justification) that R flew to Los Angeles, California, today,
and the truth is that R flew to San Francisco and not Los Angeles, then S
does not thereby know that R flew to California today.
3  If S is confident
with justification that Harrison was President between Cleveland's terms by
non-deductive  inference  from  the  false  proposition  (of  which  he  is
nevertheless confident with justification) that his friend A confidently
remembers it (when in fact he was just making a lucky guess), then surely
S does not thereby know that Harrison was President between Cleveland's
terms. If S is confident with justification of the truth that there is a fruit tree
outside his window (suppose there is an apple tree there) by deduction from
the proposition that he sees an orange tree there, when he is (unknown to
him) having a visual hallucination of an orange tree, then he does not
thereby know that there is a fruit tree outside his window. To give an
example involving a false inference rule: suppose a teacher of formal logic
slips up and tells his students that a certain somewhat complex argument-
form is deductively valid, when in fact it is not. Then one of his students
may be confident with justification that a certain conclusion is true because
he sees it is related by that argument-form to certain premisses he knows to
be true; but he does not on that account know that the conclusion is true,
even if it happens to be so.68  CHAPTER IV
If we ask why the inferential justification, in these cases where the
premisses or inference rule is false, so clearly fails to give the subject
knowledge, the answer is again that, given the actual facts, it is far too
much a piece of pure luck that that justification is a justification for a truth.
If S's position giving him his justification were corrected to accord with the
relevant facts (in the present case this would be a matter, not of adding
justification for belief in facts in which S now has no reason to believe, but
of replacing S's justification for false belief in the premiss or the inference
rule with justification for belief in the true contradictory), then his position
would no longer come anywhere near to giving him justification for being
confident that p.
3. Another possibility that must be ruled out, with respect to non-deductive
inferential justifications, is this: although the premiss, inference-rule and
conclusion of the justification are all true, there may also be true (unknown
to the subject) a proposition such that the conclusion cannot be inferred
with confidence from the conjunction of the premiss and this other truth.
And this other truth may also (but need not necessarily) be such that if the
subject's confidence in the conclusion is justified only by inference from
that premiss then it is too much of an accident that he has justification for
confidence in a truth for it to be said that he knows  it to be true. For
example, suppose that S is justified in being confident that R flew to Los
Angeles yesterday by inference from the true premiss that R's husband has
just told S, with apparent sincerity, that R flew to Los Angeles yesterday.
Now suppose that R's husband does not, in fact, believe that R flew to Los
Angeles yesterday; he was lying when he told S that she did. Given this
circumstance, we cannot say that S knows that R flew to Los Angeles
yesterday by inference from this testimony of R's husband, even if it
happens that R did fly to Los Angeles yesterday. The conjunction of the
proposition that R's husband lied in his testimony with the premiss of S's
inferential  justification  (that  he  gave  such  testimony  with  apparent
sincerity) is not merely a proposition from which the conclusion cannot be
inferred with confidence: it is a proposition from which the conclusion
cannot reasonably be inferred with any significant degree of belief at all. If
S were to acquire justification for believing that R's husband lied in his
testimony while retaining all the elements of this inferential justification
that are compatible with his having justification for believing that R's
husband lied (that is, justification for confidence in the premiss and the
inference rule and his lacking justification for other beliefs such that theEXTERNAL CONCLUSIVENESS 69
conclusion could not be inferred with confidence from the conjunction of
their objects and the premiss) then those elements plus the new justification
would be very far from giving him justification for being confident of the
conclusion, would in fact give him no justification even for believing the
conclusion.
By  altering  the  preceding  example  slightly  we  may  illustrate  an
interesting  complication  that  may  be  described  abstractly  as  follows:
Although S's justification for claiming to know that p by inference from q
may be defeated by a certain fact r (such that p cannot be inferred with any
significant degree of belief from the conjunction of q and r) S may have
another justification for being confident that p, by inference  from  the
conjunction of q and some other proposition t, that is not defeated by the
fact that r because p can be inferred with confidence from the conjunction
of q, r, and t and S's justification for being confident that t is not defeated
by the fact that r. Let p be, as before, the proposition that R flew to Los
Angeles yesterday, but change the premiss q to the proposition that R's
husband told S, with apparent sincerity, that he took R to  the  airport
yesterday and put her on the plane to Los Angeles; then let the fact r (that
defeats S's justification for claiming to know that p by inference from q) be
the fact that R's husband did not go near the airport yesterday and let the
proposition t (such that S is justifiedly confident of it and p can be inferred
with confidence from the conjunction of q, r, and t) be the proposition that
R's husband would not try to deceive S as to R's whereabouts. We must
suppose, of course, that S's justification for claiming to know that R's
husband would not practice that deceit is such as not to be defeated by the
fact that he has deceived S about his own whereabouts, but this is entirely
possible: S's justification for being confident that t may, for instance, be by
inference from such a proposition as that R's husband would not lie without
good reason and has no motive to deceive S about R's wherabouts  that
could equal in his mind the consideration that R's whereabouts are of great
importance to S.
4. Let us now consider some importantly different examples. Suppose that
thousands of people have a justification for claiming to know the truth that
Cornell lost its game to Columbia by more than 30 points last night, solely
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inference from the true premiss that they see in today's newspaper under
the heading 'Last Night's Scores' the line 'Columbia 93 Cornell 57.' But
suppose also that Cornell's coach (unhinged by the magnitude of the defeat)
is telling people, with apparent sincerity, that the newspaper has erred and
that the score was really 58—57. Now the conjunction of the proposition as
to what the newspaper says and the proposition as to what Cornell's coach
is seriously telling people is not a proposition from which it can be inferred
with confidence that the score the newspaper gives is the correct one. Yet it
seems most implausible to suggest that the coach's irrational prevarications
can render false the justified claims of all those newspaper readers to know
the score.
4
Or, for another example, suppose that I am justified in claiming to know
that I was born on July 11 by inference from the premiss that my parents
have, with apparent sincerity, said this on many occasions and they must
have known the date of my birth. But suppose that someone in the County
Clerk's office of the county where I was born has just prepared an official
copy of my birth certificate on which my birth date is given as July 21.
(Suppose also that this is the result of a copying error and that my parents
were right in what they told me.) From the conjunction of the premiss
mentioned and this additional truth as to the date appearing on a newly
prepared official copy of my birth certificate it cannot properly be inferred
with confidence that I was born on July 11: the date on the new copy of my
birth certificate would, if I came to know of it, give me reason to doubt, to
lack confidence, that what my parents told me was correct (or else that my
memory of what my parents told me is correct). Yet it seems implausible to
suggest that such an error in a copy of my birth certificate can, even though
unknown to me. prevent its being the case that I know that I was born on
July 11 by inference from the testimony of my parents (which was, in fact,
testimony as to what they knew).
5
Thus  it  seems  that  S's  knowing  that  p by inference from q is not
defeated by just any truth r such that p cannot be inferred with confidence
from the conjunction of q and r. The important thing to notice in each of
the examples just given is that the 'outside' truth r that, despite its satisfying
the condition on r just mentioned, fails to defeat the subject's knowing that
p by inference from q has the following property: even if the subject were
to have justification for believing r, if he were at the same time to retain all
the properties entailed by his inferential justification (whose premiss is q)
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have justification for being confident of the premiss and the inference rule
and continue to lack justification for belief in any other propositions (than
r) such that p cannot be inferred with confidence from the conjunction of
the premiss with those other propositions — then those elements would
still make it reasonable for him to believe that p to some degree, though not
with  confidence.  In  fact,  in  the  examples  given,  it  would  not  be
unreasonable for someone in the positions described to choose to give more
weight to the premiss and to believe fairly strongly on its basis that the
conclusion  is  true  and  that  the  conflicting  evidence  must  have  some
explanation compatible with that conclusion. No similar thing could be said
about the examples where an outside truth r does defeat S's inferential
justification for claiming to know that p: take the example where S, having
justification for being confident that R flew to Los Angeles today just by
inference from the premiss that R's husband told S with apparent sincerity
that he put R on the plane to Los Angeles today, learns that R's husband
was never near the airport today: it would be most unreasonable for S to
continue to believe (though with less than confidence) just on the basis of
R's husband's testimony (without any other 'backup' evidence) that R flew
to Los Angeles today and that her husband's not having gone near the
airport must have some explanation compatible with that conclusion.
I venture to generalize that in every case of inferential knowledge that p
where there is an outside truth r that in conjunction with the premiss of the
subject's justification does not support confident inference to p but also
does not defeat this justification, this will be because the conjunction of r
and the premiss of the justification would still justify some degree of belief
that p: they are not such as to give little or no justification even for
believing that p. If this is correct, then we can say that the possibility with
respect to inferential justifications for confidence in p that condition (4),
external conclusiveness, must rule out is this: there is true some proposition
r such that were S to have justification for believing that r and to retain all
the properties entailed by his inferential justification for confidence in p
that are compatible with his having justification for believing that r, then
those properties plus the justification for believing that r would be very far
from justifying him in confidence that p.
5. Indeed, the phrasing we have just used provides an accurate way of
summarizing all the possibilities we have recognized so far, with respect to
both  inferential  and  non-inferential  justification,  that  external72  CHAPTER IV
conclusiveness  needs  to  rule  out.  In  all  of  them,  S's  justification  for
claiming to know that p fails to give S knowledge that p because there is a
truth r such that were S to have justification for believing that r and to
retain every property entailed by his justification for claiming to know that
p that is compatible with his having justification for believing r, then those
elements would be very far from justifying S in being confident that p. It is
obvious that any compound justification for claiming to know that p will
also be defeated by a fact r of that description. Whatever justification S
may have for claiming to know that p, if there is a fact r of that description,
then, though it may be true that p, it will not be true that S knows that p on
the basis of that justification.
I see no way of giving any informative general criterion for how far
from justifying confidence is far enough to count as very far for the
purposes of this description. In fact this may vary depending on the sort of
justification in question: the examples we have considered that involve
non-deductive  inferential  justification  suggest  that,  for  that  sort  of
justification,  very far is so far as to give little or no justification for
believing  that p  at all; but with respect to memory  justifications  the
example given at the end of Section 1 (p. 68) suggests that very far need
not be quite so far. But it does seem clear in general that, for any given
justification for claiming to know that p, the crucial difference between a
justification-weakening proposition r whose truth would clearly falsify a
claim to know that p based on that justification and one whose truth would
clearly not do this, is always that the former would weaken the justification
much more than the latter, often to the point of wiping it out altogether.
In any case, the line is far from sharp and examples can be imagined
where one cannot say with assurance that a given outside fact does or does
not defeat a given justification for claiming to know that p. Suppose that S
is in a market looking at what appears to be a large display of fruit.
Looking at a particular piece, S is confident with justification that it is, as it
appears to be, an apple. But suppose also that sprinkled randomly through
the display at a ratio of about 1 to 10 there are very good wax imitations of
pieces of fruit. It seems clear that this fact, were S to learn of it, would give
S reason to doubt, at least very slightly, to be at least a little short of
completely confident, if all he has to go on is visible appearance, that the
piece he is looking at is an apple. Yet it also seems clear that this fact, as
long as S is unaware of it, does not defeat his claim to know that he sees an
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what apples look like and what is likely to be found in markets. The
conjunction of this truth and S's premiss is still a proposition from which it
can be inferred with a fair degree of belief that what he sees is an apple
(although this is not a matter of evidence still having weight against
conflicting evidence, as in the examples given in Section 4). On the other
hand, if the display were 90% composed of wax imitations of fruit then,
even though S happens to be looking at one of the few genuine apples, that
fact is not only such as to ruin his justification for being confident that he
sees an apple should be learn of it, but it also such that S clearly cannot
know that the piece he is looking at is an apple just by looking at it: in the
circumstances he could so easily have had just the same sort of visible-
appearance justification for claiming to know that he sees an apple when
not seeing one. It also seems clear that no precise answer can be given to
the question of how large the proportion of imitations to genuine pieces of
fruit must be before it does begin to defeat S's claim to know that he sees
an apple based just on looking.
6. Even when all the possibilities so far canvassed are ruled out there
remains another way in which a justification S has for claiming to know a
truth p can be defeated by outside facts if this justification is inferential, or
compound with an inferential component. Then it is possible that S's
justification for claiming to know the premiss should be defeated by an
external fact in one of the ways already discussed although S's justification
by inference from this premiss top is not. If so, then this latter justification
cannot give S knowledge that p, since, of course, one can know that p on
the basis of a justification by inference from q only if one knows that q.
Suppose that S has justification for claiming to know that (p) Bertrand
Russell was born in 1873 just by inference from the premiss that (q) N is
confident that he remembers having read that Russell was born in that year
in Russell's autobiography; and S has justification for claiming to know this
premiss q, just by inference from the premiss that (t) N has just told S that
he confidently remembers that. Now suppose that somehow this latter
premiss, t, is false but the former, q, is not (for example, N wishing to
mislead S, actually said "1872" but S misheard it as "1873"). Now not-t
does not defeat S's justification for claiming to know that p by inference
from q: it is not the case that if S had believed the negation of t while still
possessing justified confidence in q and in the inference rule from q to p
and lacking justification for belief in any other propositions such that their
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those elements he would be far from being justified in being confident that
p: those  elements  would  in  fact  still  give  him  justification  for  being
confident that p. But the fact that t is false clearly does defeat S's inferential
justification from t to q.
Now, in order to rule out this possibility that S may have no undefeated
justification for claiming to know the premiss of his inferential justification
for claiming to know that p, we do not really need to take account of any
new basic possibilities. For if any of the justifications that Sin fact has for
claiming to know the premiss is defeated by some external fact it will be so
in one of the ways already considered; and if any of his justifications for
claiming to know some other proposition that he must be justified in
claiming to know in order to be justified in claiming to know this premiss
is defeated by an outside fact it will be so in one of the ways already
considered; and so on.
Let us say that the ways we have already considered are ways in which
a justification may be locally defeated. The summary of these given above
(Section  5) defines  this  expression:  A  justification  S  has  for  being
confident and claiming to know that p is locally defeated just in case there
is a truth r such that were S to be justified in believing that r and to retain
every property entailed by the justification in question that is compatible
with his having justification for believing that r then those elements would
be very far from justifying him in being confident that p.
Now what we want to say is this: S has justification for being confident
that p that is undefeated tout court — globally undefeated — just in case he
has the right sort of hierarchy of justifications none of which is locally
defeated. The right sort of hierarchy must have a non-inferential base and
be sufficient to give S justification for claiming to know that p.   Such a
hierarchy, which we can call a global justification for claiming to know
that p, will exist just in case the following condition obtains:
   (G) There is a sequence of one or more sets of propositions <Z1,..., Zn>
such that Z1= {p}, S has non-inferential justification for confidence
in each member of Z1, and each Zi, where i > 1, satisfies one of the
following conditions:
(a)Zi is a unit set and S has justification for being confident of its
member by inference from some member of some set earlier in
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(b)each member of Zi is the sole member of a unit set earlier in the
sequence, or
(c)Zi is a unit set whose member is a conjunction of two or more
propositions, these conjuncts are the members of Zi-1, and the
compound of the justifications that S has for being confident of
each of the members of Zi-1 constitutes a justification for the
member of Zi.
It  is  obvious  that  if  each  justification  comprising  such  a  global
justification for being confident that p is locally undefeated then, and only
then, the global justification itself will, as a whole, satisfy the condition
that defines local undefeat: that is, there will be no truth r such that, were S
to be justified in believing that r and to retain all his properties entailed by
his having the global justification in question that are compatible with his
having justification for believing that r, then those elements would be very
far from justifying him in being confident that p.  So we can say that a
locally undefeated justification that S has for being confident that p is also
globally undefeated and, hence, externally conclusive if and only if it is
part of a global justification that S has for being confident that p  that
contains no locally defeated justifications. And S has at least one such
undefeated global justification if and only if there is no truth r such that,
were S to be justified in believing that r and to retain all of his properties
that are compatible with his having justification for believing that r, then he
would be very far from being justified in being confident that p.
7. I am now in a position to give the explanation regarding the lottery
paradox that 1 promised in Chapter III, Section 7.
Let L be the proposition that there will be a perfectly fair drawing of a
single winning ticket from a lottery of one million tickets numbered from 1
to 1,000,000. Let P1,..., P1000000  be the propositions 'Ticket no.1 will be the
winner',..., 'Ticket no. 1,000,000 will be the winner', respectively.  Thus the
set of propositions {L, ~P,..., ~P1,000,000} is minimally inconsistent, that is, it
is inconsistent and no proper subset of it is inconsistent.
Why is it, as we saw that intuition suggests, that a person S who is
confident and can claim to know with justification that L is true cannot by
non-deductive inference from L have justification for being completely
confident of or claiming to know the truth of any of ~P1,..., ~P1,000,000?   My
answer is this: although S's justified confidence in L gives him the premiss76  CHAPTER IV
of an inferential justification for believing, say, ~P1 to some considerable
degree, it also gives him the premiss of an inferential justification for being
sure that there is a truth r such that, were he to be justified in believing that
r and  to  retain all his  properties that are compatible with his  having
justification for believing that r, then he would be very far from being
justified in being confident of ~P1.  What truth r? The truth that would be
formed by disjoining P1 (which is the proposition that ticket no. 1 be the
winner) with that Pi such that i is the number of the winning ticket.  It is
obvious that L entails that there is exactly one truth of that description.  If S
were to acquire justification for believing that truth while retaining all his
properties that are compatible with his having justification for believing it
(including the property of having no reason to regard either  P1 or Pi as
more likely than the other), then, obviously, he would be very far from
being justified in being confident that ~P1.
In general it seems to be the case that Scan add p to the body of
propositions that he has justification for being confident of and claiming to
know, by non-deductive inference from a proposition q already belonging
to that body, only if q does not support an inference to the belief that there
is a truth r such that, were S to have justification for believing that r and to
retain  all  his  properties  compatible  with  his  having  justification  for
believing  that  r, then  he  would  be  very  far  from  being  justified  in
confidence that p.   It is not only the fact that it explains our prior intuition
about the lottery example that suggests this general principle. It is also
supported by the consideration that it seems absurd on the face of it to try
to assert the following:
I know that p, but I have — in the very
justification I have for claiming to know that p —
justification for thinking that there is true
a  proposition  such  that  were  I  to  have
justification  for  believing  that  truth,  while
otherwise remaining as I am, then I would be
very far from justified in claiming to know that p.
Indeed  this  proposition  remains  just  as  absurd  if  'justification  for
thinking that there is true' is replaced with 'no justification for being
confident that there is not true'.
6  The fact that this cannot possibly be true
means that if a person S has a justification for being confident and claiming
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confident and claiming to know that there is no truth r such that, were he to
have justification for believing that r while retaining all his properties that
are compatible with his having justification for believing that r, then he
would  be  very  far  from  justified  in  confidence  that  p.   That is, a
justification  for  claiming  to  know  that  p  is  itself  a  justification  for
confidence in its own external conclusiveness. We can call this feature of a
justification for a claim to know its being internally conclusive.  Although
not every justification for a claim to know need be externally conclusive,
every one must be internally conclusive.
8. From the preceding considerations it follows that if S has justification
for claiming to know that p and is confident that he knows that p (from
which, obviously, it follows that he is confident that p) then S is also
justified in claiming to know that he knows that p; for then he will be
justified in claiming to know that all of the conditions of propositional
knowledge, (l)—(4), are satisfied.
7 This has just been shown for (4). It is
obvious for (1). As for (2) and (3), since they are directly recognizable to S,
his satisfying them by itself gives him justification for claiming to know
that he satisfies them.
It must be the case also that, if S knows that p and is confident that he
does, then he knows that he knows that p. For, first, his confidence that he
knows that p must be supported by the justification it follows that he has
for being confident that (1)—(4) are satisfied, the main substance of which
is just his externally conclusive justification for being confident that p. He
could not understand his claim to know that p and be unwilling to cite as
justification for his confidence that he knows that p what he is willing to
cite as (disinterested) justification for his confidence that p. Second, this
justification he has for being confident that (1)—(4) are satisfied (for
claiming to know that he knows that p) is externally conclusive with
respect to each of (l)—(4), given that each of them is true (he knows that
p). This is obvious in the case of (1)—(3). As for (4), it entails that there is
no truth r that would defeat S's justification for claiming to know that p and
the fact that this justification must be internally conclusive (which was
argued in the last paragraph of Section 7) means that any truth r that would
defeat his justification for confidence that his justification for claiming to
know that p is externally conclusive would also defeat his justification for
claiming to know that p: there could not be a truth r such that were he to
acquire justification for belief in it he would be in a position to say, 'I am78  CHAPTER IV
still justified in the way that I was in claiming to know that p but I am no
longer justified in being sure that that justification is externally conclusive.’
9. Finally, note that condition (4) renders (1) redundant, since if it were not
true that p then ~p would be a truth r that would falsify (4) with respect to
any justification that S might have for being confident that p.  So  an
adequate general definition of propositional knowledge could be stated as
follows:
S knows that p if and only if: S is confident that p. this
confidence is supported by a disinterested justification that S
has for it, and there is no truth r such that, were S to be
justified in believing that r and to retain all his properties that
are compatible with his having justification for believing that
r, then he would be very far from justified in being confident
that p.
NOTES
1.  Cases like this may provide further examples of positions in which a person would be justified if he
were confident that p and also justified if he lacked confidence that p, ones of a different sort from those
suggested in Chapter III, Section 1, which involved the subject's having reason to want it to be the case
that p.
2.   That the circumstances that condition (4) must rule out can generally be characterized as those in
which it would be too much of an accident that S's confidence that p on the basis of the justification in
question is justified confidence in a truth, is, I think, a large part of the truth in Unger's (1968) interesting
suggestion that a man knows that p (at a given time) if and only if it is not at all accidental (at that time)
that the man is right about its being the case that p.
3.  This resembles an example given by Gettier (1963).
4.   This example resembles in the crucial respects one offered by Lehrer and Paxson (1969), pp.
228—229, to make an essentially similar point. In their example the conclusion is that Tom Grabit stole a
book from the library, the premiss is that the subject saw at close range someone looking just like Tom
Grabit (whom the subject knows well) steal a book from the library, and the proposition that if conjoined
to the premiss would not support a confident inference to the conclusion is that Tom Grabit's mother has
averred that Tom was far away on the day in question and that Tom's twin brother John stole the book. In
their example the mother is lying (pathologically) and there is no twin brother John, but these frills are
not essential to the point.
5.   I am indebted to Andrew Jameton for suggesting this example, which made me see that another
formulation of the fourth condition that I had subscribed to in Ginet (1970) would not do.
6.  But it will cease to be absurd if, in addition, 'be very far from' is replaced with 'not be'.
7.  Though S could hardly be justified in claiming to know that he knows that p if he did not have
justification for claiming to know each of (1)—(4), it does not follow that his knowing that he knows that
p requires him to know every one of (1)—(4). As I pointed out earlier, a person may understand, and
believe, the proposition that he knows that p without understanding all the components of our correct
analysis of it.CHAPTER V
PERCEPTUAL FACTS
1.   Perceptual knowledge is knowledge that one sees or hears or smells or
tastes or feels some specific sort of non-mental thing(s) or state(s) of affairs
or event(s). A proposition of the form 'S knows that p' reports perceptual
knowledge just in case p is a perceptual proposition about S; and p is a
perceptual proposition about S just in case p has the form 'S perceives d',
where 'perceives' may be replaced by a particular perceptual verb ('see',
'hear', etc.) or some conjunction of disjunction of such verbs, and 'd' is
replaced by an expression designating some non-mental thing(s) or event(s)
or state(s) of affairs. Thus, for example, 'S sees a house and a tree in the
distance', 'S sees and hears a galloping horse approaching', and 'S feels a
weight pressing on his stomach' would all express perceptual propositions
about S.
The qualification 'non-mental' is included because some perceptual
verbs (for example, 'feel') can take as objects terms denoting mental states
('I feel a sharp pain in my stomach', 'I feel depressed'). Such sentences do
not report perception in the sense that interests me here. In this discussion,
I am concerned only with sense-perception of things or events in space, in
the 'external world'. (Neither do the verbs in such sentences as 'I hear that
you are resigning', 'I see that Nixon has slipped in the polls', 'I smell
trouble', 'He tasted defeat', and 'I feel that there is some sort of life on Mars'
have the perceptual sense that interests me here. Of course, some such
constructions are connected more or less closely with perceptual uses of
those verbs.)
Even the perceptual uses of 'feel' are rather a mixed bag. Feeling the shape
of an object in one's pocket and feeling the temperature of the bath water
are tactual perceptions — perceptions by means of part of the perceiver's
body coming into contact with the thing perceived (or whose property is
perceived) — but rather different kinds of subjective experience (sensation)
are involved. One can also speak of feeling the position or movement of
various parts of one's own body relative to one another or the force that a
part of one's body is exerting ('I feel my finger moving (relative to my
hand)', 'I feel my arm bent at the elbow', 'I felt myself pushing strenuously80 CHAPTER V
with my hand against something before me') where this is quite different
from tactual perception of those things, from feeling those states of one's
body with another part of one's body (in the way that one might feel the
relative positions or movements of parts of another person's body). Feeling
myself pushing strenuously against something with my band differs from
feeling something pushing against my hand just in this non-tactual aspect
of the perception. This kinaesthetic and proprioceptive awareness is not
awareness of something outside the perceiver; but I classify it as a variety
of perception because it is awareness of non-mental events in space (there
is the possibility of kinaesthetic hallucination) and it is often integrated
with tactual perception in an overall haptic perception of objects (for
example, in feeling objects offering various sorts of resistance to one's
movements or in feeling the shape of an object by feeling one's hand trace a
certain path in moving over its resisting surface).
Usually, when we make an assertion with a sentence of the form 'S
perceives d', as defined above, we imply the existence or occurrence of
something satisfying the description 'd'. Normally, when someone says, 'I
see a yellow-bellied sapsucker' or '1 hear a train in the distance' or 'I smell
rubber burning somewhere near' or 'I taste garlic in this stew', or makes
corresponding third-person statements, he means to imply that there is a
yellow-bellied sapsucker in the vicinity, a train in the distance, rubber
burning somewhere near, or garlic in the stew. In special circumstances,
however, a speaker may use sentences of this sort without intending and
without  being  understood  to  imply  the  existence  of  what  he  says  he
perceives.  For example, he and his hearers may take it as understood that
he is describing hallucinations; or the interest in his perceptual statement
may be not at all in what it reveals to exist in his environment but only in
what it indicates about the nature of his subjective experience, as it might
be during a psychologist's experiment investigating perception. But I will
regard  an  utterance  of  such  a  sentence  as  expressing  a  perceptual
proposition only if the speaker intends the normal implication that the thing
said to be perceived exists. And I will consider the proposition that S
knows that he perceives d to be an ascription of perceptual knowledge only
if  the  perceptual  proposition  it  contains  is  understood  to  have  this
existential implication.
For visual, auditory, and tactual perception, the form of the perceptual
proposition 'S perceives d' can be further refined. The implications of the
scene-description 'd', the  description  of  what  it  is  that  S  perceivesPERCEPTUAL FACTS 81
according to the proposition (suppose, for example, that the proposition is
'S sees a white marble statue, which covers a hole in the floor, a few feet
away behind grillwork in ordinary daylight'), all fall into one or both of two
categories: (a) some object or objects that 'S perceives d' implies that S
perceives (a white marble statue and grillwork in the example given) plus,
perhaps, the relations of those objects to other things that 'S perceives d'
does not imply that S perceives (which covers a hole in the floor in the
example); and (b) some relation or relations between the object(s) that 'S
perceives d' implies S perceives and S that are such that they must affect
the appearance that those objects present to S (a few feet away [from S],
behind [on the other side from S of] grillwork, in ordinary daylight [from
S's point of view] in the example). We can indicate the division between
these categories formally by using instead of 'd' the schema 'x in φ', where
'x' is taken to have just the implications of category (a) and 'in φ' is taken to
have just the implications of category (b).
Let me say more about the sorts of circumstances and relations I have in
mind for category (b):
S sees  a thing in a certain light, from a certain distance and angle
(perhaps  on  the  other  side  of  certain  objects),  and  through  certain
intervening media. For example, 'S sees a house in daylight through clear
air from the front about 50 yards away'. Other intervening media through
which one can see things include water, haze, colored spectacles, windows,
screen,  reflecting  surfaces,  binoculars,  telescopes,  and  (perhaps)  live
television. It is quite natural and non-figurative to say 'Glancing in my rear
view mirror, I saw a police car close behind' or 'Looking through my
binoculars, I saw tears streaming down the coach's face' or (perhaps) 'I
turned on the television in time to see man's first steps on the moon'. That
these are natural is, I conjecture, at least partly because these special media
are sufficiently like other media through which things are unquestionably
seen (air, spectacles, windows, water, etc.) in immediacy of transmission,
in potential to distort, and in generally not distorting in ways that mislead
when the medium is known to the perceiver.
S hears something in a certain direction and at a certain distance and
(sometimes) through a certain intervening medium: 'He hears voices fairly
close on his right through a wall'.82 CHAPTER V
S feels something in contact with a certain part of his body or in a
certain direction from it and (sometimes) through a certain intervening
medium. 'With his hand he feels through the rib cage something pulsating',
'He feels the heat of a fire behind him', 'He feels the coldness of the surface
he sits on through his clothes'.
I stipulate that a description 'd' fails to be of the form 'x in φ' if it lacks
implications in category (b). Thus the sentence 'S sees a tree' fails to fit the
form 'S sees x in φ', but 'S sees a tree in the distance' is of that form because
'in the distance' does imply a relation between the tree and S that is bound
to affect the appearance that the tree presents to S. Here are some more
examples of sentences of the form 'S sees x in φ', with the part fitting 'x'
emphasized:  'S sees a horse standing on grass in clear daylight about 50
yards away', 'S sees a large dog about 10 yards away through the fog', 'S
sees a small white bird circling high above him in a clear sunny sky'. (In
the last example 'in a clear sunny sky' has implications in both category (a)
and category (b).)
2.    In this chapter and the next I want to discuss the following two
questions:
What sort of complex of conditions constitutes a perceptual fact
(that is, minimally suffices logically for the truth of a perceptual
proposition)?
What  sort  of  complex  of  conditions  constitutes  perceptual
knowledge?
An important point is the relation between these questions. There is a
temptation to suppose that one needs to know the answer to the first in
order to have the perceptual knowledge asked about in the second. But in
fact the connection between the questions is not so strong. Only by seeing
this can we deal satisfactorily with the much disputed question whether
sense-data are part of a proper analysis of perceptual knowledge. We can
admit something from both sides of the dispute. Sense-data advocates are
right in saying that subjective perceptual experience is part of a proper
analysis of perceptual facts; but sense-data opponents are right in saying
that one does not need to know that one has a certain sort of subjectivePERCEPTUAL FACTS 83
perceptual experience, and to make inferences from this information, in
order to know a perceptual fact about oneself.
Throughout this and the next chapter I take vision as illustrative of
perception in general. Conclusions parallel to most of those that I reach
about  seeing  will,  I  believe,  hold  equally  well  for  other  modes  of
perception, including combined modes, but I shall not try to show this. I
will concern myself largely with propositions that can be expressed by
sentences of the form 'S sees x in φ'; but in so doing I will not be ignoring
any  cases  of  visual  perception,  for  any  true  proposition  that  can  be
expressed by a sentence of the form 'S sees d' that cannot be expressed by a
sentence of the form 'S sees x in φ' will be entailed by some other true
proposition that can be expressed by a sentence of the form 'S sees x in φ'.
3.    It is very nearly self-evident that the relation between a perceiving
subject and an external thing that is signified by a perceptual verb must
entail an ascription to the subject of a certain state of consciousness, of a
certain sort of subjective experience. An essential element in perception is a
state intrinsic to the perceiving subject — intrinsic in the sense that it
entails nothing about the relation between the subject and anything external
to the subject (or any non-mental state of affairs). The relation 'x perceives
y' is more nearly analogous in this respect to 'x is dented by y' than to 'x is
touched by y'.
This is perfectly clear (as Berkeley noted in the First Dialogue Between
Hylas and Philonous) in the case of perception by means of touch of such
things as the high temperature of the bath water or the sharpness of a pin
point. In such cases one can specify the location in one's body in which one
feels the sensation (of heat or of sharp pain) that is an essential part of the
perception. And the very same kind of sensation could, conceivably, exist
without being an ingredient in a perception of any external state of affairs.
If  we  do  not  admit  that  the  situation  is  analogous  for  all  modes  of
perception — at least to the extent of involving an intrinsic modification of
the subject's conscious experience peculiar to the mode of perception (if
not a sensation, strictly so-called, located in a perceptual organ) — then we
shall find it difficult to explain why being conscious in these modes (not
blind, not deaf, not anaesthetized, etc.) is necessary to perceiving in these
modes. Also it will be difficult to describe the possibility of perceptual
hallucination — of the sort of experience that might prompt a person to say84 CHAPTER V
sincerely such a thing as 'It was just as if I saw a dagger before me
suspended in the air' when actually he saw no dagger or any external thing
that looks anything like a dagger — if we cannot say that the subject is
having a sense experience, that is, a subjective experience of a sort peculiar
to the mode of perception, that resembles the sense-experience one has
when one actually perceives a certain sort of external scene. One might,
like Macbeth, be in a position where one does not know whether one is
hallucinating a dagger or actually seeing one; but there will then still be
something that one does know about one's visual experience at the time,
something  one  could  express  by  saying,  'I  am,  at  any  rate,  having  a
subjective experience as if I were seeing (the sort of subjective experience
one has when one sees) a dagger'.
Yet some philosophers have thought that there are reasons to deny that
perceiving necessarily involves subjective sense-experience. Perhaps the
chief one has been the common misconception already mentioned; namely,
that to admit subjective sense experience as an ingredient in perception is
to be committed to thinking of all perceptual knowledge as knowledge by
inference  from  knowledge  of  this  subjective  sense-experience.  How
widespread this mistake has been is indicated by the fact that the phrase
'causal theory of perception' generally connotes a view that holds both to an
analysis of perception as the causing of subjective sense-experience by the
perceived object and to an analysis of perceptual knowledge as inferred
from sense-experiences, as if the two were inseparably wedded.
1 Now there
is,  as  we  shall  see,  an  insuperable  obstacle  to  explaining  perceptual
knowledge as always inferred from knowledge of perceptual sensations.
But since these two analyses can be separated (as I hope will become clear)
this does not hinder the causation-of-sensation analysis of perceptual facts.
The other arguments I know of that tempt philosophers to deny the truth in
question are the three following.
2
I.   (1) The sensations alleged to be essentially involved in visual and
auditory perceptions could not, without absurdity, be said to have
specific bodily locations.
 (2) But sensations, ordinarily so called, always have more or less
precise bodily locations.
Therefore, there are no sensations essentially involved in visual or
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This argument forces us to admit only that the states of consciousness
essentially ingredient in visual, auditory, and olfactory perception cannot
be called 'sensation' in the most ordinary sense of that term, because that
sense is confined to what philosophers have called 'bodily sensations'. But
there is nothing in the argument to prevent us from introducing a wider use
of 'sensation' to cover the experiences, or modifications of consciousness,
involved  in  every  mode  of  perception.  Nor  is  there  anything  in  the
argument to show that this extension of the term, already adopted in much
discourse about perception, is not a quite natural one.
We can mark this wider, technical sense of 'sensation' by attaching the
adjective 'perceptual.' We can distinguish various kinds of perceptual
sensation,  in  accordance  with  the  commonly  distinguished  modes  of
perception,  under  the  rubrics  of  visual  sensation,  auditory  sensation,
olfactory sensation, etc.; and we can mark hard-to-separate combinations or
blends of these, such as tactual-kinaesthetic or olfactory-gustatory, or even
visual-auditory (as when seeing and hearing someone speak). I suppose
that gustatory, tactual and some kinds of kinaesthetic sensations (feeling a
muscle tense) are the only perceptual kinds of bodily sensations. Although
all perceptual sensations are like those that are also bodily sensations in
that they are intrinsic modifications of a subject's state of consciousness
and  are  normally  ingredient  in  perceptions,  many  are  unlike  bodily
sensations (but like, say, humming a tune to oneself, having a visual after-
image) in that bodily locations cannot be ascribed to them. (One can be
said to hum a tune or to have as visual sensation 'in one's head', or to have a
sensation of ringing 'in one's ears', but this is the sense in which one has
thoughts 'in one's head' and not the straightforward sense in which one has
an ache in one's head or in one's ear.)
(There are kinds of bodily sensation, for example, stomach-ache, that
are not kinds of perceptual sensation. My stomach-ache may be caused by
excess acid in my stomach and I may come to know that there is excess
acid there by means of the ache, but we do not (yet anyway) typically say
in such a case that I feel excess acid in my stomach. Nor do we say that in
having a toothache one feels the deterioration of the tooth that is the cause
of the toothache. But our linguistic practice might very naturally change in
that direction. We do say, of course, that in feeling a sharp pain in one's
hand caused by the jab of a pin or the touch of a hot pan one feels the jab of
the pin or the touch of the hot pan.)86 CHAPTER V
II. To  understand  a  perceptual  proposition  one  does  not  need  to
understand any proposition asserting the existence of a subjective
perceptual sensation.
Therefore, the former sort of proposition does not entail the latter
sort.
3
Here the conclusion does not follow from the premiss. One could as
well argue that, since in order to understand the proposition that the
number of days in a week is seven one does not need to understand the
proposition that the number of days in a week is the cube root of 343, then
the former proposition does not entail the latter. It often happens that the
application of a more sophisticated concept is entailed by the application of
a  less  sophisticated  one.  Sophisticated  concepts  are  often  originally
fashioned so that they will be entailed by some already existing, more
common concepts. It is not part of the unsophisticated person's notion of a
stone that a stone contains neutrons if there are such things as neutrons, but
it is part of the sophisticated concept of a neutron that a stone (or any
matter) contains neutrons if there are such. It is part of the notions of
internal  angles  and  degrees  of  angles,  though  not  part  of  the
unsophisticated notion of a triangle, that the internal angles of a triangle
sum to 1800. It is part of the sophisticated notion of perceptual sensation,
though not of the unsophisticated notions of seeing, hearing, etc., that
perception contains perceptual sensation. (In such cases it would often be
misleading and unnecessary to say that the new concept brings out a part of
everyone's prior understanding of the more primitive concept; rather it is a
newly discovered or invented implication perhaps only lately thought of by
anybody.) Thus it is perfectly consistent (and also true) to say (a) that the
concept  of  perceptual  sensations  is  not  possessed  by  everyone  who
understands ordinary perceptual propositions and (b) that it is necessary to
introduce this concept in order to elucidate what is essentially involved in
perceptual facts.
III.   (1) At least for visual and auditory perceptions, the only way that the
perceptual sensations allegedly involved in them could be reported
by the subject would be by use of such forms of sentence as 'I
seem to see (hear) d' or 'It is as if I saw (heard) d' or 'It looks
(sounds) to me as if d'.PERCEPTUAL FACTS 87
  (2) But all proper uses of such locutions imply that the speaker thinks
that he does not see (hear) d or at least that he lacks confidence
that he does.
Therefore, such locutions could not truthfully be used to report
any subjective fact present in those cases where the speaker does
perceive and is quite confident that he does.
Therefore, no subjective perceptual sensations can be required in
all cases of a person's perceiving something.
This argument suffers from the defect that both its premisses are false.
Consider (2) first. It may be that ordinarily when one says something of the
form 'It seems to me as if I were seeing d' or 'It is as if I saw d' one means
to suggest either that one does not actually see d or that one has some doubt
whether one does. But, as Grice (1961) has effectively shown, the ordinary
implications  of  such  remarks  can  be  cancelled  without  falling  into
contradiction or absurdity. (They might be cancelled, for example, in the
context of an experimental investigation of perception, or in a special game
where one player is supposed to determine what, if anything, another
player  perceives  on  the  basis  of  the  latter's  reports  of  his  perceptual
sensations.) The vehicle of implication is not what is stated in uttering 'It is
as if I saw d' (the proposition) but rather the speaker's act of stating that
rather  than  something  else  (say,  'I  saw  d') in  the  context;  and  the
explanation  of  the  implication  is  the  general  presumption  in  rational
discourse that one does not say less than one knows that is relevant, the
same principle that explains how a speaker who asserts a disjunction may
thereby imply that he does not know which disjunct is true.
As for (1), there seems to be no logical obstacle to introducing a special
terminology that is specifically intended for reporting the nature of one's
perceptual sensations without implying any epistemic attitude whatever
towards any perceptual proposition. In fact various terminologies of just
this sort have been proposed.
4.    One proposal would have us use the regular perceptual verbs with
special modifiers and special sorts of objects. Thus the subjective sensory
fact involved in the fact that I see a tree could be reported by 'I directly
(inwardly) see a tree-like sense-datum (image, arrangement of colored
patches)'.
4 (The adverbial modifier could be dispensed with as long as the
object makes clear which use of the perceptual verb is intended.) The88 CHAPTER V
trouble with this sort of terminology is that it suggests that one's awareness
of the perceptual sensation is more analogous to perception (ordinarily so
called, that is, perception of external things) than it actually is; and in fact
this sort of terminology has often been proposed by philosophers who have
over-assimilated the two. They have been led to raise such insoluble
questions as whether the objects of direct perception can exist unperceived,
or whether thy have backsides. They have also been led to postulate that
perceivers must be aware of ('directly perceive') certain sorts of things that,
in fact, they are not necessarily or normally aware of while perceiving. For
example, it has often been insisted that one who sees an arrangement of
objects on a table as he moves round it must be aware of a constantly
changing two-dimensional mosaic of colored patches that represents the
unchanging  external  scene  from  the  changing  point  of  view  as  a
photograph would. And a number of properties commonly ascribed to
external objects — the 'secondary qualities' of color, sound, etc., — have
been thought to belong, not at all to external objects, but only to the objects
of 'inner perception'; on this view, for example, grass is never green (or any
color at all) but rather what is green, strictly speaking, is the visual sense-
datum that a normal perceiver directly sees when he indirectly sees grass.
Those are notorious pitfalls, but the main reason, from the point of view
of the analysis of perceptual knowledge, why one should avoid thinking of
awareness  of  sensations  as  analogous  to  perceiving  objects  is  that  it
naturally leads to thinking of one's knowledge of one's ordinary ('indirect')
perceptions as inferred from one's knowledge of one's present and past
'direct' perceptions — in the way that one infers fire from one's perception
of smoke and one's knowledge that smoke is usually caused by fire. But to
reject this terminology for describing perceptual sensations is not to reject
the  whole  idea  that  a  subjective  perceptual  sensation  is  an  essential
ingredient of a perception.
Other terminologies, free from such objectionable suggestions, are
possible. It has, for example, been proposed that we use sentences of the
form 'S is being appeared to d-ly' or 'S senses d-ly' or 'S senses in a manner'
for reporting the subjective ingredient of perceiving d.
5  This terminology,
in converting a description of an external thing into an adverb modifying
'sense' or the passive voice of 'appears', is intended to be free from the
implication either that the description fits the perceptual sensation or that it
fits a cause of the sensation or that the sensation consists of a 'direct'
perceptual relation to an 'inner' object. All to the good. But this sort ofPERCEPTUAL FACTS 89
terminology, though perhaps smooth enough when 'd' is 'red'. becomes
awkward when 'd' is 'an evergreen tree' and quite hopelessly clumsy when
'd' is 'a two-storied blue house with a red door framed by evergreen trees'.
We can achieve the same advantages and preserve a natural mode of
expression  by  adopting  the  following  way  of  describing  perceptual
sensations:
General: 'S's perceptual sensation is as if perceiving x in φ'
Specific perceptual modes:
'S's visual sensation is as if seeing x in φ’,
'S's auditory sensation is as if hearing x in φ', and so on,
where 'x in φ' is instantiated in the same way as it is in perceptual
statements.
Here what the subjective experience is like — what kind it is — is
conveyed by likening it to that more or less specific kind of experience
which, in the actual world, would normally occur as part of a perception of
x  in φ, and which, in the actual world, perceptions of x  in  φ, would
normally contain.
6
'A visual sensation as if seeing x in φ' will usually mean, then, a visual
sensation of that kind that, in the actual world, the normal perceiver would
have when seeing x in φ.  Usually, but not necessarily always; for x and φ
may be such that the normal visual preceiver could not see x in φ but an
abnormally acute visual perceiver could. Someone with super-sharp eyes
could see a small spot 20 feet away (in good light) that the person with
only normal vision could not see at that distance. Someone with eyes more
like those of a cat than is normal in human beings might be able to see
things in light so dim that the normal human visual perceiver could not see
those things in that light. In such cases the abnormally acute perceiver's
sensation may be just like what the normal perceiver has when seeing the
same thing in slightly more favorable circumstances, a slightly shorter
distance away or in slightly better light. If so, then there is a normal-
perceiver-way of specifying the kind of sensation that the abnormally acute
perceiver has in his abnormally acute seeing. In all clear cases of this sort,
the visual sensation that the abnormally acute perceiver has in seeing x in φ
(which cannot be seen by the normal perceiver) can be described as of the
same kind as the normal visual perceiver would have when seeing x in ψ,90 CHAPTER V
where ψ differs from φ only a little in its distance or lighting specification.
(The possibility of cases of abnormal seeing that differ more radically from
the normal in this way will be considered later, Section 11.)
But we should also allow for the possibility of an abnormally acute
perceiver who, in seeing x in circumstances in which the normal visual
perceiver cannot see x, has a visual sensation of a kind that a normal visual
perceiver would never have. Any possible case of this sort must, however,
be one in which the abnormal perceiver's visual sensation very much
resembles that of a normal visual perceiver when seeing x in ψ where ψ
differs from φ only a little in its distance or lighting specification.
'A visual sensation as if seeing x in φ' should, therefore, be interpreted in
the following way:  if the normal visual perceiver could see x in φ, then it
refers to the kind of sensation that the normal visual perceiver would have
when seeing x in φ; if the normal visual perceiver could not see x in φ, but φ
differs  only  a  little  in  its  distance  or  lighting  specification  from
circumstances in which a normal visual perceiver could see x, then it refers
to the kind of sensation that an abnormally acute visual perceiver would
have when seeing x in φ; otherwise, there is no kind of visual sensation to
which it refers.
In most circumstances one could infer the truths as to what a person
sees, and what his visual sensations are, that are of the plain sort that
interest us here, just from the fact that the person is a normal, mature visual
perceiver who is conscious with eyes open and working normally, together
with sufficient information about his environment, about the lighting and
what lies in the direction in which his eyes point. There is, however, one
sort of circumstance in which whether or not a person sees x in φ, towards
which his open eyes are directed, depends on a subjectively determined
factor that may vary from one occasion to another of normal, mature visual
perception. It  may be  that x is difficult to pick out visually  from  its
surroundings.  One normal visual perceiver may see and another may fail
to see the elephant shape in the tangle of lines of a puzzle picture, the only
difference being in a gestalt feature of the subjective experiences involved.
Thus 'the kind of visual sensation the normal visual perceiver has when
seeing x in φ' must be taken to refer to the kind that the normal perceiver
has when he is conscious, directs his open eyes towards x in φ and visually
picks out x. This last phrase is, of course, a virtual synonym for 'sees x', butPERCEPTUAL FACTS 91
it has the advantage of making it explicit that seeing x requires  this
subjectively determined organizational feature of the visual experience.
(There is the possibility that visual sensations of a given description of
the form 'as if seeing x in φ', however determinate the description may be,
still vary among normal perceivers seeing x in φ, in further respects that are
dependent solely on differences in the individual perceivers and not on
further differences in the external scenes they are seeing (differences not
ruled out by the description 'x in φ'). The features of a visual sensation of a
given  description  'as  if  seeing  x in φ' that do not vary among normal
perceivers seeing x in φ and do depend on its being x in φ that they are
seeing — the features that justify the description — also, of course, depend
partly on factors in the normal perceivers, as the case of abnormal visual
perceivers (for example, the color-blind) makes clear; and it is more than
likely that some of these subjective factors in turn depend partly on the
normal perceiver's having had a normal sort of background of perceptual
experience.)
The 'as if seeing (visually picking out)...' way of describing subjective
visual experience is free from the unfortunate temptations that we noted in
connection with speaking of the 'direct' seeing of special objects. For
instance, in order to characterize the changing aspect of one's visual
sensation as one moves around an unchanging scene we do not need to
posit a changing two-dimensional object (which cannot be identified with
anything in space). Instead we simply say that one's visual experience is as
if  one's  point  of  view  while  seeing  a  three-dimensional  scene  were
changing: no need for a changing object of seeing. (One can, of course,
make one's visual experience more like what it would be if one were seeing
a two-dimensional representation of the scene, perhaps by something like
squinting or just by being keenly interested in what it would be like if one
were seeing such.) Also, in not positing special, directly seen objects we do
not permit the view that 'secondary' qualities like color really belong only
to such special objects and not to external three-dimensional objects. It is
still possible to think that external three-dimensional objects do not really
have color, but this is perhaps a less attractive position if it entails that
nothing really has color.
The  'as  if  seeing  (visually  picking  out)...'  mode  of  describing  the
subjective experience necessarily involved in visual perception leaves as92 CHAPTER V
much room as one could want for further discovery of its nature. It leaves
room, for instance, for the account of what enables our visual experience to
prompt correct beliefs as to the spatial relations among objects we see (for
example, the belief that one sees one object in front of, or nearer than,
another) worked out by the psychologist James Gibson. According to him,
what is crucial are certain rather abstract features that remain invariant
through certain sorts of changes  in  the  subjective  visual  experience,
especially the changes that can be described as its being as if the perceiver's
point of view were moving relative to the objects seen. This is my own way
of putting Gibson's idea, which he puts by saying that seeing is the "pickup
of information" directly from invariant features of the "ambient optic array"
(the changing pattern of light rays converging on the eyes as they move
with respect to the seen environment) and by denying that seeing entails
having  visual  sensations,  which  he  thinks  of  as  awareness  of  two
dimensional arrays of color patches or of excitation at the retinas.
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This denial is surely right if it means only that visual perception does
not  entail  the  interpretation  or  cognitive  processing  of  such visual
sensations. Its being as if one were seeing a penny standing vertically on a
horizontal surface while moving round it is not a matter of having an
impression of a two-dimensional array of color patches subtly and rapidly
changing their shapes and going by some mental operation from this to the
impression of an unchanging three- dimensional layout. Or, to consider
another mode of perception, its being as if one were tracing with the other
end of a stick in one's hand the shape of a solid block is not a matter of
one's interpreting, or inferring from, one's awareness of sensations in one's
hand and arm, even if one could not have this experience without having
such sensations. The 'as if seeing...' and 'as if feeling...' descriptions of
these subjective experiences are as brute descriptions of them as can be
given.
But Gibson's denial is surely wrong if it means that visual perception
does  not  entail  a  kind  of  subjective  experience  peculiar  to  seeing.
Perception in any mode requires a kind of subjective experience more
specific to that mode than is implied in Gibson's phrase "picking up
information about the environment". (And it does not really entail the
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see, though it normally is the means to this.) If one closes one's eyes and
moves about a familiar room one can at each position easily think how the
surfaces in the room are laid out with respect to that position (vertical white
wall near on my left, vertical yellow wall further away on my right,
horizontal red rug beneath my feet, sofa immediately behind me, etc.). One
can  have  a  kind  of  active  awareness  of  the  arrangement  of  one's
environment that does not involve even visualizing it, much less having
visual experience. Having this kind of awareness of the environment would
not be seeing it, no matter how one came to have it, even if it somehow
resulted from light striking one's retinas.
If we adopt 'visual sensation as if seeing x in φ' as the standard mode of
describing the subjective experience ingredient in seeing external things, as
I think we should, there will be circularity in our analysis of seeing. Since
one component of the analysis will be specified by an expression of that
form, someone who did not already understand 'seeing' well enough to be
able to identify instances in his own experience to which 'seeing' applies
could not be given this understanding by this analysis. But this does not
mean that the analysis will be trivial and uninformative. For one thing, as
we have already noted, in implying that seeing external objects necessarily
involves subjective sense-experience, which could occur in the absence of
any  seeing  of  external  objects,  the  analysis  makes  a  substantive  and
controversial point.
8 For another thing, as we will see, there is plenty of
room for error in stating how the subjective visual experience must be
related to the subject's environment if his having that experience is to count
as his seeing some of that environment.
As far as I can see, we are in any case compelled to describe subjective
visual experience by referring to the kinds that would be ingredient in the
normal seeing of this or that external scene. There seems to be no way of
describing visual experience that is not parasitic on the language of seeing
external things. Consider the following visual-sensation description: 'My
visual sensation is as if I were seeing in clear sunlight an expanse of wild
flowers of various bright colors stretching out before me towards a large
stand of evergreen trees under a cloudless sky'. This, though fairly succinct,
is richly informative about the nature of the sensation. Even if one tried to
describe the same visual sensation by speaking only of the shapes, colors,
relative sizes and spatial relations of the surfaces that it is as if one were
seeing — and such a description would have to be very long to be as
informative about the visual sensation as the one just given — one would94 CHAPTER V
still be relying on the 'as-if-seeing-such-and-such-an-external-scene' recipe
for describing visual sensations. Even if one supposed (with, for example,
Berkeley) that one could convey the nature of this visual sensation by
speaking of the subject as 'directly seeing' (or 'visually sensing') a two-
dimensional mosaic of variously colored patches, one would still be relying
on this recipe. We really have no other.
Why do we have no way of specifying the kinds of sensations that are
ingredient in our perceptions that does not depend on our language for
specifying the objective appearances we perceive? The reason, I think, is
this: the only reactions we make to our perceptual sensations that can serve
as criteria of their various kinds,
9 with the specificity necessary to explain
the specificity and accuracy of our perceptual beliefs prompted by those
sensations, are the reactions that show the kinds of external things those
sensations prompt us to believe we perceive. The only dispositions to react
to our various perceptual sensations that we have or acquire that could
serve as our basis for discriminating so many various specific kinds among
them are the dispositions to react to them by forming certain perceptual
beliefs or at least finding certain perceptual propositions tempting to
believe (dispositions without which one could not be said to understand the
perceptual propositions involved). It is difficult to imagine any other sort of
reactions that could count as our discriminating such various and specific
kinds among our perceptual sensations. We get our purchase on concepts of
kinds of perceptual sensations through our grasp of kinds of perceptions,
and it is hard to see how it could be otherwise.
5.   For S to see x in φ it is necessary for S to have a visual sensation of one
of a limited range of kinds and necessary also that his having that kind of
sensation should result in a certain way from there being x in φ.  What one
sees are those things in one's environment that affect one's visual sensations
in the right sort of way.  So much is easy.  It is more difficult to spell out
the right sort of way in which a thing must cause ones s visual sensations in
order to be seen. It is obvious that not everything that plays a part in
bringing it about that S has a visual sensation of a certain sort is thereby
seen by S. The condition of S's optic nerve may affect the nature of all of
S's visual sensations without his ever seeing his optic nerve. When S sees a
train coming down the track, he does not see the fire and water in the
locomotive although they are factors in causing the smoke and steam and
motion  of  wheels  that  he  does  see,  and  thereby  the  visual  sensationPERCEPTUAL FACTS 95
ingredient in his seeing the train come down the track. The problem is what
to add to the account of the relation obtaining between a visual sensation
and a non-mental thing that obtains just in case the subject of that sensation
sees that thing.
It seems plausible to think that the description of what S sees, in having
a certain visual sensation, must, besides specifying a thing that plays a part
in  producing  that  sensation,  also  match  in  a  certain way  the correct
description of the sensation. (This suggestion is reminiscent of, though not
the same as, Descartes' and Locke's view that the ideas of sense resemble
the properties of the objects whose causing of those ideas constitutes our
perceiving those objects.
10) Suppose S can be said to see a locomotive
issuing steam and smoke several hundred yards down the track in clear
daylight because such a locomotive (in conjunction with other factors) is
causing in S a visual sensation as if seeing a locomotive issuing steam and
smoke... etc. Here we have a matching in the fact that the description of
what S sees, 'a locomotive issuing steam and smoke... etc.'), also serves
when prefixed by 'as if seeing' to describe S's visual sensation rather
definitely: his sensation is as if he were seeing a locomotive... etc. But,
supposing that the locomotive has water inside it, S could also be said to
see something that has water inside it several hundred yards down the track
in clear daylight, although no very definite visual sensation is described by
'a visual sensation as if seeing something with water inside it... etc.' So it
seems that the required matching entails this: the description of what S sees
must  pick out the same thing as  some  description  of  what  S's  visual
sensation is as if he were seeing that is sufficiently informative about the
nature of the visual sensation. This it may do either by virtue of the fact
that the two descriptions are the same or by virtue of the fact that what the
latter description picks out is, as a matter of fact, identical with what the
former picks out (the locomotive is something that has water inside it).
6.   In order to develop a more precise analysis of the truth conditions for
visual perception propositions that incorporates these ideas, I want first to
distinguish  what  I  shall  call  the  pure  and  the  impure  among  such
propositions.  Pure  visual  perception  propositions  include  just  those
propositions of the form 'S sees d' in which the scene-description 'd' is such
that it could not be altered (for example, by deleting components or
replacing components with less specific components) in such a way as to
produce a more general scene-description 'd*' (that is, 'd*' is entailed by96 CHAPTER V
but does not entail 'd'), without its being the case also that the description 'a
visual  sensation  as  if  one  were  seeing  d*' is  more  general  than  the
description 'a visual sensation as if one were seeing d', that is, the range of
kinds of visual sensations to which the former applies includes and is
greater than that to which the latter applies. Impure visual perception
propositions are just those that are not pure.
Consider the visual perception proposition 'S sees the front of a large
red house, which contains a purple closet off one of its upstairs bedrooms
in clear daylight about 50 yards away at roughly a right angle to his line of
sight'. Here the phrase 'which contains a purple closet off one of its upstairs
bedrooms'  represents  an  obvious  impurity  from  the  point  of  view  of
reporting just what S sees and no more, because it describes a fact about
what S sees that makes absolutely no difference to the sort of visual
sensation that what he sees produces in him in this seeing of it. That is, the
description 'a visual sensation as if one were seeing the front of a large red
house, which contains a purple closet off one of its upstairs bedrooms, in
clear daylight about 50 yards away at roughly a right angle to one's line of
sight' would not fit any more (or fewer) kinds of visual sensations if the
clause 'which contains a purple closet... etc.' were deleted entirely.
But the visual perception proposition that remains after deleting that
clause is still not pure. It is true that if we were to take the description 'a
visual sensation as if one were seeing the front of a large red house in clear
daylight about 50 yards away at roughly a right angle to his line of sight'
and delete 'large' or 'red', or replace 'house' with 'building' or 'structure' or
'thing', we would obtain a description that would fit more different kinds of
visual sensations than would the original. But suppose we replace all of 'the
front of a large red house... etc.' with 'something that presents to one's view
surfaces that are (in their shapes, colors and spatial relations to each other)
such as the front of a large red house in clear daylight about fifty yards
away at roughly a right angle to one's line of sight would present to one's
view'. The result is a description that fits exactly the same kinds of visual
sensations as the original, no more and no less. But the scene-description
obtained  from  'the  front  of  a  large  red  house...  etc.'  by  making  the
replacement just mentioned is clearly more general than the original, since
it is quite possible that something that is not the front of a large red house
...  etc.,  should  present  to  one's  view surfaces  that are just like those
presented by the front of a large red house ... etc. (and the contrapositive is
not possible).PERCEPTUAL FACTS 97
Do  we,  then,  arrive  at  a pure perceptual  proposition  in  'S  sees
something that presents to his view surfaces that are... etc.?' lam afraid not.
There  is  still  one  more  device  —  and  a  very  important  one  for  our
subsequent discussion — that we can use to increase the generality of the
scene-description without increasing the generality of the visual sensation
description that results from prefixing to the scene-description 'a visual
sensation as if one were seeing...' We can add to the beginning of the
scene-description the phrase 'something that from S's present point of view
looks (has the same appearance) as would...'.
Here, 'from S's present point of view looks as would x in φ' means the
same as 'from the point S occupies and in the present appearance-affecting
circumstances looks as x would look in φ'. This ascribes a certain objective
appearance to that of which it is predicated; something that is never
actually seen may, nevertheless, look as would x in φ, from certain points
of view." Something in the appearance-affecting relations it has to S —
suppose it is y in θ — looks as x would look in φ just in case y in θ looks to
a normal visual perceiver as x would look in φ. And this will be so just in
case  y in  θ would have the same effect on the visual sensation of a
conscious normal perceiver who directs his open eyes towards it and
visually picks it out as would x in φ. That is, the range of kinds of visual
sensation a conscious normal perceiver would be caused to have when
directing his open eyes towards and visually picking out y in θ falls within
the range he would be caused to have when directing his open eyes towards
and visually picking out x in φ. (If the first range overlaps but does not fall
entirely within the second, then y in θ sometimes looks as would x in φ and
sometimes does not, depending on further factors not implied in those
scene-descriptions.)
Thus, for example: a puddle of white gasoline on the pavement a few
feet away in ordinary daylight looks as would a puddle of water in the same
circumstances; a piece of canvas painted in a certain way standing about 50
feet away in stage lighting looks as would the front of a bookcase full of
books in the same circumstances; full-sized cars 1000 feet below look as
would tiny models of cars only 20 feet below; white lattice work 100 feet
away looks as would a solid white surface 10 feet away; a pink surface in
ordinary light looks as would a white surface in red light; a circular surface
at a certain angle to one's line of sight and far enough away looks as would98 CHAPTER V
an  elliptical  surface  perpendicular  to  one's  line  of  sight  at  the  same
distance.
Note that 'y in θ looks as would x in φ' is vacuously true when y presents
no appearance at all in θ and x presents none in φ; that is, when the normal
perceiver could not see y in θ or x in φ. Thus, in utter darkness a stalactite
presents the same appearance as a stalagmite or anything else in utter
darkness, namely, no appearance at all; and a stalactite in utter darkness
looks the way a penny in clear light 500 yards away looks, namely, no way
at all. And if a normal perceiver cannot see x in φ then he cannot see
something that from his present point of view looks as would x in φ, that is,
looks no way at all.
A satisfactorily general criterion for when 'x in φ' is visually vacuous in
this way — for when x and φ are such that the normal perceiver could not
be said to see x in φ, though directing open eyes toward x in φ — is not as
straightforward as one might at first think. It would be too simple to say it
is a matter of whether or not being in 4, would permit x to have any effect
on the visual sensation of the normal perceiver facing it with open eyes.
The water and fire inside the locomotive ultimately have an effect on the
visual sensation of one who sees the locomotive's wheels move, but that
perceiver does not on that account see that water and fire. The shape of a
cardboard box completely wrapped in bright paper contributes to the kind
of sensation the perceiver has in seeing the parcel, but the perceiver does
not thereby see the cardboard box itself.
The main factors that determine whether x  in φ  affects  the  visual
sensation of the normal perceiver (facing it with open eyes) in the right sort
of way for it to be said that the perceiver thereby sees x seem to be these:
(1) how distinctive x's shape is and (2) how various the shapes are that
could be substituted for x's without varying the effect in φ on the visual
sensation of a normal perceiver (facing it with open eyes). Thus a normal
perceiver could perhaps be said to see a football completely enclosed in a
tight-fitting cover a few feet away in good light, but hardly a basketball or
a brick. One can see a boat enclosed in a tight-fitting opaque cover, but not
one enclosed in an opaque box. One can see a light source (which must
have a more or less definite shape) when it is in front of one and there is
nothing but air intervening, but not when it is behind one or on the other
side of an opaque screen.
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When we prefix the phrase 'something that from one's present point of
view looks as would...' to the scene-description 'something that presents
surfaces that are ... etc.' we produce a more general scene-description,
because it is possible that there should be a kind of external scene that does
not satisfy the original description (without the prefix) but that has the
same objective appearance as one that does — perhaps something rigged
up with special lighting or mirrors or clever use of perspective. Yet the
description 'a visual sensation as if one were seeing something that from
one's present point of view looks as would something having surfaces that
are... etc.' must apply to precisely the same kinds of visual sensations as
does 'a visual sensation as if one were seeing something having surfaces
that are ... etc.'
We can generalize the point. Given any scene-description 'd' that is not
visually vacuous and that does not itself begin with the phrase 'something
that from one's present point of view looks as would...' (or an equivalent
phrase), the prefixing of that phrase to that scene-description yields a new
scene-description  that  is  more  general  than  'd',  since  it  is  always
conceivable that there be a kind of scene that is not d but that looks as
would  d; but the description 'a visual sensation as if one were seeing
something that looks as would 'd' must be satisfied by just the same kinds
of visual sensations as satisfy 'a visual sensation as if one were seeing d'.
So, for any such scene-description 'd', the proposition that S sees d must be
perceptually impure. (If 'd' is visually vacuous then it cannot be shown
impure by attaching that prefix, as we saw. But there will always be
another way in which any visually vacuous scene-description 'd' can be
made more general without making 'a visual sensation as if one were seeing
d' more general. For example, 'stalactites a few feet away in utter darkness'
could be changed to 'mineral objects a few feet away in utter darkness~ and
'a small nail in clear light 500 yards away' could be changed to 'an object
smaller than a golf ball in clear light 500 yards away.')
In propositions of the form 'S sees something that looks from his present
point of view as would something having surfaces that are... etc.' we finally
reach examples of pure perceptual propositions. In fact, any proposition
expressed by a sentence of the form 'S sees something that looks from his
present point of view as would d' must be pure. For no matter what 'd' is
and no matter how perceptually impure 'S sees d' is, the scene-description
'something that looks from his present point of view as would d' cannot be100 CHAPTER V
made more general without becoming one that, when prefixed by 'a visual
sensation as if one were seeing...', would yield a more general visual-
sensation description than would the original. The prefix 'something that
looks from his present point of view as would...' neutralizes the impurities
of a scene-description 'd' so that their remaining or being removed can
make no difference to the range of scenes that fit the resulting description
'something that looks from his present point of view as would d' and,
hence,  can  make  none  to  the  range  of  visual  sensations  that  fit  the
description 'a visual sensation as if he were seeing something that looks
from his present point of view as would d'.
7.    An  impurity  in  a  visual-perception  proposition  'S  sees  d' is  an
implication of the scene-description 'd' that components of the scene have
properties that are not themselves seen. We have illustrated one way in
which this can happen: the description of what the subject sees implies that
the subject is not in a position to see certain parts of it that make it satisfy
certain implications of the description. A different way in which impurity
may intrude is for the description of what is seen to imply a property that is
not a proper object of sight.
13 The proper objects of sight do not include
qualities of sound or taste or odor, so that the emphasized phrases in 'S sees
billowing, black, acrid smoke', 'S sees a round, red, and deliciously tart
apple', and 'S sees a loudly  roaring  jet  airplane'  all  represent  explicit
impurities in these visual propositions. And 'S feels a shiny smooth stone in
his  pocket',  'S  hears  brightly  colored  parrots  chattering',  'S  smells
billowing, black acrid smoke', and 'S tastes bright red flakes of paprika in
the soup' give examples of explicit impurities for perceptual propositions in
other modes.
To say that these descriptive terms are impurities in those perceptual
propositions is not to deny that a subject's knowledge or belief or thought
that, for example, a freshly bitten apple is deliciously tart may affect in a
special way the quality of his visual experience as he sees the apple. To say
that an apple looks tart to a subject may mean nothing more than that he is
inclined to infer that it is tart from certain properties of it that he sees in a
perfectly strict and straightforward sense, for example, its coloring.  But
something else, something about his visual experience, in a broad sense,
could be meant by saying that the apple looks tart to him, or, better, by
saying that he sees it as tart. Many experiments of psychologists as well as
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like that a subject has with respect to what he thinks he perceives can
affect, not merely the inferences he is inclined to draw from what he thinks
he perceives, but the nature of his perceptual experience. A fire can, in this
special sense, look hot, and an air conditioner can, perhaps, sound cool.
The visual experience of one who sees an apple and wants very much to eat
it may be, because of that desire, different from the visual experience of
one who sees the same apple but is not at all interested in eating it. The
visual experience of one who stares at a painting trying to determine who
painted it may be different from that of one who stares at it trying to
determine whether it is a painting or a photograph. The visual experience
of one who sees an ambiguous drawing as a picture of one thing is different
from that of one who sees it as a picture of a different thing.
All such differences and qualities in perceptual experience depend in
some way on the subject's having concepts or beliefs or desires or the like
that originate outside the perception and that he brings to it. One who had
no idea of what a rabbit is could not see an ambiguous drawing as a picture
of a rabbit, and one who had no idea of what a tart taste is could not have
the peculiar visual experience (if there be such) of seeing an apple as tart.
Such qualities belong to an extra dimension or level of the description of
perceptual experience. 1 have discussed it this much, not in order to
investigate it, but merely to indicate what is ignored in the narrower,
plainer sort of descriptions of perceptual facts, and of sensations ingredient
in them, that I am concerned with in investigating the questions of what a
perceptual fact is and how a subject knows perceptual facts about himself.
Descriptions falling within this special extra dimension of perceptual
experience are such that when one is true of a subject he must think that it
is. He cannot see lines on paper as a drawing of a rabbit unless he thinks he
sees them as a drawing of a rabbit. An apple cannot look tart to him, in the
sense that implies something special about his visual experience, unless he
thinks that it looks tart to him. Whereas descriptions of the sort I am
concerned with (of the form 'S perceives x in φ', 'S perceives something
that appears as would x in φ', and 'S's perceptual sensation is as if he were
perceiving x in φ') can be true of a subject without his thinking that they
are. A small boy may see a Boeing 707 jet airliner on the ground in clear
daylight at about fifty yards away on his left on a line of sight forming a
450 angle with a line running from its nose to its tail, and have a visual
sensation as if he were seeing that, while at the same time he may be
ignorant  that  either  of  these  descriptions  is  true  of  him  because  he102 CHAPTER V
understands  scarcely  any  of  the  expressions  that  make  them  up.  The
specifications of visual perceptions and their ingredient sensations that I am
interested in here are the ones whose applicability do not depend (logically)
on any special knowledge, desires, thoughts, attitudes, and the like, that the
particular subject may then have with respect to what he sees.
8.    With this understanding of the notion of a visual proposition, and of
how to distinguish the pure from the impure, let us turn to the task of
giving the truth conditions for such propositions.
For the impure case, matters are not too difficult:
If 's sees d' expresses an impure perceptual proposition, then S sees d
if and only if there is a description 'x in φ' such that 'S sees x in φ'
entails 'S sees d' (and is thus impure) and S sees x in φ.
If 'S sees x in φ' is impure, then S sees x in φ if and only if
(i) S sees something that from S's present point of view looks as
would x in φ and
(ii) this something is x in φ.
Thus impure visual perception entails pure visual perception: a subject sees
something of visually impure description if and only if it is identical with
something of  visually pure  description that he  sees.  Condition (ii)  is
essential, of course, because, although it is always true that if S sees x in φ
then S sees something that looks from S's present point of view as would x
in φ, the converse does not always hold: facing a well-made wax imitation,
S sees something that looks from his present point of view just as would,
but is not, an apple a few feet away in ordinary light.
9.    The pure case will be more complicated. We can start by listing the
already  clear  requirements  of  sensation,  external  object,  and  causal
connection. S sees something that looks from his present point of view as
would x in φ only if
(i) S has a visual sensation as if seeing x in φ, (or some recognizable
distortion of that sort of sensation),
(ii)there is something that looks from S's present point of view as would
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     (iii) this  something  specified  in  (ii)  contributes  to  causing  the
sensation specified in (i).
Condition (i) implies that 'x in φ' is not visually vacuous, that a normal
or abnormally acute visual perceiver could see x in φ and, hence, something
that looks as would x in φ.   For if the world is such that the normal or
abnormally acute visual perceiver could not see x in φ then it is such that
there is no kind of visual sensation that is as if one were seeing x in φ.  I do
not mean merely that there are no instances of that kind (in the way that
there are, perhaps, no instances of the kind of visual sensation that is as if
seeing a short distance away in ordinary daylight an animal with the body
of a large frog and the head of a small anteater). I mean that there is no
concept of that kind, no possibility that any sensation should count as one
of that kind, that whatever sort of visual sensation one might imagine there
is nothing to make it count as imagining an instance of that kind. In a
similar way, since there is in fact no such thing as seeing sound pitched at
middle C, there is in this world no kind of visual sensation as if one were
seeing sound pitched at middle C: no one knows what to do in order to
follow the instruction 'Imagine the experience of seeing sound pitched at
middle C' (which is not to say that in no possible world is there seeing such
a sound or that kind of visual sensation).
In condition (i) the parenthetical phrase 'or some recognizable distortion
of that sort of sensation' is intended to cover such distortions of the
sensation as would be produced by squinting, pressure on the eyeball, color
blindness or other mild defects of the eye, drugs, and the like. (Unusual
external  distorters  of  a  visual  perception,  such  as  properties  of  the
intervening medium or the lighting, may appear in the 'in φ' component of
the perceptual proposition.) This is pretty vague, but I think that such
vagueness in the analysis is inescapable. The concept of seeing something
just is pretty vague in that respect: the established use of 'see' does not
reflect precise rules as to just how much abnormality (with respect to the
shapes, colors, their spatial relations, distances, lighting, etc., it is as if one
were seeing) there must be in the visual sensation produced in a subject by
a scene towards which he directs his open eyes before we have to say that
he does not see that scene.
Vague as it is, however, condition (i) still has the consequence that S
may fail to see a thing that from his present point of view looks as would x104 CHAPTER V
in 4) and that contributes to causing him to have a visual sensation, owing
to the fact that the sensation is not as if he were seeing x in φ) or some
recognizable distortion thereof. If, for example, the scene towards which S
directs his open eyes looks from his present point of view as would a field
of varicolored wild flowers stretching out to a green forest under a blue sky
in clear sunshine but, because of some unusual factor, it causes S to have a
visual sensation as if he were seeing an endless expanse of snow under a
leaden sky through frosted spectacles, then there can be no question that S
does not see the scene before him. (In such a case it could be that the
process by which the external scene contributes to causing S's sensation is
the normal one (involving light reflected from the scene entering S's eyes
and stimulating their retinas, which stimulus acts on S's brain through the
optic nerve in the usual way) and the abnormal nature of the sensation thus
caused results from an unusual additional influence in the brain or mind of
the subject.)
In fact, it is an insufficiency of our three necessary conditions, as
formulated so far, that they do not go far enough in the match they require
between the objective appearance of what S sees and S's visual sensation.
The analysis is so phrased that, at the most, only such very general, wide
disparity as was just exemplified is ruled out. That this is not enough can
be shown by an example. Suppose S has:
 (1)  a visual sensation as if seeing in clear light a few feet away
against a white background a bright blue sphere about the size of
a basketball,
(1) entails the following more general description:
 (2)  a visual sensation as if seeing in clear light a few feet away
against a contrasting background a brightly colored object smaller
than a breadbox.
Now suppose that S is caused to have sensation (1) by the fact that his
open eyes are directed towards a bright red cube smaller than a tennis ball a
few feet away in clear light against a green background (in combination
with some strange influences in his brain). If this is the case it is clear that
S sees no scene that looks from S's viewpoint as would a bright blue
sphere... etc. A bright red cube... etc., in the circumstances mentioned does
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scene having such an appearance that S could be seeing. And it seems out
of the question that in having sensation (1) a subject could ever be seeing a
bright red cube... etc., or a scene that looks from the subject's point of view
as would a bright red cube... etc. (The phrase 'or some recognizable
distortion of that sort of sensation' will not stretch that far.) But if, in
having sensation (1) as a result of there being a bright red cube... etc., S
sees neither a scene that looks from his present point of view as would a
bright red cube... etc., nor a scene that looks from his present point of view
as would a bright blue sphere ... etc., then he surely cannot, in having
sensation (1), see a scene that looks from his present point of view as
would a brightly colored object... etc.; this despite the fact that he has
sensation (2) and the fact that a scene that looks from his present point of
view as would a brightly colored object... etc., is causing him, by the usual
channels, to have sensation (2).
These last two facts would, however, if the three conditions so far given
were sufficient for pure visual perception, make this a case in which S sees
something that looks from his present point of view as would a brightly
colored object... etc. The difficulty is that at a sufficiently general level of
description the visual sensation the subject is caused to have by the scene
he faces may match the appearance of that scene (from the subject's point
of view) but at a more specific level they may be so far from matching that
we  can hardly say  that the subject sees  that which  causes  his  visual
sensation. We can avoid this difficulty and secure a match at a sufficiently
specific  level  if  we  complicate  condition  (ii)  somewhat.  Instead  of
requiring merely that the scene S sees match his visual sensation in the
respect that it looks from his present point of view as would x in φ, we
should  require  that  it  also  match  it  in  that  way  for  every  stronger
description  of  the  form  'as  if  seeing  y  in  θ' that his visual sensation
satisfies. That is, (ii) should read as follows:
for every description 'y in θ' such that it entails 'x in φ' and
S's visual sensation is also as if seeing y in θ (or some recognizable
distortion of that sensation), there is something that looks from S's
present point of view as would y in θ.
10.    But even with this elaboration of (ii) our three necessary conditions
still fail to be sufficient for S's seeing something that looks from his present
point of view as would x in φ.106 CHAPTER V
Consider the following possible case: S has the peculiarity that, no
matter what sort of pattern of light enters his eyes, it always causes him to
have exactly the same sort of visual sensation — say, as if seeing in
ordinary light a uniformly blue surface that fills his field of view. The
causal process leading from the light patterns striking his retinas to his
visual sensation is such that it fails to preserve in the sensation any of the
variation in the light patterns.
Clearly,  S  never  sees  anything  external,  not  even  when  the  three
conditions so far specified are satisfied, that is, when his open eyes happen
to be directed towards something that looks from his present point of view
as would a uniformly blue surface in ordinary light filling his field of view.
The problem is with (iii), the causal condition. And the problem is that
our peculiar S's visual sensation is, even when he satisfies (i)—(iii), not
caused by a process such that its operation will make the caused sensation
match the causing scene in the manner implied in (i) and (ii) through any
relevant variations in the causing scene. For our peculiar S, no matter how
the causing scene varies, with respect to such properties as the shape and
distance of objects and the color of objects and lighting, it makes no
intrinsic difference to the caused visual sensation.
The problem remains if we change the example so that S has this
peculiarity only for a short time, the rest of the time seeing external things
normally (that is, the light reflected from those things to his eyes causes his
visual sensations by the normal process, one that makes the sensations vary
in accordance with variations in the external things in the usual fashion).
Still S does not see anything during this short period of his peculiarity,
even if, by coincidence, his visual sensation and the scene towards which
he directs his open eyes at certain points during that period happen to
match in the manner implied by (i) and (ii). For another example of this
sort, suppose an S who usually sees normally but on one occasion, when
S's eyes happen for some reason to be insensitive to light striking them, the
turning on of a beam of light at a little distance in front of S's open eyes
causes something to fall on his head and thereby causes S to have a visual
sensation as if seeing a beam of light a little distance in front of him. It is
clear that, in obtaining that visual sensation in that manner, S does not see
that beam of light (or anything else external). Yet S does satisfy the three
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What is missing, and what is essential in every instance of seeing
something that looks from the perceiver's point of view as would x in 4), is
the  following:  the  sensation,  specified  in  (i),  must  be  caused  by  the
matching scene, as specified in revised (ii), by a match-ensuring sort of
process; that is, one such that the operation of that sort of process will
generally make the caused sensation match the causing scene in the manner
implied by (i) and (ii), no matter how the causing scene varies in the
relevant respects. And this is, I believe, the only further restriction on the
causal condition in pure visual perception that is needed.
There are, however, certain other restrictions that might seem necessary
that we should examine. In the first place, it might be thought that the
causal process from external thing to visual sensation must, in all seeing
properly so-called, be the same as the one that occurs in actual normal
vision. Suppose that neurological experimenters rig up to some person an
artificial device that takes the place of the optic nerves that connect the
eyes with that part of the brain on which vision depends. Given the same
input from the eyes, this artificial device delivers the same output to the
brain as would the optic nerves; but, let us suppose, the process by which it
transforms the one into the other is very different from what occurs in the
normal optic nerves. (We can imagine the device to be a large contraption,
partly electronic and partly mechanical, which is outside the subject's body
and attached to his head with wires.) Through this device the light striking
the subject's eyes causes him to have the same sort of visual sensation that
a normal perceiver would have were he directing his open eyes upon the
same scene from the same point of view, and causes his sensation to vary
in accord with variation in the scene in the same way that it would in a
normal  perceiver.  The  substantial  difference  here  from  the  normal
paradigm might incline some to say that this subject, with this artificial
device in place of optic nerves, does not really see the external scenes that
his visual sensations reflect; but I think that the more natural thing to say,
on due consideration, would be that this subject sees all right, but by partly
artificial means.
Another sort of addition to the causal condition, one that I have found
more tempting, would require the match-ensuring causal process to operate
over some suitably specified significant portion of S's visual experience if
its operation in him on any particular occasion is to count as his seeing an
external thing. Consider again our peculiar S whose inner mechanisms are108 CHAPTER V
such that any sort of light striking his eyes causes him to have a visual
sensation as if seeing a uniformly blue surface that fills his field of view.
Suppose that this S often has this sensation and for long periods of time,
but that once in a great while something temporarily flips over in his brain
and makes him for a short time like the normally sighted person, so that
while in that temporary condition his visual sensation is being caused by
the normal process that would ensure the normal sort of variation in the
sensation as the external scene upon which his open eyes are directed
varies. But on these few rare occasions when S is in that normal condition
he happens to be directing his open eyes upon a uniformly blue expanse
that fills his field of view. So S's visual sensation never varies. Can we,
nevertheless, say that on those rare occasions when his sensation is caused
via the normal process by something that looks as would a uniformly blue
surface... etc., and only on them, he does see the scene before him? This
case is so different from the paradigm of a sighted person, who relies on his
sight to guide him around his environment, that it may seem wrong to say
this. This sort of case — and others that can be imagined, such as a subject
who has varied visual sensations that are like those of a normally sighted
person but are only infrequently caused in the normal way by matching
external  scenes,  usually  being  caused  by  a  powerful  demon  bent  on
deceiving him — might make us think that most of S's visual sensations (or
at any rate most of those not so discordant with the rest as to give him
reason to suspect that he is hallucinating) must be produced by a match-
ensuring causal process from the external environment, if any of his visual
sensations so caused are to count as seeing. Otherwise, we might reason, S
would have no way of telling, with any reliability, when he really sees and
when  he  does  not.  He  could  not  rely  on  his  visual  sensations  for
information about his environment without their misleading him more
often than not. But one who sees, who has sight, is, surely, one who has in
his visual sensations a reliable guide to his environment. This last dictum is
true, I think, but only if it is taken to mean that one sees over a given period
only if one's visual sensations over that period offer a reliable guide to
one's environment. But this follows already from the three conditions, as
amended,  that  I  have  admitted  to  be  necessary.  In  order  to  yield  an
objection to the sufficiency of these three conditions, the dictum must be
taken to mean something else, something false, namely, that one sees on
any particular occasion only if one sees with sufficient frequency to be said
to have in the totality of one's visual sensations a generally reliable guide to
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I am proposing to let the question whether S's having a visual sensation
on a particular occasion counts as his seeing something be decided solely
by the sort of process by which his sensation is caused on that occasion.
Someone may still think it an objection to this to point out that a subject
who satisfies my three conditions on a particular occasion, will be unlikely
to have the concept  of seeing  things in his environment if his visual
sensations as a whole (according to his current memory impressions) have
been too much the same or, on the other hand, too chaotic; for then it
would be unlikely that this subject would have the sort of expectations in
response to his visual sensations that are necessary to understanding any
visual perception proposition about himself. This may well be so, but if it
is, my proposal is unaffected, for it does not seem necessary that a person,
or other conscious creature, have an understanding of the proposition that
he sees x in φ, or any concept of seeing at all, in order to see x in φ.  It
seems perfectly coherent to suppose a creature who occasionally sees
things in his environment but is prevented, by the infrequency of his doing
so or his having at other times too chaotic or too monotonous visual
sensations,  from  ever  realizing  that  he  occasionally  sees,  from  ever
behaving (bodily or mentally) in ways that would manifest beliefs that he
sees certain sorts of things, from over having so much as the idea of seeing.
I think, then, that we may consider that no further restrictions on our
conditions are necessary in order to make them sufficient and that we may
propose the following as a plausible analysis of the truth-conditions for
pure visual perception propositions: S sees something that looks from his
present point of view as would x in φ if and only if
(i)  S has a visual sensation as if he were seeing x in φ (or some
recognizable distortion of that sort of sensation),
(ii)  for every description 'y in θ' such that it entails 'x in φ' and S's
visual sensation is also as if he were seeing y in θ (or some
recognizable distortion thereof), there is something that looks
from S's present point of view as would y in θ, and
     (iii) the sensation specified in (i) is caused by the thing specified in
(ii) via a process of a sort whose operation would generally make
the caused sensation match the causing scene in the manner
implied by (i) and (ii).110 CHAPTER V
11.   I would like to be able to leave the analysis of visual perception at that
(and perhaps I should), but there is a further question. It concerns cases in
which no actual perceiver could see x in φ because x's being in φ, or the
perceiver's failing to direct open eyes towards x, would prevent it.  Is it not
at least possible that there should be a radically abnormal visual perceiver
who could see x in φ in such cases where no actual perceiver (whether
normal or abnormally acute) could?  Consider a few examples.
Suppose we know that S is (somehow) caused by the fact that his open
eyes are directed toward a small white bird circling two miles away in a
sunny, clear, otherwise empty sky to have a visual sensation as if he were
seeing a small white bird circling about 50 yards away... etc. It is as if his
eyes were powerful binoculars (at least at the time) — and, indeed, the
explanation might be that his eyes do resemble binoculars, but that does not
matter.  If  we  know  that  this  same  sort  of  thing  happens  to  S  with
significant regularity or over significant periods, are we not tempted to say
in such a case that S sees a small bird circling two miles away ... etc.?
Or suppose that S is (somehow) caused by the fact that his open eyes are
directed towards some stalactites a few feet away in utter darkness to have
a visual sensation as if he were seeing those very stalactites in their actual
relations to him in good light. It is as if something other than light acts as
light for his eyes. If we know that this same sort of thing happens to S with
significant regularity or over significant periods, are we not tempted to say
that S sees stalactites before him in utter darkness?
Or, finally, suppose that we know that certain scenes currently visible
on a stage from a certain point in a theatre that is 2000 miles away from S,
cause S (when he closes his eyes and tries to make his mind go blank) to
have visual sensations as if he were seeing precisely those scenes from that
point — it is as if he were viewing very large-screen, 3-dimensional,
superbly realistic television transmission from that point in that theatre.
Again, if we know that this same sort of thing happens to S with significant
regularity or over significant periods, are we not at least tempted to say that
S sees, with his eyes closed, scenes in a theatre 2000 miles away?
The analysis we have given of visual perception will not, however,
permit us to succumb to these temptations. S sees x in φ, we said, only if S
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But if the circumstances φ differ more than slightly from ones in which a
normal visual perceiver could see x, as they surely do in these examples,
then there will be no kind of sensation answering to the description 'as if
seeing x in φ', no way in which condition (i) of the analysis of pure
perception could be satisfied.
If we wished, we could recognize the possibility of these radically
abnormal sorts of visual perception by replacing the preceding analysis
with the following:
For any description 'x in φ' such that a normal perceiver can see x in φ, S
sees something that looks from some point of view (not necessarily S's
present location or the appearance-affecting circumstances presently
surrounding S or that thing) as would x in φ if and only if
(i) S has a visual sensation as if seeing x in φ (or some recognizable
distortion thereof),
(ii) there is something and some point of view on it (not necessarily
S's present location or the appearance-affecting circumstances
presently surrounding S or it) such that, for every description 'y in
θ' that entails 'x in θ' and is also such that the sensation mentioned
in (i) is as if seeing y in θ, that something looks from that point of
view as would y in θ, and
     (iii) the sensation specified in (i) is caused by the thing specified in
(ii) via a process of a sort whose operation would generally make
the caused sensation match the causing scene in the manner
implied by (i) and (ii).
This analysis permits S to see x in circumstances ψ that are greatly
different from any in which a normal perceiver could see x, provided,
roughly, that x causes S to have the sort of visual sensation that a normal
perceiver would have when seeing x in more favorable circumstances φ and
this causal connection is no fluke.
But should we, after all, make this accommodation in our analysis of
visual perception? Are any of the examples described really ones in which
it would be quite literally true that the subject sees the scene to which his
visual  sensation  corresponds  and  by  which  it  is  caused?  Are  the
correspondence and the causal connection sufficient for that, given that it is
not  the  normal  sort  of  correspondence  (reflecting  the  normal  sort  of112 CHAPTER V
influence of distance, lighting conditions, etc., on the perceiver) and the
normal sort of causal process (by means of the kind and amount of light
delivered from the scene to the subject's open eyes)? Isn't there also a
temptation, given that there have never been any actual applications of 'see'
in such cases, to deny that the subjects in those hypothetical cases quite
literally see those scenes, and may not it be the sounder inclination? It
seems to me that, as long as such cases remain only epistemologists'
fancies and do not actually occur, we have no way to answer this question.
Our concept of seeing has, in Waismann's term, open texture (like most of
our empirical concepts, as Waismann says).
14 Whether or not 'see' should
be applied in these sorts of cases has not been decided in our linguistic
practice hitherto, and the speech-activities incorporating the decisions or
judgments that would settle the question are not likely to be called forth
until the actual occurrence of such cases demands them. We can say only
how we think it likely that it would be settled, or how we think that it
should be settled, not how it is settled.
So, in order to be faithful to the concept of seeing in its present state of
development, we must be indecisive in our analysis. We have to say:  it is
not now determined whether the correct analysis of pure visual perception
is the one proposed in Section 10 or the one contemplated in this section.
We  can  say,  however,  that  the  former,  conservative  analysis  gives  a
sufficient condition and covers all the cases that have any chance of
actually occurring.
NOTES
1.  The term is used in this way, for example, in Price (1932), and in Grice (1961).
2.  The first two seem to be suggested in Ryle (1949), Ch. 7, and Ryle (1956). The third once persuaded
me and is effectively criticized in Grice (1961); it is akin to reasoning suggested in Quinton (1955).
3.  The following remarks are from Ryle:
People without special theories or technical knowledge of physiology, optics, chemistry or
psychology know well enough how to use the concepts of seeing, hearing and smelling, though
not the concept of sense-impression... the concept of perception is on a more elementary or less
technical level than that of sense-impression.  We can know all that is a part of common
knowledge about seeing and hearing, without knowing anything about these impressions. But
from this it follows directly that the concept of sense-impression is not any sort of component of
the concept of perception, any more than the concept of vitamin is any sort of component of the
concept of dinner. (Ryle (1956), pp. 188—189)... the sophisticated concept of sensations or
impressions is not a component of their [unsophisticated people's] concepts of perception....
People are ordinarily ready to tell what they see, hear, taste, smell, or feel.... But they are not
ready, indeed they are not even linguistically equipped, to tell what impressions they are or have
been having. So the notion that such episodes occur does not derive from study of what ordinary
sensible people are found telling. They are not mentioned in the deliverances of untutoredPERCEPTUAL FACTS 113
'consciousness'. Rather the notion derives from a special causal hypothesis — the hypothesis that
my mind can get in touch with a gatepost, only if the gate-post causes something to go on in my
body, which in its turn causes something else to go on in my mind. Impressions are ghostly
impulses, postulated for the ends of a para-mechanical theory. (Ryle (1949), pp. 242—243.)
Argument II is not explicit in these passages, but Ryle certainly seems to be taking his observation that
the sophisticated notion of perceptual sensation is not part of the unsophisticated notion of perception as a
reason for doubting, or viewing with suspicion, the thesis that perception necessarily involves sensation
(in the sophisticated sense).
4.   See, for example, Moore (1922), pp. 168—196, Moore (1953), Ch. 2, and Moore (1952), pp.
629—630.
5.  See, for example, Ducasse (1951), pp. 259—260, Chisholm (1957), Chs. 5(3), and 8(3), and Sellars
(1968), pp. 167—168.
6.  In a somewhat similar vein, Sellars (1963), p. 47, and (1968), pp. 21, 167, suggests an explanation of
what is meant by 'S has a sensation of red' or 'S senses in a red manner' in terms of the standard result, or
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PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE
1.  Perceptual facts known to the perceiver immediately upon occurrence
fall into two classes: those that he knows inferentially and those that he
knows non-inferentially. This classification does not necessarily exhaust
the domain of perceptual facts: it is possible for a perceptual fact to be
unknown to its subject at the time it occurs.
Indeed, there are few kinds of perceptual facts of which it is necessarily
true that every instance of one of them is known or believed or at least
suspected by its subject at the time it obtains. For many propositions of the
form 'S perceives d' (where 'perceives' is replaced by some particular
perceptual verb, or conjunction or disjunction of perceptual verbs, and 'd' is
replaced by some substantial scene-description), there are at least two ways
in which it could happen that the proposition is true and yet its subject fails
at the time to know or believe or even suspect that it is true. (1) He may be
mistakenly convinced that he is currently having a perceptual hallucination,
and thus think that he is not really perceiving anything at all; (2) he may
fail to understand the proposition that he perceives d.
Confronted with the first possibility, a philosopher who wished to
maintain that some epistemic attitude towards some perceptual proposition
is essential to every perceptual fact' might retreat to the claim that if a
person perceives d then he must believe or suspect either that he perceives
d or that he would be doing so if he were not hallucinating or at least that
he is having the sort of experience one has when one perceives d. But the
falsity of this weaker claim is shown by the second possibility.
Let us again, consider seeing in particular. It is possible that a person
should fail to understand any visual propositions, should fail altogether to
have the concept of seeing, at a time when, nevertheless, he sees things. It
is perhaps tempting to think that, on the contrary, a subject cannot be said
to see things in his environment unless he is disposed to react to his visual
experience (when he does not believe he is visually hallucinating) in ways
that show that he is being given visual guidance to at least some features of
his environment, that is, in ways such that he can be said to discern features116 CHAPTER VI
of his environment by seeing them (for example, he is disposed to follow
the movement of objects he sees with his eyes or to move to touch or avoid
them). It must be agreed that if one who sees is so disposed then, whether
or not he has the capacity to express them in symbols, he understands at
least some visual propositions about himself, albeit perhaps only rather
vague and general ones ('I see something moving toward me', '1 see
something near enough and of a size for me to grasp', 'I see an object lying
in the path of my movement (requiring me to go round, or step up, or step
down)', and the like).
But the claim that one who sees must be so disposed will not hold up.
There could be a case of which it would be right to say that a subject sees
his environment even though he has not yet learned those reactions, or
dispositions to react, to his visual experience that would show that he
grasps that he sees his environment. It is possible, for example, that a
person blind from birth should have his sight restored, that he should then
take some considerable time before he becomes disposed to react to his
new sort of experience in ways that show that he understands that he sees
this and that in his environment, and that after doing so he should say, quite
sincerely, that although he now realizes that he has been seeing various
sorts of things in his environment for some time he did not at first realize
he was doing so: it has taken him some period of seeing to realize what
seeing things in one's environment is and that he has been doing it. I think
that this would be a perfectly intelligible (and very likely true) remark in
such a case. If it is, then we have a possible case in which a person was
seeing a certain sort of environment — because he was having visual
experience sufficiently like the normal perceiver has when he sees that sort
of environment (this established by the person's remembering that he was)
and  caused  by  the  environment  in  the  way  that  it  is  when  a  normal
perceiver sees that sort of environment — but did not understand, hence
did not believe or suspect, that he was seeing any particular sort of thing or
even that he was having the sort of visual experience one has when seeing a
certain sort of thing.
There may be psychological limits to what can be seen by a person who
as yet has no comprehension at all of what it is to see things in the
environment. It seems quite unlikely, for instance, that such a person would
ever be able to see certain things in surroundings that make those things
difficult to pick out visually. It seems implausible to think that there may
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puzzle picture but does not have the idea of seeing something that looks as
would a definite shape in a mess of lines, does not understand even so
much as the proposition that he could express to himself (if he knew the
appropriate language) by saying, 'I see that [focussing his attention on the
shape he sees]'. It seems plausible to suppose that creatures such as we are
would never get to have the kind of visual experience that the normal visual
perceiver has when he visually picks out a shape in surroundings that make
it difficult to discern without having had a good deal of visual experience
and visual belief, and having been guided in acquiring visual perceptions
by beliefs as to what can be seen. But, as far as I can see, there is no reason
to suppose that these limits are more than psychological ones, that they are
logical limits, that it is conceptually impossible that a person who as yet
has no idea that he sees should nevertheless have just the sort of visual
experience that the normal perceiver has when he sees something that is
difficult to pick out visually.
So it cannot be maintained that perception is essentially an epistemic
affair, that to perceive is, necessarily, to make a perceptual judgment or to
have some epistemic attitude towards some sort of proposition having to do
with that perception.
2 (It remains true, however, that over a sufficiently
long run of perceiving various things in various ways a subject's sense-
experiences must be such that they would naturally (in a normal subject)
give rise to some (true) perceptual beliefs: if a subject's sense-experiences
over a sufficiently long and varied stretch are not such as would dispose
him (eventually) to some (true) perceptual beliefs then they cannot be
related to his environment (throughout that stretch) in such a way as to
constitute perceptions of it, because then they could not be outcomes of a
process that is match-ensuring in the way required by our analysis of visual
perception (Chapter V, Section 10). Instead they would constitute either a
prolonged perceptual hallucination or else no sort of perceptual experience
at all.)
Of course, when a propositional construction is put as the object of a
perceptual verb the resulting sentence, 'S perceives that p', would in most
contexts express a proposition implying that S knows (or at least believes)
that p. But this proposition also implies more than a mere perception. It
implies  that  there  is  true  some  perceptual  proposition  that  obviously
implies that p and that S knows (or believes) that proposition (and thus
knows, or at least believes, that p). The proposition that S sees that the
thing on the wall is a photograph has epistemic implication because it118 CHAPTER VI
implies the conjunctive proposition that S sees a photograph on the wall
and in addition (not implied by the first conjunct) that S knows (or at least
believes) that he sees a photograph on the wall and, hence, that the things
that he sees on the wall is a photograph. On the other hand, the conjunction
'S sees a photograph on the wall and knows that he sees a photograph on
the  wall'  does  not imply  that  S  sees  that  the  thing  on  the  wall  is  a
photograph.  It  may  not  look  anything  like  a  typical  photograph  and
scarcely anyone can see that it is one but has to be told that it is. Seeing a
thing and knowing that it has a certain property do not make it the case that
one sees that it has that property.
3
It would be a natural way to use the phrase 'perceptual knowledge',
although  different  from  mine,  to  say  that  a  person  has  perceptual
knowledge that p just in case he perceives that p, assuming (I think
correctly)  that  'S  perceives  that  p'  entails  that  S  knows  that  p.  The
preceding paragraph has indicated the relation between these two senses:
from the premiss that S has perceptual knowledge that p in this other sense
it follows that there is a perceptual proposition about S that entails that p in
an obvious way (for example, in the way that 'S sees a photograph on the
wall' entails that there is a photograph on the wall or, alternatively, that
something S sees on the wall is a photograph) and that S knows to be true;
so that any fact that S knows perceptually in the other sense will be
obviously entailed by a perceptual fact that S knows perceptually in my
sense. But the converse does not obtain: from the fact that S knows that he
perceives d and that 'S perceives d' obviously entails that p, it does not
follow that S perceives that p. 5 may know that he sees a photograph on the
wall by having been told that what he sees is a photograph and not at all by
seeing that it is. (Whether or not a person's knowing that p is a matter of his
seeing  that p depends on the extent to which his knowledge that p is
derived from his knowledge of how what he sees looks or has looked
(objectively) from his point of view and the extent to which how it looks or
has looked (objectively) is how it looks or has looked to him.)
(There are other constructions that can be used after 'S sees...' to imply
knowledge by S of a visual proposition about himself, constructions that
are related in fairly obvious ways to the propositional construction 'that p'.
For example, there is 'what x's color is' or 'the color x has' or just 'the color
of x' or 'x's color'. Each of these phrases can be used after 'S knows...' to
imply that there is some proposition 'p' that is a correct answer to 'What
color is x?' and is such that S knows that p. Similarly, each could also bePERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE 119
used after 'S sees...' to imply, for some proposition 'p' answering 'What
color is x?', that S sees that p.)
2.    Perceiving things is, of course, a very important means to knowledge
about them. Many sorts of perceptual facts are, in the ordinary case,
accompanied by their subjects' knowledge of them and, thereby, of the
environmental facts that they obviously imply. They are easy for subjects
to know. Subjects with normal capacities and normal backgrounds of
experience are bound to know them.
Indeed, perceptual knowledge is the basic source of knowledge about the
environment: all one's knowledge of contingent facts about the external
world  is  either  perceptual  knowledge  or  inferred  from  perceptual
knowledge. For example, consider the way in which the size of a planet is
inferred from a variety of observations, or the way in which remote events
are inferred from hearing or reading reports of them. But that perception
provides the foundation for knowledge of the world around us is only a
contingent fact itself. Conceivably, a person might deserve to be credited
with knowledge of some external fact although he has not learned of it in
any of the ordinary ways involving sense-perception. For example, on a
number of occasions convictions about remote events might just 'come' to a
person (from out of nowhere, as it were), and if these convictions always
turned out to be right, we might begin to find it compelling to regard them
as more than lucky hunches, as knowledge, even before we know why they
arise and are always right. That is, we might be willing to say that in
having these queer convictions this person knows, even if this person has
not himself checked by ordinary means the general correctness of his queer
convictions. But as things actually are, it seems quite likely that our senses
are the only means by which we can know the way the world is.
How are current perceptual facts known by their subjects? How do
different sorts of perceptual facts stand with respect to being known, at the
time they obtain, either inferentially or non-inferentially? On this matter
philosophers have sometimes gone to extremes. According to one strong
tradition, a person can know any current perceptual fact about himself only
inferentially. I will argue that this tradition is in error in not recognizing the
possibility  of  non-inferential  perceptual  knowledge.  But  an  opposing
tendency, especially evident recently,
4 errs in underestimating the role of
inferential justification in knowing current perceptual facts about oneself.120 CHAPTER VI
3.    It has been widely held in the philosophy of perception that a person
can know a current perceptual fact about himself only by inferring it from
what he knows his sense-experiences to be or to have been. A major
challenge for this view is giving a plausible account of how inferences
from subjective sense-experience to objective perception are justified and
what form they take. Descartes and Locke, who are among the more
notable supporters of the view that current perceptual knowledge must be
inferential, never really offered an analysis of the inferences involved. But
it is not obvious what the account should be.
It cannot be said that the inference is simply a deduction, for it seems
clear that no history of a subject's actual subjective sense-experience can
logically entail that he is perceiving a certain sort of external scene. There
is always the logical possibility that he is having an extensive hallucination.
Simply having a certain sort of sequence of sense-experiences is not all that
perceiving the external world amounts to. It requires also that the sense-
experiences be caused by the external world and match it in the right sort of
way. This has been acknowledged by virtually all who have held the view
in question.
It is difficult to see how the inference could fit the strictly inductive
pattern. How could it be an inference from a certain concomitance or
proportion  among  properties  in  a  set  of  examined  cases  to  a  similar
concomitance or proportion among the same properties in some set of
unexamined cases, since the perceptual conclusion seems to entail the
instantiation of wholly different properties from any instantiated by the
subjective sense-experiences of the premisses? But perhaps this is an
illusion. Could the premisses and conclusion be understood in such a way
as to be about the same sorts of cases, instantiating in the same way the
same sorts of properties, with the only difference that the premiss cases are
examined and the conclusion cases unexamined?
Phenomenalism attempts to offer this sort of account.
5 This view can be
formulated as follows: A person can be in a position to infer by induction
the proposition that he perceives a certain sort of external scene from what
he knows his sense-experiences to be and to have been, because (1) such a
proposition is equivalent in content to some proposition according to which
(a) the subject is having a certain sort of sense-experience and (b) thePERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE 121
subject will or would have, or would have had, certain other sorts of sense-
experiences if he were to have, or had had, experience as if making certain
movements of his body or sense-organs ;6 and (2) he can infer the (b) part
of this proposition from the (a) part (which he knows non-inferentially) and
certain general propositions about what sorts of sense-experiences are
obtainable  when  certain  sorts  are  had;  and  (3)  he  can  know  general
propositions sufficient for that purpose by induction from his past sense-
experiences.
Let us concentrate on point (1) of this phenomenalist thesis, using vision
again as our illustrative sense. For any proposition of the form 'S sees d' (or
'S sees x in φ' or 'S sees something that looks from his present point of view
as would x in φ') can we find an equivalent conjunction (or other truth-
function) of propositions to the effect that S has (or has had) certain sense-
experiences (visual or otherwise) and would have (or would have had)
certain other ones if he were to have (or had had) experience as if making
certain movements? The difficulties in the way of doing so may not amount
to a proof that it cannot be done, but they are so great as to make it
reasonable to despair.
The worst difficulty, it seems to me, stems from the possibility that a
person could be the victim of an hallucination so extensive that all the
sense-experiences he actually has or could obtain for an extended period
might be such as to make him justifiedly confident that he sees a certain
sort of external scene when, in fact, he sees no external scene at all. There
could be an hallucination so extensive that it could not be discovered or
reasonably suspected by the victim himself. That this has happened to
someone might be discovered by others, who perceive the hallucinator
acting as if he perceives a sort of environment that, as they perceive, is not
there.
This sort of possibility might lead one to think that one can get an
analysis that entails that S sees an external scene of a certain sort if one
adds to the propositions about the sorts of sense-experiences that are
present  or  obtainable  for S,  propositions  about  the  sorts  of  sense-
experiences present or obtainable for other subjects. But, in addition to the
fact that the problem of extensive hallucination would still be there (several
subjects could have agreeing sense-experiences that were all hallucinatory),
this  suggestion  encounters  the  difficulty  of  finding  a  way  in  which
descriptions merely of various subjects' sensations as if perceiving, say, a122 CHAPTER VI
tree (assumed to be non-hallucinatory) can be made to entail that those
subjects are perceiving one and the same tree and not distinct but very
similar ones. I can see no way of doing this. No matter how extensive the
descriptions, as long as they are limited to intrinsic properties of various
subjects' sensations, actual or obtainable, it will be a logical possibility that
those subjects are perceiving separate external scenes. (If enough were
included in the (non-hallucinatory) sensations that each subject could
obtain, then we could suppose them to be perceiving distinct objects only if
we suppose an extensive duplication of environments, perhaps even a
symmetrical universe, that is, a universe divisible into halves that are
'mirror-images' of one another.)
This possibility can be ruled out only by including some propositions
about the spatial relations among the subjects and the directions in which
they are perceiving. But including such propositions will defeat the point of
the  phenomenalist  analysis,  which  was  to  show  how  all  perceptual
knowledge is equivalent to a combination of non-inferential knowledge of
actual sensations and inductive knowledge of obtainable sensations. This
objective obviously fails to be achieved as soon as the analysis of a
subject's perceiving something is seen to require inclusion of facts not
reducible to the intrinsic features of sensations. For the subject will need to
know that these external facts obtain in order to know that he perceives
such-and-such a thing and the analysis does not explain how he can know
these facts by inductive inference from subjective experience.
In raising these difficulties for thesis (I) of phenomenalism, I have been
assuming that it would be true of a visual perception proposition if a sense-
experience equivalent for it could be found in which the kinds of sensation
are specified in the manner 'a sensation as if perceiving d'. But on this
understanding (1) would not support the idea, which some phenomenalists
seem  to  have  had,  that  the  concept  of  seeing  an  external  (mind-
independent)  scene  is  derivative  from  (a  logical  construction  out  of,
reducible  to)  more  primitive  concepts  of  kinds  of  subjective  sense-
experience. One could establish (1) in such fashion as to support this more
radical idea only if there existed a way of conceiving or describing visual
sense-experience that is not parasitic on the concepts and language of
seeing external things. But, as we noted earlier, this there does not seem to
be. It is more faithful to our actual practice of talking and thinking about
vision to say that our concepts of various sorts of visual sensations are
constructed out of, derived from, our concepts of various sorts of seeing ofPERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE 123
external things than to say the reverse. Likewise for perception in other
modes and the sensations ingredient in them. So no one can hope to show
that perceptual propositions, or their truth-conditions, could in principle be
expressed without the aid of sentences (or clauses) expressing perceptual
propositions.
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Given that phenomenalism fails, there seems little hope that the alleged
inference from subjective sensation to objective perception can be made to
fit  a  strict  inductive  pattern.  However,  the  foregoing  points  against
phenomenalism do not rule out the possibility of some other pattern of non-
deductive inference such that whenever a person knows a perceptual fact
about himself that fact will be related in the way prescribed by that pattern
of inference to actual and obtainable sensations of his that he then knows
of, or would know of if he understood the propositions that report them. In
fact, in Chapter VIII I will indicate what I take to be such a pattern of
inference.
But even if an account can be given of inference patterns that permit
perceptual conclusions to be drawn from premisses about one's sensations,
the thesis that a person must know his perceptions by inference from his
sensations would by no means be established. This thesis implies that a
person must, in order to know that he sees a certain sort of external scene,
know that his present and past sensations have been of a certain sort.
However, Ryle's point that a person does not have to have the relatively
sophisticated concepts of the various kinds of perceptual sensations in
order  to  have  the  concepts  of  seeing,  hearing,  etc.  is  a  knock-down
objection to any such claim that perceptual knowledge requires that the
subject have knowledge of his sensations (though, as we saw, it fails as an
argument against the thesis that perception necessarily includes subjective
sense-experience). If a person's knowledge of perceptual truths about
himself  had  to  be  by  inference  from  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  his
sensations,  then  no  person  who  has  an  understanding  of  perceptual
propositions  while  lacking  understanding  of  the  notion  of  subjective
sensation ingredient in perception could possibly know that he sees or hears
various sorts of things. For he could not know the premiss of the inferential
justification supposedly required for knowledge of such truths. For one's
claim to know that p to be justified and supported by inference from q, one
must be justifiedly confident that q; and this one could not be if one did not
even understand the proposition that q. But people who do not have the
sophisticated concept of perceptual sensations are clearly not thereby124 CHAPTER VI
barred from knowing that they see and touch and hear trees and tacks and
trains.
4.    Disabused, then, of the idea that perceptual knowledge must be by
inference  from  sensations,  let  us  try  to  give  a  correct  account  of  its
conditions.
I will deal only with visual knowledge, and I will undertake to give an
account of the truth-conditions only for those propositions of the form 'S
knows that he sees d' where 'd' is of the form 'x in φ'. This will not limit the
generality of my account of visual knowledge. 'd' can fail to be of the form
'x in φ' only through lacking implications about the appearance-affecting
relations of x to the perceiver, that is, all of 'd' goes into the 'x' slot of the 'x
in φ‘ form. But if a person knows that he sees a certain sort of object — for
example, a man, a rectangular surface — he must know something about its
appearance-affecting relations to him, even if it is only something as non-
specific as that the object is in at least dim light, at least not very far away,
at least not very far from a right angle to his line of sight, at least not very
far from the center of his field of view. And normally he will know much
more specific facts about these relations. If a person knows that he sees x in
φ), then, obviously, he knows that he sees x: in knowing the first he knows
the second, what suffices for his knowing the first suffices for his knowing
the second. Thus, whenever a proposition of the form 'S knows that he sees
d' is true there is also true a proposition of the form 'S knows that he sees x
in φ' that entails 'S knows that he sees d'. So to give a general account of
the conditions under which propositions of the form 'S knows that he sees x
in φ' are true is not to overlook any conditions under which propositions of
the form 'S sees d' maybe true.
As one might expect, the conditions that constitute a person's knowing
that he sees x in φ differ according to whether the proposition that he sees x
in φ is pure or impure. This division does not, however, coincide with the
division between non-inferential and inferential perceptual knowledge.  I
will argue that all cases of impure perceptual knowledge and some cases of
pure perceptual knowledge must be inferential (if not memory knowledge,
an unlikely possibility that I will ignore); only knowledge of a certain
special sort of pure visual perception proposition about oneself can be non-
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5.   That S's knowledge that he sees x in φ must be inferential if 'he sees x
in φ' is impure can be seen by considering the nature of impurity in a visual
perception proposition. An impurity in 'S sees x in φ' is a property of S's
environment that is entailed by the description 'x' and is such that in the
perception  reported  by  that  proposition  S  cannot  be  perceiving  that
property, because whether or not x has that property could not, given that it
is in φ, make any difference to the visual sensation that the subject of such
a perception would be caused to have. Thus, if 'he sees x in φ' is impure
then S can know that he sees x in φ only if he knows that what he sees in φ
possesses a certain property that he does not then see. There is no way in
which he can be justified in claiming to know that something he sees
possesses a certain unseen property other than by inference from the
conjunction of those objective appearances of the thing that he does then
see and other propositions he is then justified in claiming to know that
connect in some appropriate way this thing having those appearances with
that unperceived property. By itself, a single perception can disclose to the
perceiver only the objective appearances of the thing that he then perceives.
Anything else, anything not entailed by those appearances, that he knows
about what he perceives he must know by inference from his perceiving
those appearances plus other information about them)
What has just been said obviously holds for certain sorts of impure visual
proposition, namely, ones containing an explicit impurity in the scene-
description  or  ones  such  that  scenes  that  do  not  satisfy  the  scene-
description but appear just like scenes that do satisfy it are fairly common.
An example of the first sort would be the proposition (that would normally
be expressed by) 'I see a large oak tree that my great-grandfather planted',
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and an example of the second sort would be the proposition 'I see a solitary,
small, brown shed on the hillside about 200 yards away through fog and in
the twilight'. None of the impurities in the latter scene-description are
explicit; but so many things that are not sheds could and do look as would a
solitary,  small,  brown  shed  on  a  hillside  at  that  distance  in  those
circumstances — a large rock, a tree stump, a rusting car body —that no
one will want to deny that a person who claims to know that what he sees
in those circumstances is a shed must rely for justification of his knowledge
claim on other information besides what his present visual perception of
that thing gives him in itself. And, of course, one who claims to know that126 CHAPTER VI
the tree he sees was planted by his great grandfather must be relying on
information other than what he can get just from his present seeing of the
tree.
But the same thing holds for those implicitly impure scene-descriptions
of the form 'x in φ' for which it happens to be true that it is extremely
uncommon and unlikely that anything not x looks in φ just as x would look
in φ. Consider, for example, 'I see an ordinary house in clear daylight about
50 yards away' or 'I see a stand of several large evergreen trees in clear
daylight from within it'. Here, however, there may be a temptation to think
that  one  who  knows  that  he  sees  such  a  thing  need  not  rely  for  his
justification on information other than the appearances of what he then
sees. Here it may seem that just the look of what he sees — namely, its
looking as would x in φ — discloses to him what he sees — namely, x in φ
—because that look is in fact seldom or never possessed by something that
is not x in φ.  But this last fact is a contingent one that the perceiver must
know if he is, on the basis of knowing that he sees something that looks as
would x in φ, to know that he sees x in φ . Suppose I see an ordinary house
in clear daylight from about 50 yards away, but suppose also that, for all I
know, things that are not houses, but look, from about 50 yards away in
clear daylight, just as would a house (indeed just as would this house I now
see), abound everywhere and that I have no reason other than the objective
appearances that I presently see for thinking that I see a house. Then clearly
I have no justification for claiming to know that I see a house; no one
would allow that I did know it, under those circumstances. It is impossible
to know merely from seeing what looks as would a house in clear daylight
about  50  yards  away  that  one  sees  a  house;  one  must  rely  on  other
information as well, perhaps, for example, the information that what looks
as would a house... etc. is virtually never anything other than a house ... etc.
What holds for 'I see an ordinary house in clear daylight about 50 yards
away'  must  hold  for  any  impure  perceptual  proposition.  No  single
perception of a scene can by itself give its subject knowledge that it fits a
description implying properties not perceived in that perception of it. Such
knowledge is obtained only if the single perception is supplemented by
knowledge attained independently of this perception, either particular
information about this particular scene or general information about scenes
having the appearance this one does.
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In consequence, when 'S sees x in φ' is impure, the justification condition
in the general analysis of what it is for S to know that he sees x in φ must
be inferential, and the premiss of the inference must include the proposition
that S sees something having a certain objective appearance plus some
other proposition connecting what S sees with the unperceived properties
of x implied in the impure proposition 'S sees x in φ’.
6.   As with other kinds of propositional knowledge, I will fit my analysis
of impure visual knowledge to the pattern of the four general conditions of
knowledge introduced in Chapter II, Section 1. Doing this, together with
illustrating the analysis of the specific kind, will help to give a better idea
of what the general analysis means, especially in the third and fourth
conditions, by showing what it generalizes. And, of course, showing that
the general analysis holds up well in specific cases provides further support
for that general account. Analyses of different kinds of propositional
knowledge will differ importantly in the details of the third, justification
condition. In presenting this condition I will rely on the general analysis of
inferential and noninferential justification given in Chapter III, Section 9.
This is the general strategy. Now for the detailed analysis of our present
case.
The conditions of impure visual knowledge may be stated as follows.
If 'S sees x in φ' expresses an impure visual proposition, then S knows
that he sees x in φ if and only if
(1)   S sees x in φ,
(2)   S is confident that he sees x in φ,
(3)   this confidence is supported by the justification that
(a) there is a description 'y in θ' such that S has justification for
confidence that he sees something that looks from his present
point of view as would y in θ,
(b) there is another proposition q such that S has justification for
confidence in the conjunction of q and the proposition that he
sees something that looks from his present point of view as
would y in θ and for confidence that from that conjunction
there can be (nondeductively) inferred with confidence the
proposition that what he sees that looks from his present point
of view as would y in θ is x in φ and, hence, the proposition
that he sees x in φ,128 CHAPTER VI
(c) there are no propositions r1,..., rn such that S has justification
for believing each of r1,..., rn and the proposition that he sees
x in φ  cannot  be  inferred  with  confidence  from  the
conjunction of q, r1,..., rn, and the proposition that he sees
something that looks as would y in θ,
(4) there is no truth r such that were S to be justified in believing that
r and retain all his properties that are compatible with his having
justification for believing that r then he would be very far from
justified in being confident that he sees x in φ.
In typical cases satisfying these conditions 'y in θ' will have the same
instantiation as 'x in φ'. A person's justification for thinking he knows, for
example, that he sees a cardinal just outside the window in clear daylight
will  typically  be  by  inference  from  a  conjunction  that  includes  the
proposition that he sees what looks from his present point of view as would
a cardinal just outside the window in clear daylight. But we need in (3) (a)
to have 'y in θ', instead of 'x in φ' repeated from (1) and (2), in order to
accommodate the following sort of case. It may be that a person who
knows that he sees an astrolabe in a glass case a few feet away in good,
ordinary light ('x in φ') does not rest this knowledge on his knowledge that
he sees something that looks from his present point of view as would an
astrolabe... etc. For it may be that he has just come to know how an
astrolabe looks (in such circumstances) by coming to know that the thing
he presently sees is an astrolabe. This latter knowledge may derive from his
knowledge that it has certain other objective appearances — for example,
that it looks from his present point of view as would pieces of brass of
such-and-such shapes put together in such-and-such ways lying in a glass
case a few feet away in good, ordinary light ('y in θ') — plus his knowledge
that (q) the guide accompanying him has just pointed to the thing he sees
and said (with apparent sincerity), 'That is an astrolabe'. (In this example
the difference between 'x in φ' and 'y in θ' lies entirely in the 'x’ and ‘y’
components. For an example where the 'φ' and 'θ' components also differ,
let 'x in φ' be 'an astrolabe in a glass case a few feet away illuminated by a
red light' and let 'y in θ' be 'pieces of pinkish brass of such-and-such shapes
put together in such-and-such ways lying in a glass case a few feet away in
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7.   The proposition q (mentioned in (3) (b) and (c)), for which S needs to
have justification for confidence if S's confidence that he sees x in φ is to
be supported by a justification he has, may be any one of several different
sorts. If it is the case that things that look (from some point of view) as
would y in θ but are not x in φ are rarely or never encountered (so that
people would rarely or never be mistaken if they were always to believe
that they see x in φ whenever they see something that looks as would y in
θ) then it may suffice if (a) S knows just that general fact about that sort of
appearance. If, on the other hand, this is not generally true of that sort of
appearance, or S does not know that it is, then it will need to be the case
either that (b) S knows other appearances as well of what he sees, that is,
appearances it presents from other points of view or in other circumstances
— enough so that he does know (or at least has justified confidence) that
what has all these appearances is always, or virtually always, x in φ — or
else that (c) S knows other sorts of facts from which the fact that what he
sees is x in φ can be justifiably inferred with confidence. Let me illustrate
each of these alternatives.
(a) It may be that so few, if any, other actually existing things look (from
any point of view) just as would a large mountain in clear daylight a few
miles away that anything having that appearance is almost bound to be a
mountain... etc. Thus S may need to know no more about the appearance of
the particular thing he sees than that from his present point of view it looks
as would a mountain ... etc. in order to know, by inference from that
appearance and that general fact about such appearances, that what he sees
is a mountain... etc. It may be that all houses having a certain peculiar
shape and arrangement of their front windows are houses that S's great-
grandfather built. If S knows this and also that anything that looks (from
some point of view) as would the front of a house with that peculiar shape
and arrangement of its windows from fairly close in clear daylight is very
unlikely to be other than the front of such a house, then S may know, by
inference from those general truths about things having that sort of look
plus the particular fact that he now sees something that looks from his
present point of view as would the front of such a house... etc., that he sees
the front of a house that his great-grandfather built.
(b) S may know that he sees a small shed on a distant hillside by
inference from the facts that he now sees something that looks from his
present point of view as would a small shed in sunlight on a distant hillside130 CHAPTER VI
(a dark speck in a green expanse), that he was a short time ago looking at
the same thing only a short distance away from it and then saw something
that looked (from his point of view then) as would a small shed a short
distance away in sunlight, and that things that look as would small sheds
outdoors a short distance away in sunlight virtually always are small sheds.
How can S know that what he saw a short time ago that looked (from his
point of view then) as would a small shed a short distance away in sunlight
is identical with what he sees now that looks (from his present point of
view) as would a small shed in sunlight on a distant hillside? One way
would be by inference from his memory knowledge (if he has it) that in the
interval he has moved his body in such a way that his point of view now is
distant from his point of view then but he now faces and looks toward the
same place he faced and looked toward then and that it is extremely
unlikely that anything looking from his present point of view as would a
small shed in sunlight on a distant hillside could in that interval have come
into that place, or between that place and his present point of view, without
a lot of commotion of a sort that he would have perceived had it occurred
but he did not perceive.
S may know that he sees a small solid cube lying in his right hand by
inference from the facts that he now sees something that looks from his
present point of view as would a small solid cube lying on his right hand
close before him in good light, that during a short period up to now he has
been seeing something continuous with what he now sees in his right hand
that looked from his point of view during that period as would a small solid
cube being turned over on all sides in his right hand close before him in
good light, and that during this same period he has been feeling with his
right hand something that felt as would a small solid cube that he was
turning on all sides in his hand. Here the generalization that anything
having all those (seen and felt) appearances is a small solid cube may be
non-contingent. With the right sort of description 'x', a thing's objectively
appearing as would an x from a sufficient variety of points of view relative
to it may exclude every possibility of its being other than an x, may entail
its being an x.
(c) If S is ignorant of any such general truths connecting appearances of
what  he  sees  that  he  has  perceived  (plus,  perhaps,  a  certain  sort  of
circumstance in which it is being seen, such as its being outdoors rather
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it that he does not see, he may yet know that what he sees has those
properties by inference from other sorts of facts he knows. S may know
that the house with the peculiar looking windows that he sees is a house
that his great-grandfather built from the fact that his father has just pointed
to it and said 'Your great-grandfather built that house'. S may know that the
dark speck he sees on the distant hillside is a man (and not a rock or bush
or small shed or something else) from knowing that his companion beside
him has just said, 'There's Jonathan on the hill yonder, waiting where I left
him'. Looking at a stage set, S may know that what he sees in the set that
looks as would a bookcase full of books is a bookcase full of books from
the fact that he, the director, instructed the stagehands to install in the set a
real bookcase with real books.
If S knows that he sees x in φ only in way (c) and not in way (a) or way
(b), then he does not see that what he sees is x in 4). If S knows that the
dark speck on the distant hillside is a man only from knowing that his
companion has just said, 'There's Jonathan on the hill yonder...', then
clearly S does not see that the thing he sees is a man. All ways of being
justified in thinking that he knows that he sees x in φ that will also support
S's claiming that he sees that what he sees is x fall under (a) or (b). In
seeing x in φ a person sees that what he sees is x only if he sees, or has
seen, enough details of its appearance for it to be true that he knows that
virtually always when something has that sort of appearance it is x.
8.  Condition (3) (c) rules out the circumstances that would spoil S's justi-
fication for claiming to know that he sees x in φ, insofar as that justification
is given him by (3) (a) and (b). Condition (4) rules out the circumstances
that would defeat S's claim to know that he sees x in φ, insofar as that claim
is justified by condition (3). Here are some examples of how these negative
conditions work.
Let 'x in φ' be 'a small shed built by S's great-grandfather, a short distance
away in good light', and let 'y in θ' be the same except for deletion of 'built
by S's great-grandfather'. Let q be the proposition that someone has just
told S (with apparent sincerity) that the shed S now sees was built by S's
great-grandfather. Condition (4) would be falsified in this case, of course, if
it were false that S sees something that looks from his present point of view
as would (y in θ) a small shed a short distance away in good light or false
that (q) someone has just told S that the shed he sees was built by S's great132 CHAPTER VI
grandfather. For then the premiss of the inferential justification ascribed to
S in (3), which premiss is specified in (3) (b), would be false. A proposition
r, whose truth would falsify (4) and S's having justification for believing
which would falsify (3) (c), but whose truth and S's having justification for
believing  which,  would  not  falsify  (1)  or  (2)  or  the  premiss  of  the
inferential justification (indicated in (3) (b)), would be the proposition that
the  person  who  told  S  that  the  shed  he  sees  was  built  by  S's  great
grandfather did not believe what he told S (which proposition does not
entail that what he told S was false).
Another illustration: Let 'x in φ' be 'a three-story wooden frame building
in clear daylight about 50 yards away', and let 'y in θ’ be the same. Let q be
the proposition that what S sees that looks from his present point of view as
would  a  three-story  frame  building...  etc.  is  among  things  that  taken
together look to a motorist passing through them as would a small town
and are, in fact, located on a mid-western prairie, and something of which
all that is true is rarely anything other than a three-story frame building...
etc. Again, condition (4) would be falsified if it were false that q or false
that S sees something that looks from his present point of view as would y
in ψ. An example of a proposition r whose truth would falsify (4) and S's
having justification for believing which would falsify (3) (c), but whose
truth and S's having justification for believing which would be compatible
with (1), (2), and the premiss of S's inferential justification, would be the
proposition that what S is passing through that appears to be a small town
is actually a movie set and the great majority of what look to the passing
motorist as would buildings are actually excellent canvas representations of
the fronts and sides of buildings. (But S happens to be looking at one of the
few actual buildings that are mixed in with the canvas representations.)
In these examples we see how it is possible for S to see a certain sort of
thing, be justified in claiming to know that he sees that sort of thing by
inference from a premiss he knows to be true, and yet, because of unusual
circumstances of which he is ignorant, fail actually to know that he sees
that sort of thing. About the earlier example, where the premiss is S's
hearing  apparently  sincere  testimony,  it  seems  right  to  say  that  the
inference goes through a false intermediate step, but not so with the latest
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9.   S knows a pure visual fact about himself when, for some description of
the form 'y in θ', S knows that he sees something that looks from his
present point of view as would y in θ.  This  knowledge  can be  non-
inferential,  and  normally  will  be  so,  if  certain  conditions  are  met.  It
depends on the nature of the description 'y in θ' and also on whether what S
sees looks to him as would y in θ.
It can be the case (though normally it will not be) that S sees something
that looks (objectively) from his present point of view as would y in θ but it
does not look to S that way, that is, S's visual sensation is not as if seeing y
in  θ  but  rather  some  distortion  thereof.   Suppose,  for  example,  that
something S sees looks from S's present point of view as would a white
rose in bright daylight but, because of some aberration in S's visual system,
it looks to S as would a red rose in very dim daylight. If S nevertheless
knows that what he sees looks from his present point of view as would a
white rose in bright daylight then, it seems clear, it is not just by means of
S's present visual experience that S knows this and that S's justification for
claiming to have this knowledge would have to be by inference from (at
least in part) knowledge that has come to S quite independently of S's
present visual experience. Perhaps S knows that his present manner of
seeing things is abnormal, and knows how to correct for the abnormality in
judging the visible properties of what he sees, by inference from his
knowledge that he has taken a drug that he was reliably told would have a
certain  distorting  effect  on  his  visual  sensations.   Or  perhaps  the
abnormality is permanent with S and S has learned how the way things
always look to him deviates systematically from the norm (insofar as his
experience  permits  him  to  understand  this)  by  inference  from  much
testimony of others as to how things really look. (A radically color-blind
person, whose visual sensations record no differences in hue but only
differences in intensity of the colors of what he sees, cannot know to be
true, because he cannot understand, the proposition that he sees something
that looks from his present point of view as would a reddish-orange
surface...; but he could know that how what he sees looks (objectively) is
different in respect of color from how it looks to him and that how it looks
(objectively) in respect of color is what normal visual perceivers call
'reddish-orange'.) In general, it is clear that it is only by appeal to other
things S knows that S can justify being confident that he sees something
that looks (from his present point of view) as would y in θ, if that is not
how it then looks to him.134 CHAPTER VI
But even if S is a perfectly normal visual perceiver he may still be barred
from knowing non-inferentially that he sees something that looks from his
present point of view as would y in θ by the nature of this description. S
might know non-inferentially that he sees something that looks from his
present point of view as would a lavender surface facing him in ordinary
light a short distance away, but he could not know non-inferentially that he
sees something that looks from his present point of view as would a surface
of Lisa's favorite color facing him a short distance away in ordinary light.
The meaning of some descriptions of the form 'y in θ' — for example, 'a
large red surface in ordinary light a short distance before one', 'a small
square surface at roughly a right angle to one's line of sight in ordinary
light a short distance before one' — is connected with how y in θ looks in a
certain direct way. That is, knowing the meaning is directly connected with
knowing what the appearance is like; whereas knowing the meaning of
other descriptions of that form — for example, 'a surface the color of my
true love's eyes a short distance before me in ordinary light', 'a surface of
the same shape as the State of Wyoming a short distance before one in
ordinary light' — is not connected in this way with knowing how y in θ
looks. When knowing the meaning of 'y in θ' is connected in this direct way
with knowing how y in θ looks let us say that 'looks as would y in θ' gives a
direct specification of a visual appearance.
I  have  given  some  examples  but  now  let  me  try  to  give  a  general
characterization of this direct connection. If we had only color terms to
deal with, we could simply say that 'looks as would y in θ' gives a direct
specification of a visual appearance just in case one cannot understand 'y in
θ' without knowing how y in θ looks. For the meaning of color terms must
be learned from visual experience; a person who does not know what
anything  looks  like  (because,  say,  he  has  always  been  blind)  cannot
understand the description 'a red surface in θ'.
10  But if 'y' is instantiated
with 'square surface' instead of 'red surface' then it will be false that one
cannot understand 'y in θ' without knowing how y in θ looks, because of
the possibility that a person might learn what shapes are designated by
certain shape terms through tactual-kinaesthetic perception. Yet it seems
clear that a person's understanding 'square' requires him to know what some
sort of appearance of a square surface is like, and that a normal sighted
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knowledge of what a square surface looks like as it is with his knowledge
of what one feels like. It is just that the meaning of simple shape terms,
unlike  that  of  color  terms,  is  directly  connected  not  only  to  visual
appearance.
I think that we can capture the class of visual-appearance specifications
that  we  want  if  we  say  this:  'looks  as  would  y in θ' gives a direct
specification  of  a  visual  appearance  if  and  only  if  it  is  possible  to
understand 'y' without having perceived y in any other mode than the visual
one and 'y in θ' is such that one who has not perceived y in any other mode
than the visual one can understand the proposition that he sees y in θ only if
he knows how y in θ looks.
The  following  then  are  examples  of  direct  specifications  of  visual
appearances: 'looks as would a red square surface perpendicular to one's
line of sight a short distance away in ordinary daylight', 'looks as would a
small blue cube a short distance before one in ordinary daylight', 'looks as
would a large tree some distance away in ordinary daylight', 'looks as
would a small bird circling a short distance before one in ordinary light',
'looks  as  would  something  that  in  ordinary  daylight  and  the  same
orientation would look as that object now looks to one'. None of the first
four  of  these  would  be  direct  specifications  of  visual  appearances  if
'ordinary daylight' were replaced with, say, 'red light', for a person may
know how red or blue or brown looks (in ordinary daylight) and know what
red light is (and even how a beam of it looks) without yet knowing how a
red or blue or brown surface looks in red light. The last two examples in
the first four illustrate the fact that a direct specification may include a term
that is not a simple shape or color term (or a term like 'surface'), but the
name of a kind of particular thing, if that term implies a characteristic shape
or color in that kind of thing, so that a person could not be said to know
what kind of thing the term denotes unless he knew what that characteristic
shape or color was. This is true of many terms, some common and some
not so common: for example, 'man', 'house', 'spoon', 'the letter A in Gothic
script', 'rainbow'.
The last example in the list above depends on the fact that understanding
one's demonstrative reference requires attending to what one demonstrates;
this form keeps the propositions about directly specifiable appearances that136 CHAPTER VI
one  understands  and  knows  to  be  true  from  being  limited  by  one's
descriptive vocabulary.
An example of a specification of a visual appearance that is not direct (is
indirect) is 'looks as would an animal of the kind Melora likes least a short
distance before one in the kind of light Roberta has in her room. The
meaning of this might be understood perfectly by someone who has no idea
of what specific kind of appearance it refers to.
If 'looks from one's present point of view as would x in φ' is indirect then
typically a person who knows that he sees something that looks from his
present point of view as would x in φ will know how x in φ looks. S can
know that he sees something that looks from his present point of view as
would x in φ without knowing how x in φ looks only if S does not know
whether or not the way x in φ looks (objectively) from his present point of
view is the way it then looks to him. That S's knowledge in that case will
have to be by inference from other things he knows is just as clear as it is in
any  case  of  abnormal  vision  where  something  looks  to  the  subject
otherwise than it really looks from his present point of view.
Typically, however, when 'looks from his present point of view as would
x in φ' is indirect, S will know that he sees something that looks from his
present point of view as would x in φ because he knows the following: x in
φ looks as would y in θ (where this is a direct specification of a visual
appearance) and he sees something that looks from his present point of
view as would y in θ. Since no one who knows this conjunction to be true
could avoid realizing that it entails that he sees something that looks from
his present point of view as would x in φ, one who knows it to be true
could be said to know by an obvious deductive inference that he sees
something that looks from his present point of view as would x in φ.  Or, if
we choose to say that in knowing that conjunctive proposition to be true S
knows that he sees something that looks from his present point of view as
would x in φ — the entailment is so obvious that the latter piece of
knowledge  cannot  be  separated  from  the  former  —  then  the  latter
knowledge will still be inferential because S's knowledge of one of the
conjuncts, namely, that x in φ (indirect) looks as would y in θ (direct), must
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(This, the typical case of knowing that one sees something that looks
from one's present point of view as would x in φ, when 'looks as would x in
φ' is indirect, is also clearly a case where one sees that something looks
from one's present point of view as would x in φ. And any other, atypical
sort of case, where S knows that he sees something that looks from his
present point of view as would x in φ without knowing whether or not how
x in φ looks is how what he sees then looks to him, will clearly be a case
where S does not see that something looks from his present point of view
as would x in φ.)
10.   S's knowledge of the other conjunct, that he sees something that looks
from his present point of view as would y in θ (direct specification), can,
however,  be  non-inferential.  And  normally  it  will  be  so,  the  only
exceptions being either cases where S's vision is abnormal and what S sees
looks to S otherwise than it really looks or cases where S has some reason
to distrust his visual sense on this occasion but this is over-ridden by other
special evidence S has that justifies his being confident that his seeing is all
right after all. It is from one’s non-inferential knowledge that one perceives
things having certain directly specifiable appearances that all the rest of
one's perceptual knowledge must derive. All of one's perceptual knowledge
is or comes by memory and inference from one's non-inferential knowledge
of appearance-reporting propositions that are such that to understand them
is to be able to recognize and discriminate the appearances that they report,
to know what those appearances are like.
It should be noted that propositions of this sort are generally not ones
such that one must be able to express them in language if one understands
them and knows them to be true. A person may know, hence understand
the proposition, that he sees something that looks from his present point of
view as would a chartreuse elliptical surface perpendicular to his line of
sight a short distance before him in ordinary light without being able to put
that proposition into words. Or, supposing that 'T' is a description in
English of that shape that has been characteristic of the standard table
telephone,  S  need  not  be  able  to  formulate  'T' or  any  other  correct
description of that shape in order to know on some occasion that he sees
something that looks from his present point of view as would a black, solid,
T object in ordinary light at about arm's reach before him or to know that T
is a characteristic shape for table telephones. A person's behavior may138 CHAPTER VI
provide evidence of his making visual discriminations that would show he
has the concept of an object's being chartreuse or T or elliptical or about an
arm's reach away or at a certain angle to his line of sight, even if he knows
no words for any of these concepts.
To say that S's knowledge of the directly specifiable visual appearances
(from his present point of view) of the things he sees can be non-inferential
is to say that there is a set of conditions that minimally suffices for his
knowing that he sees something having a certain directly specified visual
appearance (from his present point of view) and that does not entail that he
has an inferential justification for claiming to know it. A set of conditions
that is minimally sufficient, and also necessary, for such non-inferential
knowledge is the following:
If  'looks  as  would  y in  θ' is a direct  specification of a visual
appearance, then S knows non-inferentially that he sees something
that looks from his present point of view as would y in θ if and only if
(1) S sees something that looks from his present point of view as
would y in θ,
(2) S is confident that he sees something that looks from his present
point of view as would y in θ,
(3) this confidence is supported by the justification that
(a) S has a visual sensation as if seeing y in θ,
(b) there are no propositions r1,..., rn such that S has with respect
to each of them either a memory-impression that ri or  a
perceptual sensation as if ri
11 and his having those memory-
impressions  or  sensasations  would  give  him  reason  (by
however elaborate a sequence of inferences) to be unsure that
he sees something that looks from his present point of view as
would y in θ despite his sensation as if seeing y in θ, and
(4) there is no truth r such  that  were  S  to  have  justification  for
believing that r and to retain all of his properties implied by (3)
(a) and (b) compatible with his having justification for believing
that r then that justification and those properties would be very
far from justifying S in being confident that he sees something
that looks from his present point of view as would y in θ.
(Note that non-inferential visual knowledge of directly specified visual
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sees such-and-such a thing) will always be visual knowledge in that other
sense mentioned in Section 1 (seeing that such-and-such a thing is there).
That is, if 'looks as would y in θ' is direct, then S knows non-inferentially
that he sees something that looks from his present point of view as would y
in θ only if S sees that what he sees looks from his present point of view as
would yin θ.  If S knows non-inferentially that he sees something that looks
from his present point of view as would a small blue egg shape on a flat
brown surface within easy reach before him in ordinary daylight, then what
S sees looks to him as it looks objectively from his present point of view
and he sees that there is something that looks as would a small blue egg
shape... etc.)
I will argue for the joint sufficiency of the conditions in the analysis just
given in Chapter VIII. The necessity of each of them can, I think, be seen
fairly quickly. The necessity of (1), (2), and (4) has already been argued in
the argument for the general definition of knowledge given in Chapters
II—IV. Note that (4) here refers to all of S's properties implied by (3) (a)
and (b) where (4) in the general definition of knowledge refers to all of S's
properties,  without  restriction.  This  is  because  here  we  are  giving
conditions for S's having a particular sort of knowledge of the fact in
question,  non-inferential knowledge,  which  is  not  the  only  sort  of
knowledge of that fact that S could have. So we do not want (4) formulated
so that it can be true owing to S's also having some inferential justification
for confidence in the proposition in question, even though there is a truth r
that defeats S's non-inferential justification specified in (3) (a) and (b).
That (3) (a) is necessary for a non-inferential justification of a claim to
know the proposition in question follows quickly from things we have
already noted. If S does not have a sensation as if seeing y in  θ (for
example, as if seeing a red square surface perpendicular to his line of sight
a short distance away in ordinary daylight), but instead some recognizable
distortion of that kind of sensation (for example, as if seeing a red surface
with four concave sides a short distance away in dim light), then what he
sees does not look to him as y in θ looks. So he can know that what he sees
nevertheless looks objectively, from his present point of view, as would y
in θ only if he has some other knowledge by which to correct the belief that
should otherwise arise from how it does look to him: if he has no reason to
think that what he sees looks objectively some particular way that is
different from the way it presently looks to him, then he should not think140 CHAPTER VI
that it does. But a justification for thinking that it does must, of course, be
inferential.
The necessity of (3) (b) is also easily seen. If, contrary to (3) (b), S has
some memory-impressions or sensations that do give him reason to be
uncertain that he sees something that looks from his present point of view
as would y in θ, despite his having a visual sensation as if seeing y in θ,
then he should be uncertain of it and does not have justification for being
confident of it and claiming to know it, hence does not know it, unless he
has  some  other reason for being confident of it that outweighs these
reasons for doubt and thus, despite them, gives him inferential justification
for being confident of that proposition. But his having such other reasons,
outweighing the reasons for doubt ruled out by (3) (b), is not entailed by
(1), (2) or (4); so one who satisfies (1), (2), (4), and (3) (a), but fails to
satisfy (3) (b), will be one who either has such  other  counterbalancing
reasons and thereby has inferential justification for the proposition or lacks
such  other  counterbalancing  reasons  and  therefore  fails  to  have  any
justification for claiming to know the proposition.
In Chapter VIII I will discuss the principles that determine the sorts of
memory-impressions and sensations that (3) (b) rules out. But in the
meantime a few quick illustrations will give a more concrete idea of the
work that (3) (b) does. Suppose S sees and is confident that he sees
something that looks from his present point of view as would a turtle
resting on a table within easy reach in good light (so that S satisfies (1), (2),
and (3) (a) if 'y in θ' is replaced with 'a turtle ... etc.'). Now suppose that,
contrary to (3) (b), it seems to S as if he remembers that he saw no turtle on
that table when he looked at it just a moment ago and that he took an
hallucinogenic drug a short time before. These memory-impressions give S
reason to be unsure that he sees something that from his present point of
view looks as would a turtle... etc. and make his confidence that he does
unreasonable, even though he has a visual sensation as if seeing a turtle...
etc. (and whether or not he believes the deliverances of these memory-
impressions), unless these memory-impressions are overborne by other
justified beliefs (such as that a friend who has taken no drug has just told
him that he too sees what looks like a turtle on the table).
A concurrent perceptual sensation that would give S reason to be unsure
that he sees something that from his present point of view looks as would a
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hallucination), despite his having a visual sensation as if seeing a turtle...
etc., would be the tactual-kinaesthetic sensation as if feeling with his hand
over the entire surface of a table before him (where the table he sees looks
to be) and feeling nothing on it. And let us suppose that his visual sensation
is as if seeing a turtle on the table and nothing else, no hand. Here the
testimony of the two senses conflicts. Each gives reason to doubt the other.
If belief in one rather than the other is justified it will be for reasons other
than the present deliverances of those senses, and the justification will be
inferential.
A final remark in elucidation of the part of (3) that comes before (a):
Supposing that S has the non-inferential justification specified in (3) (a)
and (b), what makes it the case that S's confidence in (1) is supported by
this  justification?  Would  it  be  possible  for  S's  confidence  in  such  a
proposition not to be supported by such a justification if he has it? Only, I
think if S fails to have an adequate grasp of what counts as a reason in one's
memory impressions or other sensations for being unsure of (1) despite
satisfying (3) (a); so that S would fail to recognize some such reasons as
such, if he had them. At least this is the only circumstance that I want 'is
supported by' to be taken to rule out here. In some sense, no doubt,
confidence in (1) is not supported by (3) (a) and (b) in a subject who has a
perfect grasp of such reasons but is willing, out of some motive or other, to
maintain confidence in (1) (given (3) (a)) even if such reasons to doubt
were  to  appear  without  there  being  any  countervailing  inferential
justification; so that, while satisfying (3) (a) and (b) this subject could truly
say that he would still be sure of (1) even if... and then go on to specify a
counterfactual circumstance in which (3) (b) would be false and no other
justification would be present. But I don't think that we should want on that
account to deny that such a subject knows (non-inferentially) that (1) is
true. After all, this subject realizes that, though his being confident of (1) in
the specified counterfactual situation would defy disinterested reason, it
does not do so in the actual situation.
NOTES
1.  As some do. See, for example, Armstrong (1961), p. 191, Hamlyn (1957), p. 110,
Hamlyn (1961), p. 196 and Chisholm (1957), p. 3.
2.  This point and ones in the next paragraph were brought home to me by Collins (1967).
3.  For a full and interesting discussion of the conditions of seeing that p see Dretske
(1969).
4.  See, for example, Armstrong (1961).142 CHAPTER VI
5.  Put forward by Berkeley (see Principles of Human Knowledge, I: 3, 58) and many philosophers since,
for example: J. S. Mill (1865), Ch. 11 and Appendix to Ch. 12, Russell (1914a and 1914b), Lewis (1947),
Chs. VI—IX, and Ayer (1947).
6.  In the language of Russell's phenomenalism: one's concept of an external state of affairs is a "logical
construction" out of one's concepts of various sorts of sense-data; or in Mill's phrase: an external object is
an "enduring possibility of sensation".
7.  Criticisms of phenomenalism similar to those that I have given, and some others as well, are presented
in Armstrong (1961), Chs. 5 and 6.
8.  The emphasized phrase represents an explicit impurity in that it could be simply deleted, without being
replaced by any other phrase with descriptive content, and the resulting description prefixed by 'a visual
experience as if one were seeing...' would not be a more general visual-sensation description than one
formed by putting that prefix on the scene-description before deletion.
9.  Applied to modes of perception other than the visual, this conclusion means, for instance, that one's
knowledge that one hears a dog barking or smells rubber burning or tastes sugar in the tea needs to be
grounded on more knowledge than just the knowledge that one hears something that sounds as would a
dog barking or that one smells something that smells as would rubber burning or that one tastes
something that tastes as would sugar in the tea.
10.  I use 'red' here in its ordinary sense and not in any special 'physical' sense, which it has been alleged
to have, in which it is synonymous with some phrase of the form 'reflects light of such-and-such wave-
length'. In its ordinary sense 'red' expresses a concept of an objective property that one can grasp fully
without knowing anything about the physical theory of color, a concept one must grasp before one can
fully understand what that theory explains.
11.  S has a memory-impression that ri just in case it seems to him as if he remembers that ri. This does
not imply that he does remember that ri or even that he thinks he remembers it. 'S has a perceptual
sensation as if ri' expresses an intelligible proposition only if 'ri' expresses a perceptual proposition having
S as its subject.CHAPTER VII
MEMORY KNOWLEDGE
1.   Let us say that a memory fact about S is a fact expressible by a sentence
beginning 'S remembers...' or 'S remembered...'. A memory fact about S is
often a dispositional fact about S. That is, the fact does not entail that S
manifests  (at  the  time  at  which  he  remembers...)  the  fact  that  he
remembers... in any mental or behavioral act, but only that he could or
would manifest it given suitable motive to do so. This might well be true,
for example, of the fact that one would intend to express by saying 'S still
remembers the name of his first grade teacher'. But memory facts are not
always dispositional. For instance, the fact reported by 'S remembered in
the nick of time that he had a doctor's appointment' is not.
I want to define memory knowledge in terms of dispositional memory
facts,  but  not  in  the  way  that  would  be  parallel  to  my  definition  of
perceptual knowledge in terms of perceptual facts. S's memory knowledge
is not his knowledge of memory facts about himself. Memory facts are not
the  objects  of  memory  knowledge,  but  have,  rather,  to  do  with  its
justification. S has memory knowledge that p just in case he knows it
because he remembers it.
It does turn out, on this definition, that S has memory knowledge that p
just in case he knows that he remembers that p. So a person's memory
knowledge of any fact is equivalent to his knowledge of a certain sort of
memory fact about himself. But it is not the case that knowledge of just any
sort of memory fact about oneself is equivalent to memory knowledge of
some fact, because not every sort of memory fact is equivalent to one of the
form 'S remembers that p.' For example, a proposition of the form 'S
remembers to V,' where 'V' is a description of some action (for example,
'get milk on the way home') entails more than S's remembering some fact
(say, that he has formed the intention to V); it entails that he does V. A
proposition of the form 'S remembers V-ing', where 'V-ing' is a description
of  some  past  action  or  perception  or  subjective  experience  of  S  (for
example, 'climbing  Pinnacle  Peak'  or  'seeing  Franklin  Roosevelt  in  a
motorcade'), is always stronger than 'S remembers that he V-ed' or any144 CHAPTER VII
other proposition of the form 'S remembers that p': one thing that the
former entails but the latter does not is that S remembers that he V-ed from
a time when he V-ed(a condition I will explain more fully later).
It might seem plausible so say simply that S has memory knowledge that
p if and only if S remembers that p. It is clear that 'S remembers that p'
(though  not  'As  S  remembers  it,  p') entails  that  p. And,  for  many
instantiations for 'p', it is clear that 'S remembers that p' implies that S has
at some time or other in the past come to know that p. The more interesting
exceptions to this are those sorts of propositions about his own past
experience of which a person may have original memory knowledge, which
I will discuss in the next section.
(A less interesting sort of exception is the possible case where S would
have known that p but for his unreasonably doubting it in the face of his
justification for being confident of it. If S later becomes more reasonable
and, remembering that he was entitled to claim to know that p, he claims to
remember that p, to have come to know that p, we should, I think, allow
that he then does know that p: the only obstacle there was to saying that he
came to know it, his unreasonable doubt, has been removed. Strictly
speaking this would not be a case of knowledge retained from an occasion
of  original  acquisition.  On  the  occasion  of  his  being  in  an  original
justifying position for the knowledge claim S did not know because he was
not confident. Still, in a looser mood, it would be natural to date S's
achievement of knowledge from his coming into the original justifying
position rather than from his later overcoming his unreasonable doubt
while remembering that he had been entitled to claim knowledge. I will
ignore the possibility of this sort of case. It could be catered for by
replacing  'non-memory  knowledge'  with  'externally  conclusive  non-
memory justification for confidence' in the definitions to be given at the
beginning of Section 3 and at the end of Section 5.)
If S came only to believe hesitantly that p on rather weak evidence — for
example, S came to think that probably the checkbook was put in a certain
drawer because R told S that she had a hazy impression but she was not
sure that she put it there — then, even if as a result S later thinks  he
remembers that p (and it happens to be true that p), S is mistaken. If S does
remember what his previous basis for thinking that p was, then he cannot
truthfully say, 'I remember that p', for that would be to imply that his basis
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say this of him, for the same reason. Nor would it seem any more plausible
to say that S remembers that p, if every justification S has had for thinking
that he knew it failed to be externally conclusive, if in every case it was
pretty much a lucky accident that S's justification was justification for a
truth.
But the proposed definition, that S has memory knowledge that p if and
only  if  S  remembers  that  p, will  nevertheless  not  do  (whatever  the
instantiation for 'p') because the definiens does not entail condition (2) of
the general definition of knowledge: that S is confident that p. It might be
true that S remembers that p but false that S knows that p
1 because S's
present belief that p is hesitant and uncertain. If for this reason S cannot say
that he knows that p then no one else can say so either, although it may still
be reasonable to say that S does remember that p if it is clear that S's
present uncertain belief that p results in the right sort of way (more of this
later) from S's having previously come to know that p. (Indeed, S himself
may confidently remember that he used to know whether or not p: S may
be able to say, 'I did know the answer to that and I think, but am not sure, I
remember that it's p.') If, for example, S were asked what his telephone
number was twenty years ago and S comes up with the right number but is
extremely uncertain that he has got it right then S does not know that this
was his telephone number then, but I think we would want to say that S
does remember his number.
Could we say that S has memory knowledge that p if and only if S
remembers that p and is certain that p? No, because the mere conjunction
of these conditions does not ensure that the certainty is connected with the
remembering in such a way as to make it memory-certainty. Suppose that S
came to know that the first five digits of the decimal expansion of   are
3.1415 by having read this in a mathematics textbook. Suppose that some
considerable time later S is asked what the first five digits of the decimal
expansion of   are and answers (sincerely), 'Well, I'm not certain but I am
inclined to think that what I learned was that they are 3.1415, but I am not
at all sure of my memory on the last two'. At this point S does remember
the fact in question (since, we may suppose, his present uncertain belief in
it results in the right sort of way from his former knowledge of it) but he
does not know it (since he is uncertain). Now suppose that S's questioner is
a person whom S knows to be a reliable mathematician and the questioner
now tells S that what S seems to remember having learned is in fact
correct. On the basis of this new expert testimony S now begins to think146 CHAPTER VII
(correctly) that he knows the fact in question. Now, although he knows it
and  continues  to  remember  it  (as  he  did  just  before  getting  the  new
testimony), he does not know it because he remembers it. His present
knowledge of the fact is freshly acquired and not retained from a previous
acquisition; it is therefore not memory knowledge.
2.   These reflections might lead us to say that to have memory knowledge
of a fact is just to have retained (in one's memory) knowledge of it that one
originally  acquired  at  some  past  time:  it  is  to  know,  because  one
remembers, that one previously came to know it. Such retained knowledge
must, of course, be memory knowledge, but not all memory knowledge
need be retained from some prior original acquisition of it. There is a
certain sort of fact — namely, one about one's own past experience (that is,
perception, thought, feeling, action, etc.) — of which one's very first
knowledge can (though it need not) be memory knowledge. That is, it can
be that whenever one has known a certain fact of that sort one has known it
because one remembers it. This, which we may call original  memory
knowledge, can happen in various ways.
It may be that the proposition that p, though it reports a past experience
of the subject, is a proposition that he did not understand at the time he had
the experience. But after coming to understand the concepts involved in the
proposition he remembers that they apply to an experience that he has had.
Young children are sometimes able to describe from memory experiences
they had before they learned any language adequate to describe them. I
have heard, for example, of a two-year-old child who, upon seeing a certain
building which she had been in only once before when she was under a
year old, was able to recall having been inside it and to describe various
features of the interior. In this case, for instance, the subject remembers the
experience from the time when she had it. But she does not remember from
that time that her experience was such-and-such; that she realizes only
later. Still, when she does come to understand that proposition and to know
that her previous experience was such-and-such, she knows this because
she remembers that it was; therefore this knowledge is, upon its original
acquisition, memory knowledge.
(There could be a case of which we would have to say that a subject
remembers a fact about his own past experience that he never knows.
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seeing a circuit diagram for a radio, suffering hyperasphyxiation) when he
V-ed because S lacked the necessary concepts, and at every time after S
comes to possess them S's sincere response to 'Did you ever V?' would
have to be 'Well, I've a vague impression that I did once but I can't be
sure'.)
A person may also have original memory knowledge of a generalization
about a period of his past experience of the form 'Never during such-and-
such a period did I V'. Generally when a subject knows on the basis of
memory such a negative generalization about his past it will not be because
he infers it from knowledge retained from each moment during the period
in question (even if he did have such present-tense knowledge at each
moment during that period). My confidence, for example, that I have not
seen anyone enter my study during the few hours that I have been here
need not be justified by generalization from a vast number of recollections
for each moment within those hours that I was not then seeing anyone enter
my study. Nor need it be justified by inference from the proposition that I
do not recall seeing anyone enter and I would recall this had I done so. I
can simply recall that my experience during that period included no such
experience, and this will be how I first know that proposition. Simple recall
of negative general facts about one's past experience is not limited to short
periods in the immediate past. I can simply recall, for example, that during
the last twenty years I have never been to a dog show. I can be quite sure of
that, on the basis of memory, without being sure of the counterfactual
conditional proposition that if I had been to a dog show during the last
twenty years I would now recall it — a sort of proposition that it is hard to
be justified in being sure of. There is no absurdity in saying '1 know that I
have not V-ed, though whether or not I would now remember it if I had V-
ed I cannot tell'.
The case is often similar with positive generalizations about one's past
experience. I believe that my very first knowledge of the generalization
about my past that I have several times eaten pickled beets must have been
by simply recalling that this was so and not, say, by inference from distinct
recollections of several particular occasions on which I had that experience
or by inference from the testimony of another. (In fact I do not now
remember any particular occasion on which I ate pickled beets but I do
remember that I have eaten them quite a number of times). Typically, my
original knowledge of such a truth as that I have been reading for quite
some time now is also by simple recollection (and not by generalization148 CHAPTER VII
from a number of recollections about the various moments in the period
referred to or by inference from the proposition that I do not recall not
reading during that period and I would now recall it if I had been not
reading then).
Original  memory  knowledge  of  generalizations  about  one's  past
experience is important in the initial stages of the acquisition of knowledge
of one’s environment (at least in the actual, normal case, although it is
imaginable that it should be otherwise). It is a big help in getting started on
perceptual knowledge. For example, a young child may know that he sees a
solid cube by inference from the proposition that he sees something that
looks from his present point of view as would a solid cube at arm's reach
before him in good light plus the generalization that things looking that
way from a single point of view (or a limited range of points of view)
virtually always are solid cubes; and this generalization the child may
know by inference from the generalization about his own experience that
he has many times seen something looking like that and subsequently felt it
and looked at it on all sides and never (or almost never) did it fail to feel or
look solid or cubical on all sides; and this the child may know in the
manner of original memory knowledge, because he remembers it from his
previous experience, without having known on the occasions of previous
experience, or even understood the proposition, that he was perceiving
something  of  such-and-such  an  appearance.  The  same  perceptual
experience in the early years, from which the normal person derives his
knowledge of many general truths about connections among objective
appearances of things, also gives him his grasp of various concepts of
directly specifiable appearances, his understanding of various propositions
to the effect that he perceives something that appears from his present point
of view as would such-and-such ( a solid cube or a ball or a person's face,
at about arm's reach or further away than that, in good light or relative
darkness), since this understanding requires a knowledge of what sorts of
further appearances must be perceivable through various sorts of action if
what appears as would such-and-such is such-and-such.  And  to  think
merely that one sees something that looks from one's present point of view
as would a thing of a certain sort is to think that one is being affected by
one’s environment in a way that can be counted on, if one moves in certain
ways,  to  produce  further  perceptions  that  will  have  certain  coherent
relations to the present perception and accompanying perceptions in other
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the environment, such as losing consciousness or malfunctioning of one's
perceptual faculties).
It may be that not all of a normal person's understanding of perceptual
propositions and beliefs about general connections to be expected in his
perceptual experience come about through memory of earlier experience. It
may be that from the beginning of his perceptual experience a normal
infant has some generally correct (if crude and inspecific) beliefs as to what
sorts of things he perceives and what sorts of further perceptual experience
he would have if he moved in certain ways. (Bower (1974) reports recent
experiments on perception in infants that support such an hypothesis.) If
this is so and if the explanation of the normal infant's having these beliefs
that are not derived from experience also explains why they are generally
correct, then it would be natural to count the correct ones as knowledge, or
as close to it as the infant (with his lack of experience and lack of a concept
of justification) can come.
With respect to his beliefs as to the directly specifiable appearances he
sees  the  inexperienced  infant  may  virtually  satisfy  the  justification
condition (3) in our analysis of non-inferential perceptual knowledge (as
well as the other conditions), all except for the 'supported by' part at the
beginning. And he may have beliefs about general connections to be
expected in perceptual experience that would, when conjoined with his
direct  perceptual  beliefs,  form  premisses  from  which  some  impure
perceptual beliefs (such as that he sees a graspable object within arm's
reach, or that he sees a sharp drop-off just ahead of the surface on which he
lies, or that he sees one object go behind another) could be properly
inferred with confidence. The beliefs a very young infant has about general
connections to be expected in perceptual experience that are not derived
from earlier experience could be likened to memory-impressions, and the
correct ones among them that we might want to count as quasi-knowledge
might be likened to memory knowledge. They are not actually memory-
impressions  or  memory  knowledge,  of  course,  but  this  comparison
becomes plausible (if it isn't already) in light of another: between the
infant's case, as we are supposing it to be, and the fanciful but conceivable
case of the coming into existence full-blown of an adult human being who
is much like one of us in his general beliefs about how the world works and
what sorts or things there are in it but lacks any memory-impressions of
particular past experience of his. The inclination to treat such a person's
general beliefs as showing impressions on his part that he has come to150 CHAPTER VII
know certain things, memory-impressions, and to treat the true ones as a
sort of knowledge very like our memory knowledge would be very strong,
especially if what explains his having them (for example, his brain's having
been copied from that of a person who was born and grew up in the real-
world way) also explains their being generally correct.
2 Similarly, if the
normal infant starts his perceptual experience with some beliefs as to what
it is and will be like, and that which explains his having those beliefs (for
example, their being genetically determined traits that have important
survival value) also explains their being generally correct, then it would not
be stretching things far to look at them as, in a way, knowledge and to liken
them to memory. Here, and even more plausibly in the case of the newly
existent full-blown adult, one might speak of pseudo-memory-impressions
and pseudo-memory knowledge (where 'pseudo' modifies 'memory' rather
than 'impressions' or 'knowledge').
The two sorts of genuine memory knowledge that I have distinguished
—  original  memory  knowledge  of  one's  own  past  experience  and
knowledge of any sort of fact retained in the memory from a prior original
acquisition — are all the sorts there are. Thus it is true in a sense that one's
memory knowledge is always knowledge of one's own past. Or rather: to
claim that one knows a fact because one remembers it is always to claim
something about one's past: either one implies that one came to know the
fact in the past or the fact is itself about one's past experience. This is a
significantly weaker sense than that in which many philosophers have
taken it to be true that memory is always of the subject's past. Many seem
to have thought that to remember something is always really to remember
experiencing something.
3 But this is not so. Even to remember that one had
a certain sort of experience is not necessarily to remember experiencing a
certain sort of thing. The proposition expressed by 'S remembers V-ing' is
much stronger than that expressed by 'S  remembers that he V-ed.' S
remembers V-ing if and only if he remembers that he V-ed from a time
when  he  V-ed  and  not  just  from  some  other  time  when  he  acquired
knowledge that he V-ed and, further, he remembers, not merely the bare
proposition that he V-ed,  but also in some detail what V-ing on that
occasion was like.
I  know  that  I  saw  the  Chicago  World's  Fair  in  1933,  but  I  do  not
remember that I saw it from the time of my visiting it but rather only from
several  accounts  of  our  visit  that  my  parents  gave  me  years  later.  lf
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answer that I remember that I saw the one in Chicago in 1933, but I cannot
truthfully say that I remember seeing that Fair since I remember nothing
from the original experience itself. Moreover, in order to be able to say that
I remember seeing (attending) that Fair I would have to remember from the
time of my seeing it more about that experience than just the proposition
that I did see it: I would need to be able to give some non-empty answer to
the question "What was it like?" that my claim to remember seeing it is
likely to raise: 1 must be able to describe the experience or picture it to
myself in some detail. If I now recall that it is a fact that I saw the Chicago
World's Fair in 1934 but I do not now know whether I remember that from
the original experience and do not recall any details of the experience, then,
even though it should happen that I do remember that I saw the Fair from
the time of the original experience, I do not remember seeing  it. The
experience, as distinguished from the knowledge that I had an experience
satisfying a certain (meager) description, has not stayed with me.
3.    Let me turn now to formulating conditions of remembering and
memory knowledge. First I shall state several definitions: of remembering
that p, of memory knowledge that p in general, and of each of its two kinds.
Then I will explain and comment on these definitions
S remembers that p if and only if
(1)S has a (strong or weak) memory-impression that p and
(2)there was a time t such that either (a) S's memory-impression that p
is memory-connected to his having non-memory knowledge that p
at t or (b) 'p' is of the form 'S V-ed', attributing to S a certain sort of
past experience (action, perception, or subjective experience), and
S's memory-impression that p is memory-connected to his having
V-ed at t.
S has memory knowledge that p if and only if
(l) p,
(2) S is confident that  p,
(3) this confidence is supported by the justification that
(a)S has a strong memory-impression that p and
(b)S has no other memory-impressions or sensations or infallible
knowledge that would give S reason to be unsure that p despite
his strong memory-impression that p, and
(4)(a)there is no truth r such that were S to have justification for
believing that r and retain those properties implied by (3) (a)152 CHAPTER VII
and (b) that are compatible with his having justification for
believing  that  r then that justification and those properties
would be very far from justifying Sin being confident that p:  in
particular the negation of the following proposition is not a
truth:
either (i) 'p' is of the form 'S V-ed', attributing to S a certain
sort of past experience, and there was a time t such that S V-
ed at t and S's present strong memory-impression that he V-
ed is memory-connected to his having V-ed at t, or (ii) there
was a time t such that S had non-memory knowledge that p
at t and  S's  present  strong  memory-impression  that  p is
memory-connected to his having known that p at t.
S has retained knowledge that p if and only if (1), (2), (3),(4) (a),
and (4) (b) (ii).
S has original memory knowledge that p if and only if (1),(2), (3), (4)
(a), and (4) (b) (i).
The definitions of memory-knowledge have, of course, been constructed
so as to fit the pattern of the general definition of knowledge given at the
beginning of Chapter II. This has the interesting consequence that the
crucial feature of memory, namely, the special causal connection that it
requires  between  a  present  cognitive  state  and  a  past  experience  or
cognitive  state  of  the  subject,  is  implied  in  the  fourth,  external-
conclusiveness condition.
The two species of memory-knowledge are distinguished by the nature of
the earlier in the pair of items that this connection connects. In the case
where 'p' is of the form 'S V-ed' and attributes to S a certain sort of past
experience, what determines whether S's memory knowledge that p is
retained knowledge, original memory knowledge, or both (as it could be),
is a matter of how (4) (b) is satisfied: it is both if both (i) and (ii) are true; it
is only original memory knowledge if (i) but not (ii) is true; and it is only
retained knowledge if (ii) but not (i) is true. The justification condition, (3),
does not discriminate between these, so S may be justified in claiming to
have memory knowledge without being justified in claiming to know that
he has one rather than the other or both species of it. In satisfying (3) with
respect to a proposition about his own past experience, S may be justified
in being confident that (4) (b) is true without being either justified in being
confident that (i) is true or justified in being confident that (ii) is true. I
may, for example, claim to remember and know that I once saw FranklinMEMORY KNOWLEDGE 153
Roosevelt in a motorcade without being sure whether I remember this from
the occasion of the experience itself or only from later occasions when I
was told about it.
Perhaps the most important thing to note about (3), the justification
condition, is that it is not inferential: memory knowledge is non-inferential
knowledge.
But note that some memory knowledge, namely, retained knowledge, is
in another way derivative. Retained knowledge that p derives via the
memory-connection from some prior state of non-memory knowledge that
p. But one may retain knowledge that p without retaining the justification
one previously had for claiming to know that p. Nothing in (3) or (4) (b)
(ii) entails that S continues to satisfy the conditions that would have
justified  S's  knowledge  claim  at  the  time  t from which S retains the
knowledge, and this is as it should be. Suppose, for example, that S
originally came to know a certain mathematical truth by a certain complex
proof that S constructed, but S now remembers confidently only that he did
somehow come to know that truth and does not remember at all how he
came to know it, not even whether it was by working out a proof or by
being told that it was true by a reliable authority. Clearly, S does still know
that  truth  even  though  S  can  no  longer  produce  the  justification  for
claiming to know it that S originally could, but only the justification that he
does remember that he did (somehow) come to know it. S's retained
knowledge in this case will, in a sense, no longer have its original basis, for
S no longer satisfies all the conditions that originally made it the case that S
knew it. But in another sense S's knowledge does have its original basis for
it is retained from its acquisition on that basis: without that (or some other)
history of original justification S's present confidence on the basis of
memory would not be retained knowledge.
4.   Condition (3a) requires that S have a strong memory-impression that p.
This means that it seems to S that he remembers that p and that there is
nothing in, so to speak, the way it so seems to give him reason to lack
confidence that p. Sometimes when one thinks or is inclined to think that
one remembers something, one wants to say something like 'I seem to
recall that p but I don't clearly remember it: my memory on the point is
weak (hazy, uncertain)'. This is what I mean by saying that one's memory-
impression is weak. 'I seem to remember...' or 'It seems  to me as if I154 CHAPTER VII
remember...,' with a certain emphasis on 'seems' and a certain tone of
hesitation, express this weakness in the memory-impression, suggesting
that one's hesitation has to do with the nature of one's memory itself and
does not derive entirely from other considerations such as beliefs that fail
to  cohere  with  what  the  memory-impression  delivers.  But  'seem  to
remember' can be used without this suggestion of weakness in the memory-
impression, as in: 'You say you weren't there at all? How strange. I seem to
remember so clearly that you were. It's rare that one seems so clearly to
remember something that never happened.' The intelligibility of the last
sentence shows also that 'seems to remember that p' does not (or at least
need not) imply that the subject does not actually remember that p or that
he has some reason to doubt that he does. (I take it for granted that 'S
remembers that p' implies that p.) That sentence uses 'seems to remember'
in that sense in which seeming to remember is not only compatible with
remembering but is implied by it.
A strong memory-impression is just one that is not weak in the sense
explained. It is one whose deliverance its subject will not normally be
inclined to doubt except for reasons external to the memory-impression
itself, which (3) (b) says he does not have. So one who satisfies both (3) (a)
and (3) (b) but lacks confidence that p must be abnormally distrustful of his
memory (either in general or for some reason having to do with the nature
of  the  proposition  that  p,  for  example,  that  proposition  may  report
something that he very much wants not to be the case).
It is possible for one who satisfies (3) (a) and (b) but is abnormally
distrustful of his strong memory-impression that p to be confident that p for
some other sort of reason. This is where the part of (3) before (a) and (b)
does its work: such a case would not be memory knowledge that p. S's
confidence that p is supported by the memory-justification specified in (a)
and (b) only if S could (provided that he understood the propositions)
truthfully say either that he is confident that p merely because (a) and (b) or
that he would be confident that p merely because (a) and (b) if he had no
other reason to be confident that p.
A memory-impression  (weak  or  strong)  is  an  enduring  sort  of
dispositional state of its subject that may be (and usually is) present when it
is not being manifested in any mental or behavioral act. Most of us have at
any  given  time  a  great  many  memory-impressions  of  which  we  can
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person has a certain memory-impression is tied to whether or not he would
manifest it if the circumstances were of the right sort. Manifestations of
memory-impressions come in a great variety of styles. Contrary to what
many philosophers have thought, they need not involve a mental image or
other representation of the experience or fact remembered.
4 Any act of
which we can truly say that in that act the subject relies on his memory that
p manifests a memory-impression that p (for example, when asked 'Where
did you put the pliers?', simply replying 'the kitchen drawer' or going to the
kitchen  drawer  or  pointing  to  it  may  suffice  to  manifest  a  memory-
impression that one put the pliers in the kitchen drawer); any thought that a
subject could correctly express by saying 'I recall that p' or 'I seem to
remember that p' is a manifestation of a memory-impression that p. We can
say that a person has a memory-impression that p, the dispositional state, if
he would manifest it, at least in the sort of thought just mentioned, were he
to consider and try to answer the question whether it seems to him that he
remembers that p.
Philosophers who have thought of all remembering as remembering
experiencing, have usually also thought of its manifestations as confined to
having a mental image of the remembered experience. It seems to have
been  supposed  that  producing  information  from  one's  memory
(remembering it) must be a matter of reading it off from a retained trace or
copy of a past experience while feeling the copy to be derived from (a trace
of) something past. (Somehow it seems to have been easier to suppose that
an experience should produce in its subject later copies of itself than that it
should produce merely the disposition to assert that it happened or to
manifest this belief in some other manner. This tendency may be part of a
general tendency to regard any sort of thinking of a fact or a possibility as
essentially involving a picture or representation of it.
5) This description of
what happens when one remembers has even seemed to be an analysis of
what a memory impression is, or what a manifestation of one is. But it is no
analysis at all: The irreducible element of feeling or being aware that a
present mental image refers to a past experience, however it may be
described — as there being a feeling of pastness about it, or an aspect about
it of seeming left by what has gone before — can be nothing other than
seeming  to  remember  that one had an experience like what one now
pictures. That would have to be the tacit understanding as to how those
descriptions — which could have other applications — are to be taken in
the context of that analysis.156 CHAPTER VII
As far as I can see, the proposition expressed by (3) (a), 'S has a strong
memory-impression that p', or the weaker ones expressed by 'it seems to S
that he remembers that p' or  'I  seem  to  remember  that p', cannot  be
expressed  without  the  use  of  'remember'  or  some  cognate  expression
(cognate by existing usage or by stipulation). Clearly, 'It seems to S that p'
will not do, since it is obvious that it can seem to S that p without its
seeming to him that he remembers that p (for example, he has for the first
time just been informed that p or come to the conclusion that p). Similarly
for 'It seems to S that he knows that p': S may just now have come to know
that p for the first time. The proposition 'It seems to S that he previously
came to know that p.' (or 'It seems to S that he V-ed') is entailed by, and in
most circumstances entails, 'It seems to S that he remembers that p' (or 'It
seems to S that he remembers that he V-ed'). But there is at least one
circumstance in which the truth of the former does not require the truth of
the latter, namely, when S has just now been given what he takes to be
good evidence that he previously came to know that p (or that he V-ed).
Suppose that at some past time S came to know that Pluto is about 48
times as far from the sun as the earth and since then has not had occasion to
manifest memory of this fact or otherwise to think of it, and suppose that S
is just now reliably informed that he once came to know that fact. What can
now  show  whether or  not  it also  seems  to  S  as  if  he  remembers it?
Obviously not merely his thinking it right to say that it seems to him that he
has previously come to know it, since that could be explained by his having
just now been informed that he previously came to know it. The only
criterion that would show it that I can think of is whether or not S thinks it
right to say that he remembers, or seems to remember, it (and he knows the
correct use of 'remember'). Suppose someone tells me that he was present
the last time I told the joke I have just begun to tell and his doing so
reminds me of, that is, leads me to remember, that fact. If I am asked how I
know that I do recall that fact, and do not know of it only on the basis of
having just been told it, the only thing that I can answer, as far as I can see,
is that it just seems to me that I do remember it — and, of course, I know
how to use 'remember', 'recall', and the like correctly: I know, for example,
that it is correct to say 'S remembers that p' when it is the case that S
previously came to know that p and without having been introduced in any
way to the information again S now believes that p. Of course, if I were
able to supply more detailed information about the previous occasion of my
coming to know the fact in question than anything I have since been told
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from that previous occasion. But we cannot require such ability to supply
further details as a necessary condition of remembering or seeming to
remember, for it is possible to remember about a past occasion only what
one has just now been told and no more. As far as I can see, there is no
report a subject can give of his present state in other terms, in terms of
other things that he thinks it right to say about himself, that will in every
circumstance be equivalent to the proposition that he would express by
saying 'I seem to remember that p'. (From this it follows that, given the
unlikely circumstance that S is just now informed that he previously came
to know that p and does not know the use of 'remember' or any cognate
expression, then the only sort of reason another person could have for
saying that it also seems to S that he remembers that p would  be  an
inductive one: the presence of some condition found to be correlated with
seeming to remember in cases where there was present some such clear
criterion of seeming to remember as (a) the subject's thinking it right to say
that he remembers or seems to remember or (b) its seeming to the subject
that he has come to know that p when he has not just been given good
evidence that he came to know that p.)
If it were necessary that every memory-impression represent a genuine
memory, impossible that any memory impression be a memory delusion
—as distinguished from a memory of some past experience or apparent
acquisition of knowledge that was illusory — then a memory-impression
that p could be defined as an impression that p that is memory-connected to
a previous acquisition of knowledge that p  or seeming acquisition of
knowledge that p (or, where 'p' attributes to the subject a certain past
experience, to an occasion when the subject had that experience or it
seemed to him that he was having it or he dreamed that he was having it or
he vividly imagined having it or something of the sort). And then we'd need
to consider whether we can explicate memory-connection without using
'remember' or any cognate. But, of course, delusions of memory are
possible. It is, for instance, possible that a person should seem to remember
skiing (even seem to remember it vividly) but have never actually skied or
had an illusion or dream that he was skiing or engaged in imagining
himself skiing or even been informed what skiing was like: though we do
not expect it ever to happen, we can conceive what it would be like for (and
what we would be willing to count as) a person who has never before had
any experience that would have given him any idea of the phenomenon of
skiing to wake up one day with a vivid memory-impression of having been
skiing.158 CHAPTER VII
5.    Let  us  consider  now  the  negatively  phrased  conditions  of  the
definitions, (3) (b) and (4). There is this relation between them: if a
proposition r is incompatible with (4) then S's having justification for
believing  that  r, given  him  ultimately  by  his  memory-impressions,
sensations, or infallible intuitions, is incompatible with (3) (b). The way in
which (4) can be false to which I wish to give most attention in this chapter
is through the falsity of (4) (b), through the absence of the right connection
between S's previous knowledge or experience and his present memory-
impression that he had it.
But there are other ways in which (4) or (3) (b) could be false, which are
compatible with the truth of (4) (b) and also quite compatible with the truth
of (1), (2), and (3) (a). For example, suppose that S has just awakened in
the morning and let the proposition 'p' — with respect to which (1), (2),
and (3a) are satisfied — be the proposition that S got up in the middle of
the night and closed the bedroom window. A proposition r whose truth
would falsify (4a), and S's having justification for believing which would
falsify (3b), would be the following conjunction: the window is now wide
open, S's husband did not open it at any time in the night, he is the only
other person S has any reason to think was in the house during the night,
and dreams while asleep often give rise to false memory-impressions upon
awaking. (This proposition is compatible with (1): suppose that S did get
up and close the window and that after S went back to sleep a burglar
opened it, entered the house, found nothing he wanted to remove and
departed without leaving a trace and without closing the window.) Though
this r be true, as long as S is ignorant of it, especially the first conjunct, and
satisfies both (3) (a) and (3) (b) S is justified in being confident and
claiming to know that p; but if this r is true then S does not know that p,
because if S were to have justification for believing this r (thus failing to
satisfy (3) (b)), S's strong memory-impression that p would be too far from
justifying her in being confident that p. (This seems to me right, but if it
seems not quite so clear to others it will be, I think, because S's coming to
have justified belief that r would not cancel altogether the justifying force
of her strong memory-impression that p. It would be not unreasonable for S
still to think hesitantly, to suspect at least, that her memory is correct and
the wide open window has some other explanation now unknown; and,
though it would be unreasonable, it would not be quite absurd for S toMEMORY KNOWLEDGE 159
continue to believe strongly, to insist stubbornly on, what she seems so
clearly to remember.)
(3)  (b)  in  the  analysis  of  memory  knowledge  differs  from  the
corresponding  condition  in  the  analysis  of  non-inferential  perceptual
knowledge (p. 140) by the addition of reference to S's infallible knowledge
as a possible source of reason to doubt the deliverance of his memory-
impression. This is necessary in order to exclude the remote possibility that
S should have a strong memory-impression of having come to know the
contradictory of an a priori necessary truth that is now self-evident to him
or that he now sees to follow self-evidently from self-evident truths.)
That the negation of (4) (b) is another proposition incompatible with (4)
(a)  but  compatible  with  (1),  (2),  and  (3)  (a)  will  be  clear  once  it  is
explained what is meant by its central term 'memory-connection'. This
relation is to be defined in such a way that S remembers that p (or that he
V-ed) from his having known that p (or his having V-ed) at t if and only if
S has a (strong or weak) memory-impression that p (or that he V-ed) that is
memory-connected to his having known that p (or his having V-ed) at t.  To
say that a case of seeming to remember is also a case of remembering, that
a memory-impression is a bona fide memory, is to say that the memory-
impression results in the right sort of way from a matching prior experience
or state of knowledge.
What is the right sort of way? One answer we could give is this: consider
all the ordinary, normal, clear cases of a person's remembering a particular
experience or previously acquired piece of knowledge; whatever sort of
neurological  process  it  is  that  in  fact  links  the  experiences  or  the
acquisitions of knowledge to the memories in all these clear cases, that in
fact provides a true neurological explanation of how experience produces
later memory of it (which is not known, as far as I know), is a connection
that will suffice to make the memory connection whenever it links a
particular experience or acquisition of knowledge and a later matching
memory-impression.
Now this seems to be true, provided that there is such a neurological link.
But it also seems that we need not go so far as to depend on any such
possibly false assumption in order to get a conceptually sufficient condition
for the memory connection. We can construct one using the circumstances
that define the clear, normal cases of memory, the ones where we look for160 CHAPTER VII
whatever neurological explanation it may have. It seems to me that these
show the notion of the causal connection essentially involved in memory to
be a special defeasible concept. Given that a person previously knew that p
(or V-ed) and that he now has a memory-impression that p (or that he V-
ed), the memory-impression must of course be the right sort of result of his
previous knowledge (or experience) to count as his remembering it unless
there are certain special facts in the case that defeat that attribution. In the
absence of the right special sort of reason to think otherwise, the internal
relation between S's memory-impression and his previous knowledge or
experience is reason enough to attribute the first to the second as a memory
of it.
What sort of fact could defeat this attribution? Only the intervention of
something else sufficient to have caused the present memory-impression.
This might be an intervening occurrence of something sufficient to give S
the  same  piece  of  knowledge  (or  an  occurrence  of  the  same  sort  of
experience  or  of  something  sufficient  to  inform  S  of  his  previous
experience). Or it might be something more fanciful, such as neurological
experimenters applying to S's brain a stimulus designed to give S just such
a memory-impression. Given that a person on just one occasion acquires a
certain piece of knowledge (or has a certain sort of experience) and then
later has a matching memory-impression, then the two alternatives, that the
impression is a memory of the previously acquired knowledge (or the
previous experience) or that it has its source in some other intervening
cause (of the sort mentioned), are the only accounts possible. We could not
take seriously a third way of regarding such a case, one in which we
suppose that neither the matching earlier knowledge (or experience) nor
anything since is the cause of it but that it simply has no cause at all and its
matching the earlier experience is only coincidence.
This is not because it is inconceivable that something should have no
cause (which I disbelieve) but is a matter of our concept of memory. We
just do not recognize any basis for doubting that a person's memory-
impression is a memory of his matching earlier acquired knowledge (or his
matching  earlier  experience),  for  suspecting  that  there  is  some  other
connection instead or that the matching is just a coincidence, except the
belief or suspicion that the subject would not have that memory-impression
had not something else happened that was sufficient to cause it. It would be
absurd to suggest both that it is a coincidence, an accident, that a person's
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experience)  and  that  the  impression  has  no  other  cause.  The  first
suggestion could be supported only by evidence of the existence of another
cause.
This seems to me to hold even for the circumstance where the subject's
memory-impressions regarding very similar matters are so much more
often  wrong  than  right  that  the  subject  could  have  done  as  well  by
guessing:  one has good reason to think that someone merely guessing as to
the facts on those matters would be right by mere chance as often as this
subject's memory-impressions are right.
6 Suppose that in a psychological
experiment the subject hears spoken ten three-digit numbers in succession
and after a short interval is supposed to write down all of the ten numbers
that  he  can  remember  having  heard,  and  suppose  that  one  particular
subject,  claiming  sincerely  to  remember  them  all,  writes  down  ten
numbers. This is repeated, with different sets of ten numbers, several times
with the same result each time: this subject confidently offers ten numbers
as the ones he remembers having heard. But actually the numbers he writes
down coincide with the numbers he has just heard very infrequently, no
more frequently over a longish run of trials than those written down by
another subject who is asked just to invent sets of ten three-digit numbers.
Knowing this about a case would, indeed, make us strongly suspect that
those of the subject's memory-impressions regarding the numbers he has
just heard that happen to match the facts are not genuine memories, that it
is just a coincidence that those memory-impressions are correct. But this
would be because what we know about the case gives us reason to suspect
equally strongly that those few correct memory impressions, along with the
many incorrect ones, have another cause unconnected with the subject's
hearing the numbers spoken.
Although the absence of any other explanation is sufficient to connect the
memory-impression to the matching earlier knowledge (or experience) in
the right sort of way for the one to be a memory of the other, it is not
necessary. I may remember that I had a certain sort of experience from the
time when I had it, even though something has happened to me in the
meantime that was independently sufficient to cause me to have a memory-
impression that I had such an experience. Suppose, for example, that I now
remember that I once lost control of a car I was driving on a snowy road
and skidded into the roadside ditch and that I have remembered this ever
since it happened. It is quite compatible with this that on some occasion in
the meantime I have had the experience of hearing other occupants of the162 CHAPTER VII
car tell of the incident in vivid detail and that experience would have been
sufficient to produce in me the same memory impression even if I had
before  that  completely  lost  my  memory  of  the  incident.  A  sufficient
condition for memory connection that is also necessary must not exclude
such a case.
Another sufficient condition for memory connection would be simply
that since acquiring a certain piece of knowledge (or having a certain sort
of experience) the subject has continuously had a memory impression of it.
If S came to know that p at t and at all times since t it has seemed to him
that he remembers that p, then it cannot be denied that he has never since
then forgotten that p, that he remembers that p from t, no matter what else
may have happened in the interval. But this too is not necessary for
memory connection, since it is possible that a person should totally lose
memory of a certain piece of knowledge (or experience) for an interval
after which memory of it simply returns without anything new impinging
on the person that would suffice to produce the memory-impression.
7
What we can say is this:
Given  a  person  who  at  a  certain  past  time  t had  non-memory
knowledge that p (or V-ed) and now has a memory-impression that p
(that he V-ed), the latter state has the right sort of connection to the
former state to be a memory that p (that he V-ed) from t if and only if,
for any time since t at which something impinged upon him sufficient
to produce in him a memory-impression that p (that he V-ed), he then
already possessed such a memory-impression.
Here 'already' means that his possessing it then was not brought about by
what impinged upon him then. This condition is satisfied if upon being told
about his past acquisition of knowledge (or his past experience) the person
is able to say sincerely or think, 'Ah yes, I remember it now', even if before
that a more limited prompting did not succeed in reminding him of it. If he
thinks it right to say that, then the prompting, however thorough, does not
create the memory-impression but only provides a (perhaps necessary)
stimulus to its manifestation. A memory-impression may consist in (among
other things) a disposition to be reminded when given sufficient prompting.
However, the only criterion for whether a really thorough prompting — an
out-and-out telling — reminds the subject or is instead the whole source of
the  subsequent  memory-impression  is  whether  or  not,  upon  being  soMEMORY KNOWLEDGE 163
prompted, the subject thinks it right to say that he is reminded or now
remembers or some such thing (and, of course, knows the correct use of
such expressions). If the subject, S, does not think it right to say some such
thing and the reason is that S does not understand any such proposition,
then one could speculate that S would think it right if S did understand.
This speculation would be supported, for instance, if there were present a
neural state that we had good reason, derived from what we have found in
clear, unproblematic cases of memory, to think would have resulted in S's
so thinking had S possessed the necessary concepts. (The presence of a
certain neural state about which we possessed the right sort of information
might  even  support  the  conjecture  that  a  subject  who  possesses  the
necessary concepts but does not think it right to say that he is reminded,
even after thorough prompting, nevertheless would have been reminded if
some other sort of prompting had been given.) This possibility does not,
however, open up any way of specifying what would constitute a subject's
possessing an impression that has the memory-connection to that subject's
previous coming to know (or experience) without using 'remember' or any
cognate expression; and, as far as I can see, there is no way of doing this.
6.   If the condition I have given for memory-connection is sufficient, then
it follows that the concept of that connection does not require that there be
some further causal connection between comings to know (or experiences)
and later memories of them that explains the memory-connection in terms
of neural mechanisms in the brain; though, of course, neither does it
exclude this. In particular, it does not follow that there must be a further
causal connection that is spatio-temporally continuous. If the sufficient
condition I have given were satisfied by a particular past experience and
present  memory-impression  of  a  person  then,  even  if  there  were  no
intervening continuous chain of states or processes that is the mechanism
by which the past experience causes the present memory-impression, the
experience would still be the cause of the memory-impression and we
would still have a case of memory. In the concept of memory we have a
concept of a causal connection that could cross spatio-temporal gaps
(though it may not in fact ever do so).
8
Some  philosophers  have  claimed  the  contrary.  Martin  and  Deutscher
(1966), p. 189, say:
Once we accept the causal model for memory we must also
accept the existence of some sort of trace, or structural analogue164 CHAPTER VII
of what was experienced. Even if someone could overcome the
many difficulties of various kinds surrounding the idea of action
at  a  distance,  it  could  not  be  true  to  say  that  someone  was
remembering an event if his past experience of that event caused
him, over a temporal gap, to recount it.
I don't know what difficulties surrounding the idea of action at a distance
these authors have in mind. Perhaps one of them could be that it is hard to
see how the spatial or temporal parameters would be accommodated in
general laws governing a causal connection that could cross spatiotemporal
gaps of various, and haphazardly determined, sizes. But this is a difficulty
only on the assumption that any sort of causal connection requires that
there be true causal laws under which its instances are subsumable —that
only a law can make a causal connection. But it seems that in the concept
of memory we have a counter-example to this assumption, since it seems
clear that a particular experience and later matching memory-impression
could satisfy the condition I have given for memory-connection without
there being any true nomic generalization of the form 'Whenever a person
has such-and-such an experience, and certain further circumstances obtain
(then or thereafter), then the person at such-and-such later time has such-
and-such a memory-impression.
To philosophers strongly influenced by the Humean tradition about
causation, the idea of a causal connection that need not be continuous or
governed by general laws will seem strange. This possibility is perhaps
especially difficult to discern in the case of memory because it is now a
firm belief — at the very least a strongly appealing hypothesis — among
psychologists, neurological investigators, and probably many of the rest of
us, that the phenomena of memory of experience are to be explained by
some specific states or processes which our experiences produce in our
brains and which continue to be or unfold there until they are operative in
producing the manifestations of memory of those experiences. But the fact
that this hypothesis is widely accepted or appealing, perhaps even strongly
indicated by the evidence already turned up by neurological investigation,
should not be confused with the non-fact that the very concept of memory
requires some sort of continuous causal link between an experience and the
memory of it; this is no more the case than the fact that the hypothesis of an
intervening medium to explain the phenomena of gravitational attraction
was once widely appealing (and, some tell me, still is) indicates that theMEMORY KNOWLEDGE 165
very concept of gravitational force requires such an intervening medium
through which it is exercised.
If the continuity of the causal connection in memory were a feature of the
concept of memory, and not merely a feature of a dominant hypothesis that
there is a neurological explanation of memory, then, of course, whether or
not memory occurs at all would depend logically on whether or not there is
such a continuous link between experience and later memory of it. But it
seems to be at least logically possible that the hypothesis of a continuous
neurological link in memory might go the way of the "ether" hypothesis. It
might fail to be supported by further investigation. Although there seems to
be good evidence that certain kinds of memories and memory capacities
depend on the (continuous) absence of certain kinds of interference with
the brain, the search for how a particular experience and a later memory of
it are linked by a continuous chain of brain states and processes specific to
that memory could conceivably go on for a very long time and never turn
up any solid answer. It could conceivably give us reason to doubt seriously
that there are any such specific continuous brain "traces" for each memory.
But it could not, of course, conceivably give us reason to doubt that people
actually do remember specific past experiences.
What we have learned about the dependence of particular functions of
mind on particular brain states, including the fact that there are such
particular dependences on physical states, we have, after all, learned only a
posteriori; and it is conceivable that we should discover that what has been
looking and acting like an ordinary person for a long time — one of us, say
— actually has no brain at all inside his skull, nor anything else in him that
could be the vehicle of continuous specific causal connections between his
experiences  and  his  memories  of  them.  Such  a  discovery  would  not
demand the conclusion that this apparent person did not really remember
his experience (or did not really have experience, or a mind).
Another remark that Martin and Deutscher (1966) direct against the
possibility of discontinuity in the memory-connection is this (p. 189):
Furthermore, if our past experience could act directly on us
now, there would no longer be any reason to suppose that we
could remember only what we had experienced ourselves. If we
did not hold [some sort of storage or trace account of memory],166 CHAPTER VII
why should we not suppose that events which occurred years
before we were born could cause us to recount their occurrence?
If my denial that the memory-connection must involve a spatio-temporally
continuous causal process does have the consequence that it is possible that
one person's memory-impressions should have the memory-connection to
another person's acquisitions of knowledge (or experiences), it does not
much disturb me; for I am strongly inclined to think that interpersonal
memory-connection is a logical possibility. Moreover, I cannot see that one
is protected from having to admit this possibility by holding that the
memory-connection  is  continuous  or  involves  a  continuous  trace.  As
Shoemaker (1970a) points out, if there is a continuous physical connection
on which every memory depends, one could surely imagine that this
physical  process  (whatever  it  may  be)  might  run  from  one  person's
experience to another person's later matching memory-impressions, or
something sufficiently like it might, so that one would want to say, not
perhaps that the second person remembers the first person's experience, but
at least that he does something very like remember it, he 'quasi-remembers'
it (to use Shoemaker's term).
Shoemaker  himself  suggests  a  different  sort  of  argument  for  the
spatiotemporal  continuity  of  the  causal  connection  in  memory.
9  This
argument arises out of his aim (which I endorse) of showing that it is
possible to frame a satisfactory sufficient condition of personal identity
across time that uses memory as the link and does not require bodily
identity. What he appears to suggest is that memory can be the prime factor
in  such a sufficient condition for personal identify only if the causal
connection in memory is conceived to be continuous.
Shoemaker's argument has to do with what happens when one provides a
sufficient  condition  for  memory  connection  that  is  free  of  the
presupposition that the persons connected are identical. And this one must
do, of course, if memory-connection is to be of any use in specifying an
interesting  condition  for  personal  identity.  If  it  is  possible  at  all  to
formulate a sufficient condition for the memory-connection that does not
presuppose the identity of the persons connected and if the condition I have
already formulated (with that presupposition) is sufficient for memory-
connection then it should be possible to formulate a sufficient condition
that is free of that presupposition but is like the one already formulated in
not entailing a continuous connection.
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Shoemaker's argument suggests, will not work as the basis for a memory
criterion of personal identity.
This is because such a sufficient condition for memory connection would
have a certain feature that must be shared by any plausible candidate for
such a condition that does not presuppose the identity of the persons
connected: it must entail the possibility that the memory-connection could
branch or split. That is, it must allow it to be possible that similar memory
impressions had by two or more distinct persons at time 2 could have the
memory  connection  to  a  single  person's  experience  up  to  time  1.
Shoemaker's argument finds nothing wrong with this possibility but rather
points out that it means that a sufficient condition for identity between
person 1 at time 1 and person 2 at time 2 in which this possibly branching
memory-relation is central, must also contain a clause that stipulates that
there are no "competitors" to person 2's claim to identity with person 1 on
the basis of memory-connection that have been produced by branching of
that connection. But, says Shoemaker's argument, if discontinuity were
permitted in the memory-connection then this required 'no competitors'
clause would imply that nowhere in the universe after the time of the
extensive experience of person 1 to which person 2's memory-impressions
are connected does there exist any other person having equally extensive
memory connection to person 1. And, says Shoemaker (1970a), p. 274,
such  a  "self-consistent,  unrestricted,  negative  existential  claim”  is
"impossible in principle to establish."
This last claim, on which his argument ultimately rests, Shoemaker seems
to think needs no argument. But I see no good reason to accept it. Perhaps
Shoemaker's  thought  is  that  a  spatio-temporally  unrestricted  negative
existential claim ('Nowhere and nowhen is there... .') could be established
only  by  inspecting  all  of  space  and  time,  and  that,  I  will  grant,  is
impossible in principle. But that is surely not the only way that confidence
in  such  a  proposition  can  be  justified.  The  law  of  gravity,  like  any
contingent  universal  generalization,  implies  some  self-consistent,
unrestricted negative existential propositions, such as the proposition that
nowhere and nowhen is there a body with the same mass as the earth, a
body with the same mass as a brick, ten feet of empty space between them,
no other bodies within a hundred billion miles, and no motion of the one
toward the other. Our justification for being fairly sure of this does not
depend on our having inspected all of space and time. Our extremely
localized observations and experiments that are grounds for confidence in168 CHAPTER VII
the law of gravity are grounds for confidence that certain sorts of logically
possible states of affairs just do not occur anywhere anytime.
Consider now unrestricted negative claims about duplication. In order to
be justly sure that there is nowhere else on the face of the earth a city
exactly like New York City in all its details I do not need to have reason to
believe that every other part of the face of the earth has been inspected and
found to be without a duplicate of New York City. If I have no specific
evidence of such a duplicate then I can be sure that there is none simply on
the ground that it is just too unlikely, given our experience of the sorts of
things of which exact duplicates are found or made. I can be sure on the
same basis that there is no complete duplicate of New York City anywhere
in our galaxy or in the universe. Adding territory does not significantly
increase the likelihood. I have so much reason to think that such massive
detailed duplication just does not happen, at all.
It is the same for the possibility that there are two people having exactly
the same set of memory-impressions as I now have. Our experience,
although restricted to a very limited region of space and time, gives us title,
in the absence of specific evidence to the contrary, to be sure that such
extensive duplication does not happen. Suppose a person whom we were
talking to suddenly vanished without a trace and a few minutes later there
suddenly appeared elsewhere in the room 'from out of nowhere' a person
possessing all the same memory-impressions as were possessed by the one
who vanished (but, let us suppose, having a different bodily appearance).
We would naturally think, and would be entitled to think, that the second
person's  memory-impressions  have  the  same  source  as  did  the  first
person's, namely the previous knowledge and experience of the first. And,
as long as we do not observe or hear of another person with all those same
memory-impressions  popping  into  existence  somewhere,  we  will  be
entitled to think, as we would think, that the second person is the same
person as the first, one who has undergone a discontinuous change of
spatial and temporal location (along with a discontinuous change of bodily
appearance). We would and should not hesitate over the mere logical
possibility that somewhere we don't know about there has popped into
existence another person with all the same memory-impressions. In the
absence of specific evidence to the contrary, we would be entitled to
assume that whatever explains the extraordinary vanishing and appearing
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now find it that more than one person (with a normal sort of totality of
memory-impressions) should have all the same memory-impressions.
What  if,  however,  more  than  one  person  with  the  same  totality  of
memory-impressions did suddenly appear after the first one vanished?
They could not, of course, both be identical with the person who vanished;
and there would be no good reason to say that one rather than the other
was, so neither could be. But there would still be sufficient reason for
saying  that  the  exactly  similar  memory-impressions  of  the  suddenly
appearing ones are what they are because the experience and acquisitions
of knowledge of the vanished person were what they were: they quasi-
remember that previous knowledge and experience. If there is no other
causal explanation of the initial memory impressions of the suddenly
appearing persons, then the explanation of memory connection, or quasi-
memory  connection,  to  the  vanished  person  is  far  preferable  to  the
hypothesis of sheer coincidence.
NOTES
1.  A possibility that has been denied, for example, by Malcolm, in 'A Definition of Factual Memory' in
Malcolm (1963), p. 223.
2.  Unger (1967) brought me to realize how natural it would be to attribute knowledge— perhaps even
knowledge of past events — to such a person from his very beginning.
3.  See, for example: Aristotle, On Memory; Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IT,
Ch. X; Russell, (1921), Lec. IX.
4.  For excellent critiques of this erroneous conception of what must happen when a
person manifests that he remembers something (remembers it in the 'occurrent' sense)
see Malcolm, (1963), pp. 210—212, Malcolm (1970); Munsat (1966), especially Chs.
4—8; and Shoemaker (1967).
5.  As Malcolm (1970) suggests.
6.  A circumstance that Jose Benardete suggested to me might offer a counterexample
to this claim.
7.  This possibility of remembering again after an interval of not remembering or knowing
at all seems to be denied by Munsat (1966), p. 34n:
If I try to remember something at a certain time but cannot, and then later on can (do), we say I
"knew it all along." And I think that if we now say that I remember that p, then we are committed
to describing my previous inability to recall that p as "not being able to think of it at the time" and
not as "not knowing at the time (when asked) that p."
Apparently Munsat wants to say that, no matter how hard you tried and failed to come up with it, if you
ever again remember it (without having been reinformed) then you "knew it all along". It seems to me
that this is flatly wrong and that cases of temporary amnesia (though one need not go to such an extreme)
are clear counter-examples. We would not say that the temporary amnesiac knew all along the name of
the street on which he lives but was just unable to think of it. The blow on his head has, we say, left him
temporarily not knowing even his own name. The sorts of cases of which we would say that, although a
person's efforts to recall were not successful, he nevertheless knew it all along are ones in which we think
that his not being able to think of it has a special sort of explanation, such as his not trying hard or long170 CHAPTER VII
enough or distraction or his having a special sort of temporary 'mental block' on that particular matter.
There is an analogy here to being able to do a certain sort of thing (for example, hit a target, get a tight lid
off a jar) though failing to do it when one tries because of interfering external circumstance, or passing
jitters, or just not trying hard enough.
8.  This possibility is considered seriously in Russell (1921), Lecture IV.
9.   See Shoemaker (1970a and b). His argument owes something to Wiggins (1967) and ultimately to
Williams (1960).
10.  The chief effect of removing the presupposition of identity between the person coming to know (or
having the experience) and the person having the later matching memory-impression is that, if the
memory-impression is sufficiently limited in the previous knowledge or experience that it delivers, it is
no longer impossible, or even implausible, that the matching should be entirely coincidence even if the
memory-impression has no other unconnected cause. If person S has an otherwise uncaused memory
impression of having come to know that p, where 'p' is some simple proposition that many people have
come to know (e.g., that the moon is smaller than the earth), it would be silly to suggest that the latter
fact, or any particular person's previous knowledge that p, has the memory connection to — is the cause
of — S's memory-impression. But the more extensive and detailed the match between what S's otherwise
uncaused memory-impression delivers and any particular person's previous knowledge or experience, the
more plausible it becomes to say that these memory-impressions have their source in that (possibly
distinct, possibly identical) person's previous knowledge or experience. It becomes compelling to say this
when the extent and detail are so great that we can be justly quite confident that there never have been or
will be two distinct people who have acquired all those same pieces of knowledge (or had all those same
experiences). Here we have a sufficient condition for memory connection that does not presuppose the
identity of the people connected or entail that there is a continuous connection between the memory and
what is remembered. It is not necessary, however, since it is possible that the memory connection should
in fact always be explained by a continuous physical chain of a sort that could run from a limited, isolated
experience of one person to a matching memory impression of another. So any sufficient condition of
memory connection that is free of the presupposition of personal identity and is also a plausible candidate
for being necessary must be a disjunction of at least these two alternatives. (It might be thought that the
non-necessity of the sufficient condition given earlier in this note follows from the fact that the sufficient
condition given earlier in the text, for the case where the presupposition of personal identity is satisfied,
does not require any such extensive matching of memory-impression with previous knowledge or
experience. But this would follow only if the satisfaction of that presupposition did not entail such
extensive matching, and whether this is so or not is a difficult question about the criteria of personal
identity that I do not want to go into here. My present inclination is to think that personal identity does
not entail such extensive memory connection.)CHAPTER VIII
WHEN AND WHY TO TRUST ONE'S SENSES
AND MEMORY
1.    One's knowledge of a fact is either inferential or non-inferential, and
either fallible or infallible, depending on the sort of externally conclusive
justification  one  has  for  claiming  to  know  it.  All  one's  inferential
knowledge of contingent facts in the world outside one's current state of
consciousness is justified ultimately by one's non-inferential knowledge.
Although infallible knowledge (of necessary truths and of one's current
states of consciousness) comes into it, the principal part of this non-
inferential basis of one's knowledge of the 'external' world is formed by
one's  fallible  non-inferential  knowledge.  This  fallible  non-inferential
knowledge consists of one's non-inferential knowledge of one's current
perceptions of directly specifiable appearances of things around one (direct
perceptions, let us call them) and of one's memory knowledge (retained and
original, of previous perceptions and of other sorts of facts, including
general facts).
For each of these two sorts of fallible non-inferential knowledge I
have presented four conditions that I claim to be sufficient as well as
necessary  (for  perceptual  knowledge  on  pp.  140—141,  for  memory
knowledge on pp. 153—154). Their sufficiency may strike some as more
open to doubt than their necessity. In particular, it may seem that in both
analyses the non-inferential justification condition ((3) in each case) is
inadequate; and for a reason well worth considering, for doing so will
naturally bring us to suggest a general account of the circumstances in
which the (b) part of condition (3) holds, an account of when S's sensations
or  memory-  impressions  (or  infallible  knowledge,  which  needs  to  be
mentioned only in the analysis of memory knowledge) would, and when
they would not, give him some reason to be unsure of (1) (the proposition
for his knowledge of which I claim (1)—(4) are sufficient) despite his
satisfying the (a) part of(3).172 CHAPTER VIII
Let us concentrate primarily on the conditions I have given for
noninferential perceptual knowledge. (Corresponding things can be said
about my conditions for memory knowledge.) It may seem that, in order for
S to be justified in his confidence that (1) is true (that is, that he sees
something that looks from his present point of view as would y in 6 (direct
specification)), he must do more than satisfy (3) (that is, have a visual
sensation as if seeing y in 0 and have no reason in his other sensations or
memory-impressions to be unsure that (1)). To support the view that (3) is
inadequate, one might try to appeal to reasoning essentially like that I used
in Chapter VI, Section 5, to argue that, in order to know that one sees such
a thing as a house, one must know more than that one sees something that
looks as would a house from one's present point of view. That argument
was that, no matter how favorable the viewing circumstances or how much
like a house a thing looks, it is possible that things that are not houses but
look just the same way in the same circumstances are quite common;
hence, one must have reason outside the objective appearance one sees for
being sure that what one sees is a house. (Such reason might, for instance,
be justified confidence that things having the sort of appearance of a house
that one now sees, in the sort of circumstances that one knows to be
present, virtually always are houses.)
The parallel argument with respect to my conditions for non-inferential
perceptual knowledge would go as follows. It is possible a priori that, for
some period up to the present, instances where a subject satisfies (3) but (1)
is false have occurred very frequently. Hence, besides satisfying (3), S
needs some further reason for thinking that the present instance is not of
that  sort.  This  must  consist  in  justified  confidence  in  some  other
proposition from which, along with (3), S could properly infer (1) with
confidence. (I am indebted to Richard J. Hall for suggesting this argument.)
2.    There are many forms that such another proposition might take. One
obviously suitable form would be the following:
 (A)  (1) If my (S's) visual sensation as if seeing something that looks from
my present point of view as would y in θ is F, then I(S) see
something of that appearance; and
   (2) my present visual sensation is F.
I do not want to deny, indeed I want to admit, that content can be found for
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who satisfies (3) (a) to have justification for confidence in that instantiation
of (A), and if S did have that justification (and awareness of the self-
evident inference rule that (1) can be properly inferred with confidence
from the conjunction of (3) (a) and any instantiation of (A)), then S would
have inferential justification for claiming to know that (1) is true. In fact I
shall shortly suggest just such a content for 'F'. But I do not want to admit
that S's having confidence in such an instantiation of the form (A) — or in
any proposition about his subjective sense-experience which could together
with (3) (a) provide the premiss of an inferential justification for (1) — is
necessary for S's claim to know the truth of (1) to be supported by adequate
justification.  Ryle's  point,  again,  seems  to  me  to  offer  a  devastating
objection to that conclusion: many people, of whom it would be absurd to
say that they have no perceptual knowledge, lack the concept of subjective
perceptual sensations required for understanding and, hence, for believing
any such proposition.
Still, it is obvious that if S did have justification for confidence in some
proposition of the (A) form while satisfying (3) (a) then S would also have
inferential justification for confidence in (1). Now the interesting thing is
that there is an appropriate instantiation of the (A) form such that S has
justification for being confident that it is true if S satisfies both (3) (a) and
(3) (b). The dummy predicate 'F' in (A) can be given a content such that S
must have justification for being confident of the resulting instantiation of
(A) — that is, his directly recognizable position must be such that he would
be justified ~f he were confident of the resulting instantiation —whenever
S has the non-inferential justification for confidence in (1) that is specified
in (3).
A content for 'F' that does, I believe, have this consequence appears in
the following instantiation of(A):
 (A*) (1)If my (S's) visual sensation as if seeing something that looks from
my present point of view as would y in θ is such that its direct
deliverance that I see such a thing is, according to what my
memory-deliverances' imply about my past direct perceptions,
(i) not ingredient in a history of direct deliverances of my visual
and tactual-kinaesthetic senses that fails to be sufficiently
coherent, and
(ii) not incoherent with other past or present direct deliverances of
my senses,174 CHAPTER VIII
then I do see such a thing; and
   (2) my present visual sensation is such that its direct deliverance that I
see something that looks from my present point of view as would
y in θ is, according to what my memory-deliverances imply about
my past direct perceptions, (i) and (ii) [as above].
3.    The meaning of (i) and (ii) in (A*), particularly the meaning of
'coherent' in (i) and 'incoherent' in (ii), needs explanation. Let's start with
(i). A history of direct deliverances of a subject's visual and tactual-
kinaesthetic senses is sufficiently coherent, in the sense of (i), just in case it
satisfies the following two conditions:
(a) The shape-appearances that each sense has delivered have been
stable and regular enough in their pattern of changes to permit selecting of
places  (among  the  perceived  things)  relative  to  which  more  or  less
enduring fixed spatial locations can be identified. This would not be
possible if the spatially continuous changes that the shape-appearances
underwent over temporally continuous periods of sensation were too rapid,
widespread, or irregular, or if there were spatially discontinuous changes
that were too frequent, widespread, or irregular: if, in other words, the
pattern of changes has been too chaotic to present a coherent external
space.
(b) The shape-appearances delivered by the visual sense have been
sufficiently congruent, and sufficiently free of incongruence, with those
delivered  by  the  tactual-kinaesthetic  sense.  The  two  senses  deliver
congruent shape appearances when at the same time they deliver the same
shape at the same place. They deliver incongruent shape-appearances when
at the same time either they deliver different shapes at the same place or
one delivers absence of any shape where the other delivers a certain shape.
Thus when I both see and feel a telephone receiver in my hand, or when
climbing stairs I both see the rising steps before me and feel them with my
feet and legs, then congruent shape-appearances are being delivered by the
two senses. But if I were to have a visual sensation as if seeing a telephone
but no hands on a table immediately before me while at the same time
having a tactual-kinaesthetic sensation as if running my hands over the
surface of a table immediately before me and feeling nothing on it at all,
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One sense can and often does deliver a shape-appearance that is neither
congruent nor incongruent with any delivered by the other sense, as when I
see a distant tree or feel an object behind me. So by no means total
congruence, but only enough of it, is required if the history of direct
deliverances of the two senses is to be sufficiently coherent in respect (b).
Nor, for that matter, is total lack of incongruence required.
I have only an extremely vague idea of what is sufficient coherence in
respects (a) and (b) for the purposes of (i) in (A*). I do not see how it can
be made more precise. It can, however, be characterized in another way. It
is the same as my extremely vague idea of what is sufficient coherence in
what  a  person  remembers  or  expects  about  his  visual  and  tactual-
kinaesthetic experience for him to have the concepts of seeing and feeling
external things. That is to say: sufficient coherence in respect (a), in the
deliverances of a sequence of visual/tactual-kinaesthetic sensations (which
is long enough for the notion to apply at all), is a degree of it at least as
great as that degree such that only if the deliverances of a person's memory
or expectations (or both) imply that whatever past or future visual/tactual
kinaesthetic history he has is coherent in respect (a) at least to that degree,
can that person have a concept of what it is to see/feel things of this or that
appearance (things in space). Sufficient coherence in respect (b), between
the deliverances of a sequence of visual sensations and the deliverances of
a concurrent sequence of tactual-kinaesthetic sensations, each of which is
sufficiently coherent in respect (a), is a degree of it at least as great as that
degree such that a person who has a concept of what it is to feel things in
space can have a concept of what it is to see them only if what the
deliverances of his memory or expectations imply about his past or future
visual experience is coherent in respect (b) at least to that degree with what
they  imply  about  his  concurrent  past  or  future  tactual-kinaesthetic
experience.
A  person  who  has  only  a  very  short,  isolated  visual  or  tactual-
kinaesthetic sensation, of whatever kind, and has no idea at all, even in
imagination, of a more extensive visual or tactual-kinaesthetic experience
that was sufficiently coherent in respect (a) and included such a sensation,
clearly can have no idea of what it could be to see or feel objects in space.
And if it were only in his imagination, and not in the deliverances of his
memory or expectations about himself, that he had the idea of a more
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have only imagined possible sorts of perceiving. He would not have a
concept of what visual or tactual-kinaesthetic perception is. He could not
say, 'This is what it is like, subjectively, to see such-and-such' but, at most,
'This is what it could be like, in some possible world, to perceive a certain
sort of thing in a certain sort of way'. A person who has always been blind
might, conceivably, be able to imagine a visual experience that is what it is
in fact like, subjectively, to have many of the various sorts of visual
perceptions that we are familiar with or have concepts of. But if this person
did not know that this was what he was doing (as perhaps he could not), he
would not have succeeded in coming by imagination alone to a concept of
what seeing this or that sort of thing is like. If he did not know that what he
imagines is in fact like, or systematically related in the right sort of way to,
the experience that people actually have when they see, he could not say,
'Now I know what it is (or would be) like to see such-and-such'. The most
he could say would be 'This that I imagine is what it could be like to see
such-and-such'. (Similarly, some normally sighted person might be able to
imagine a sensory experience in which touching different surfaces causes
different sorts of special tactual sensations according to the color of the
surface touched. This would not be to conceive what it is like to feel colors,
or what instances of feeling color would have to be like if they were to
occur, but only what feeling colors could be like in a world different from
the actual one in certain ways. There is no concrete concept of feeling color
in this world (yet anyway) and the concrete content of that concept for one
non-actual possible world may be different from what it is for another. It
may be possible to imagine a world for which the concrete content of the
concept of seeing things having certain shape appearances would be very
different from what it is in the actual world.)
A perceptual history sufficiently extended and coherent in respects (a)
and (b) for the memory of it to permit its subject concepts of seeing and
feeling things could contain an occasional visual-tactual incongruence, for
this could be regarded either as a perceptual malfunction (an hallucination
or severe distortion by one of the senses) or as a perception by one sense of
something that was imperceptible to the other sense. But if there were too
much visual-tactual-kinaesthetic incongruence, or too little visual-tactual-
kinaesthetic  congruence,  then  only  the  sensations  on  the  tactual-
kinaesthetic side could, in the absence of the subject's somehow expecting
whatever  visual-tactual-kinaesthetic  future  he  has  to  be  much  more
coherent in this respect, permit a concept of objective perception or give
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deliverances were sufficiently extensive and coherent in respect (a)). The
sensations on the visual side could be thought of by their subject as no
more  than  merely  subjective  mental  phenomena,  like  the  play  of  an
exceptionally vivid and uncontrolled visual imagination but without the
subject's thinking that he is imagining seeing various things. They could
not even give rise to the idea of seeming to see, or visually hallucinating,
various external things, and they could certainly not be regarded as any sort
of guide to the contents of the environment.
This primacy of tactual-kinaesthetic perception can be seen, I think, if
one  asks  oneself  how  one  would  regard  one's  visual  and  tactual-
kinaesthetic experiences if the two were to diverge totally with respect to
congruence over a fairly long period. Suppose that you awoke sometime to
find that the environment being delivered by the one sense is completely
different  from  that  being  simultaneously  delivered  by  the  other.  For
example, you have tactual-kinaesthetic sensations as if feeling yourself
stretched out on the floor with your children piling on you and wrestling
with you, and you have the sort of visual sensations you would have if first
sitting in a chair then getting up and going into the kitchen and making
coffee and in the process seeing no other persons. After a while of such
complete divergence you would, I think, begin to think of your visual
experience as a subjective picture show, a fantasy, that distracts you from
attending to your commerce with the actual environment by touch and
motion.
2
The explanation for this probably lies in such facts as the following. My
tactual-kinaesthetic perceptions, but not my visual perceptions, of the
movements of my own body are intimately connected with the fact that it is
my body that is moving. I cannot have a kinaesthetic awareness of someone
else's body doing sit-ups. The subjective experience ingredient in my
tactual-kinaesthetic perception of my body walking forward over a level
surface can be ingredient only in a perception of my, the perceiver's, body
doing this; whereas the very same visual sensation ingredient in my seeing
my feet moving forward one after the other could have been ingredient in
my seeing someone else's feet moving. Also my will to move my body in a
certain way is a part of my tactual-kinaesthetic perception, but not of my
visual perception, of a voluntary movement of my body. My impression
that my body moves because I will it, that I am moving my body, is an
inseparable aspect of the subjective experience I mean when I speak of the
tactual-kinaesthetic experience as if I were moving my body in such-and-178 CHAPTER VIII
such a way; this experience differs from the tactual-kinaesthetic experience
as if my body were being moved in that way by something other than me.
To have an illusion of raising my arm (voluntarily) would necessarily
require a putative kinaesthetic perception of doing so, but not necessarily
any putative visual perception. Finally, my tactual-kinaesthetic, but not my
visual, perceptions include those painful (or pleasant) sensations that
deliver the most directly forceful and alarming (or appealing) perceptions
of actions of other things on my body. My seeing a vice slowly flattening
my hand, unaccompanied by any tactual-kinaesthetic perception of it, could
fail to arouse in me any active concern (I might not even realize that it was
my hand); but the same could not be said for my tactual-kinaesthetic
perception of the same thing unaccompanied by any visual perception of
it.~ So, in a case of prolonged extreme divergence between one's visual
experience and one's tactual-kinaesthetic experience, even if one tried to
believe in the visual environment and disbelieve the tactual-kinaesthetic
one, the attempt would be constantly undermined by one's dispositions to
bodily action and reaction (without which actions and reactions one's
tactual-kinaesthetic experience would in any case be very impoverished
and very different from the familiar sort). (It should be noted that what I've
said does not imply or give support to the suggestion that in any instance of
visual-tactual-kinaesthetic incongruence, however short-lived and whatever
the other perceptual experience of the subject, the subject's presumption
would or should be in favor of the veridicality of the tactual-kinaesthetic
side: if I see something moving my right hand towards my right where I
seem to see an active buzz saw (and where I previously thought I saw and
felt a buzz saw), but it feels to me as if my right hand is being moved to the
left, I will doubtless try to stop the apparent movement to the right and
scoff at any questioning of the reasonableness of doing so.)
4.    Condition (ii) of (A*) speaks of incoherence among different direct
deliverances of the subject's sensations. One thing that is meant by this is
the sort of incongruence between visual and tactual-kinaesthetic shape-
appearances discussed above. But there are other sorts of incoherence, in
the sense needed in (ii), that are not the opposites of any of the sorts of
coherence so far explained. They have to do with a given deliverance or
combination of deliverances possessing what is a severely anomalous
feature in light of, against the background of, all that is implied about the
subject's past perceptions by his memory-deliverances. (One can, of course,
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perceptual experience without remembering many, or even any, particular
instances of it.)
A feature of some direct perceptual deliverance or combination of direct
perceptual deliverances is a severe anomaly within the totality of the past
and present direct perceptual deliverances of a person's sensations if it is a
feature that in the light of the totality would definitely be expected not to
occur,  whose  non-occurrence  could  be  inferred  with  considerable
confidence from the other features of the totality. Against the background
of a normal sort of sensation history among us, severe anomaly would be
offered by spatio-temporal discontinuity in the changing of the shape-
appearances delivered (for example, from something looking as would a
large oak in an open field abruptly to something looking as would a wall
full of books close at hand), or by certain bizarre sorts of continuous
changes (for example, what looks as would walking, gesturing furniture or
what looks as would a filing cabinet gradually changing into a man), or by
certain  bizarre  combinations  of  shapes  or  of  shapes  and  colors  (for
example, what looks as would wings on a purple cow). Deliverances of
different, non-continuous segments of a person's sensation-history could,
taken together, constitute a severe anomaly: given the background of a sort
of sensation-history normal for us, it would be severely anomalous if a
person had visual sensations as if seeing through a window a violent
windstorm come along and uproot some fair-sized trees and then, no more
than an hour or so later (in the meantime having had perceptual experience
only of indoor scenes), he had visual experience as if seeing through the
same window the same trees firmly planted and showing no signs of
unusual disturbance.
In general, whether or not, and to what degree, a given feature of a
perceptual deliverance or sequence or combination of deliverances would
be anomalous in light of the whole of a person's perceptual deliverances is
a matter of the strength with which its contradictory could be properly
inferred from the totality minus that feature and is thus a matter of logic
broadly conceived (mainly non-deductive), a study into which we are not
entering here.
Not every sort of possible anomaly in the direct deliverances of one's
senses would be severe enough to produce incoherence in the sense I mean
in (ii). A feature will be severely anomalous enough just in case a person
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unsure that the deliverance or sequence or combination of deliverances it
embraces is true. I doubt that any more informative general criterion for
what degree of anomaly is enough can be given: it is anomalous enough
when it becomes unclear that confidently accepting the delivered anomaly
is preferable to accepting the anomaly that at least some part of the
perceptual deliverances of one's senses or memory is false. It is clear that,
against the sort of background of perceptions implied by a normal totality
of concurrent memory-deliverances, thorough spatial discontinuity in the
changing of the shape-appearances delivered by the subject's visual sense
would be anomalous enough, whereas what looks as would a man twice as
tall as normal would not be. A chartreuse moose deliverance is perhaps not
clear one way or the other — assuming that the subject has no evidence
that  he  sees  a  moose  that  has  been  dyed  or  painted  chartreuse  or
illuminated by special light which reflects chartreuse from the moose, for if
he had then his seeing something that looks as would a chartreuse moose in
ordinary light need not be at all anomalous in light of the totality of
perceptual deliverances that his memory delivers. But one could add to a
chartreuse-moose deliverance to get a combination that would be more
clearly anomalous enough: add, for instance, deliverances that are strong
evidence that the subject has taken a drug that typically causes visual
hallucinations of bizarre-looking animals.
A sufficiently anomalous sequence or combination of deliverances
might (though it need not) be made up of parts each of which is not
anomalous in itself, so that the anomaly of the combination or sequence
lies  in  the  relation  of  these  parts  to  each  other.  In  such  a  case,  the
extrinsically anomalous parts can be said to be incoherent with each other
(in the sense intended in (ii)). (In a case where a perception delivered by
the senses or memory is intrinsically severely anomalous, that is, it is
severely anomalous and cannot be divided into separate non-anomalous
perceptions (such as ones s seeing a big red bear with large white wings),
the perceptual deliverance can be said to be incoherent with all the other
perceptual or perception-implying deliverances of the subject's senses or
memory  that  provide  the  evidence  in  light  of  which  it  is  severely
anomalous, but they are not incoherent with it.) Among the possible cases
of anomalous combinations or sequences that divide into non-anomalous
parts, one kind would be visual-tactual-kinaesthetic incongruence and
another would be a sharp, thoroughgoing break in the continuities of shape
delivered by a temporally continuous sequence of visual sensations (in a
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Another kind of possibility is illustrated by the example given earlier of
the uprooted and restored trees. This example differs from the two just
mentioned in that the anomaly of the direct deliverances in the uprooted-
trees example can be comprehended only by understanding that they are
evidence for another, unperceived anomaly (a very quick restoration or
replacement of the trees). If certain direct deliverances are evidence for an
anomaly in the world then they must themselves be anomalous against the
background of the whole of the subject's perceptual deliverances:  if what I
have perceived is evidence for something that I have a right to regard as
anomalous  then  I  have  a  right  to  regard  what  I  have  perceived  as
anomalous. Another sort of case that would have this feature even more
strikingly (again assuming a sort of background of perceptual deliverances
that is otherwise fairly normal) would be deliverances that are strong
evidence of an incongruence between a perception by the subject and a
perception by another person. That is, the senses or memory of the subject
deliver his perceiving something of a certain appearance at a certain place
and they deliver also strong evidence that another person has perceived
something of a quite different appearance, or nothing at all, at the same
place and time.
Another possible case of incoherence through extrinsic anomaly is this:
one s senses deliver or have delivered strong evidence that a particular one
(or ones) among one's perceptual sensations, whose deliverances would
otherwise be non-anomalous, has been caused in such a way as to make it
hallucinatory in some respect(s). For example, it could be that I clearly
seem to remember having observed or conducted or participated in or saw
reliable testimony concerning experiments that showed that electrically
stimulating a person's brain in a certain way causes him to have a visual
hallucination of a vulture, and I also seem clearly to remember my being
told a short while ago by the same experimenters that my brain would
shortly be stimulated in that way, and now I have a visual experience as if
seeing something that from my present point of view looks as would a
vulture sitting on the ledge outside the laboratory window. This direct
perceptual deliverance and those implied by the memory-deliverances must
form an anomalous combination; otherwise, those implied by the memory-
deliverances could not be evidence that the present visual sensation is at
least partly hallucinatory, that is, false in its direct deliverance.182 CHAPTER VIII
In a case of a perceptual deliverance that is non-anomalous in itself but
has an anomalous relation to others of the subject's perceptual deliverances,
it could happen that, even though the anomaly is severe enough of its kind
to give the subject some reason to be unsure of that deliverance, the subject
has countervailing reason in other parts of his total perceptual deliverance
for being confident of the deliverance despite its anomaly, reason that
outweighs  the  reason  for  doubt,  that  restores  the  confidence  that  the
incoherence would otherwise destroy. Suppose, for example, that, as his
visual sense delivers it, a person is one moment (what looks as would)
sitting in his study at his typewriter and the next moment (what looks as
would) flying over fields and woods like a bird (without the aid of any
device, as if swimming in the air). Here the subject's confidence in his
(memory  delivered)  perceptions  of  having  been  in  his  study  at  his
typewriter might be justly restored, despite the anomalous abrupt switch to
outdoor flying, in light of the fact that the earlier perception is continuous
with so much more in his past and the fact that the flying perception is
intrinsically  anomalous,  as  well  as  being  abruptly  and  thoroughly
discontinuous with the preceding perceptions. And if the flying perception
were followed by an abrupt switch back to the study and typewriter, it
would be doubly anomalous extrinsically. All this might justify the subject
in  regarding  the  flying  perception  as  hallucinatory  and  restoring  his
confidence in the preceding and following mundane perceptions.
Or consider the example where my senses deliver strong evidence that
another person has had a visual perception that is incongruent with one of
my own. My confidence in my own might be restored by my having
evidence in other perceptions that the other person's visual perception is
intrinsically or extrinsically anomalous within his perceptual deliverances
(and apart from comparison with mine), or by my having equally strong
evidence that several other subjects have perceptions that are congruent
with  mine  but  incongruent  with  his.  Or  in  the  example  where  the
deliverance of my current sensation is incoherent with the deliverances of
some of my past ones (as implied by my memory deliverances) because
those  past  ones  deliver  evidence  that  the  current  one  has  had  a
hallucination-producing  cause,  the  fact  that  so  much  of  my  putative
perceptual history is tied up in or continuous with those past putative
perceptions as compared with the current perception might justify restoring
confidence  in  all  those  past  perceptual  deliverances  despite  their
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In all such cases the subject's justification for being confident of a
perceptual deliverance despite its incoherence with others is inferential.
The justification has the form: 'Although my perceptual deliverance P is
incoherent with my perceptual deliverance(s) Q, P is surely true but Q may
not be, since P and Q have such-and-such relations to others of my (non-
anomalous) perceptions or to each other.' But we are now concerned with
non-inferential  justification  for  claims  to  know  direct  perceptual
propositions about oneself, and with the notion of a reason for being unsure
that weighs against such a non-inferential justification. The explication of
this  notion  need  not  take  account  of  the  kinds  of  factors  that  can
inferentially restore confidence despite anomaly, but can simply rely on the
kinds of incoherence that I have been explaining.
5.    Turning  to  memory-knowledge  of  one's  perceptual  past,  we  can
construct a proposition parallel to (A*) such that a claim parallel to the one
I  am  making  about  (A*)  vis-à-vis  the  conditions  of  non-inferential
perceptual knowledge — namely, that one who satisfies condition (3) has
justification for being confident of (A*) — can equally well be made about
this parallel proposition vis-à-vis condition (3) of memory knowledge for
the specific case where p (the proposition of which the subject has memory
knowledge) is a past-tense direct perceptual proposition about the subject.
(A*)   (1) If  I  have  a  strong  memory-impression that I have seen
something  of  such-and-such  an  appearance  (direct
specification) and this perceptual deliverance is, according
to what my memory-deliverances imply about my other past
direct perceptions, (i) and (ii) [same as in (A*)], then I have
seen such a thing; and
(2) [as in (A*), (2) is the same proposition as the antecedent of
(1)].
The parallel claim that holds concerning (A*m) is this: if S satisfies
condition (3) of memory knowledge with respect to the proposition that he
has seen something of such-and-such a directly specified appearance —
that is, he has a strong memory-impression that he has and his other
memory-impressions or sensations give him no reason to be unsure that he
has despite his strong memory-impressions that he has — then S would be
justified in being confident that (A*m).
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Note  incidentally  that  there  is  just  one  sort  of  case  where  the
incoherence  of  a  perceptual  memory-deliverance  (or  a  perceptual
implication of a memory-deliverance) with other perceptual deliverances of
a subject's memory or senses is such as to give the subject reason to suspect
that  it  is  his  ostensible  memory,  rather  than  the  putative  perception
ostensibly remembered, that is playing him false. This is the case where the
incoherence is a matter of the other perceptual deliverances being strong
evidence that this memory-impression has been caused in such a way as to
make it delusory. Otherwise, any reason the subject has for preferring one
suspicion to the other must consist in further facts about his sense- and
memory-deliverances than the incoherence in question.
6.   Let us return to the claim I am making about (A*) vis-à-vis (3) of the
conditions of non-inferential perceptual knowledge (which were stated on
pp. 140—141, namely, that a subject who satisfies (3) thereby has the
makings of a justification for being confident that (A*) (which was stated
on pp. 176—177).
My claim can be made out in two parts: first, how it is that such a
subject has justification for confidence that (A*) (2) is true and second,
how such a subject has justification for confidence that (A*) (1) is true. (A
parallel argument could be given for the corresponding claim about (A*m)
vis-à-vis (3) of the conditions of memory knowledge given in Chapter VII,
Section 3.) The first is fairly obvious, the second I will take up in Sections
8 and 9.
A person who has the visual sensation specified in (3) (a) will have
justification for being confident that (A*) (2) holds of that sensation if he
satisfies (3) (b). Whatever would make it false that the specified direct
deliverance of that sensation, according to what S's memory-deliverances
imply about his past perceptions, satisfies (i) and (ii) — would make (A*)
(2) false — would also, clearly, be a reason, offered by S's memory-
impressions or other sensations, for S to withhold non-inferential trust in
that direct visual deliverance. And, as far as I can see, that sort of thing is
the only such (sense- or memory-delivered) reason a person could have for
withholding non-inferential confidence in a direct deliverance of his senses.
My explication of coherence in the sense of (i) and incoherence in the
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under which non-inferential trust in the current direct deliverances of one's
senses is justified.
It does not follow from any of my claims, nor do I think it true, that a
subject can be justified in suspecting the truth of some of the perceptual
deliverances of his senses or memory only if he confidently accepts the
truth of others, as some philosophers seem to have suggested.
5 What is true,
rather, is that a doubt about any of one's perceptual deliverances must arise
from the nature of the rest and cannot be grounded on something outside
that, such as the mere logical possibility that all the perceptual deliverances
of one's memory and senses, no matter what their nature, are false. It is
pretty  clear  that  if  the  totality  of  the  visual  and  tactual-kinaesthetic
deliverances of a subject's senses and memory (at a given time) fail to be
coherent in the minimal sense of (i) then that subject ought not to be
confident of any of them (supposing he somehow had the understanding of
perceptual propositions necessary for believing them). But even if that
totality satisfied (i), the nature of the totality of the perceptual deliverances
of the subject's senses and memory could still be such that none of them
satisfy (ii) and the subject should on that account be less than confident of
any of them.
One way in which this latter possibility might be realized is this: at a
certain time a person whose sense- and memory-deliverances up to then
have been perfectly normal and coherent throughout, suddenly experiences
a radical and thorough discontinuity in his perceived environment, of the
sort described earlier. For example, one moment the person is in his study
at his typewriter and the next he is in a canoe moving down a wooded
stream. At first, it may be plausible to suppose, his memories of his
experience prior to the break in continuity would be sufficiently more
extensive than the new sense-experience to restore his confidence in the
former (but not the latter). But, if his post-break experience continues long
enough in coherent fashion and is retained well enough in his memory (and
brings no strong evidence that he did undergo a discontinuous change of
place, such as testimony of others that they saw him disappear in the one
place and suddenly appear in the other), then perhaps there could come a
time when neither the deliverances of his memory concerning his pre-break
experience nor those concerning his post-break experience are sufficiently
more extensive than the others to restore confidence in either set. They
might come into a kind of balance in which the subject would not be
unreasonable if he were to be uncertain whether to trust the one or the other186 CHAPTER VIII
or both or neither of the internally coherent parts of the incoherent whole.
(All of the putative perceptual experience prior to the break is incoherent
with all of that after the break because the thoroughgoing discontinuity, the
feature that is severely anomalous in light of the totality of the totality of
the subject's perceptual deliverances (as he remembers them), is a relation
between two different sequences of the subject's putative perceptions and it
would  be  arbitrary  to  exclude  from  either  sequence  any  putative
perceptions that are either continuous (in respect to the perceiver's location
in  space  and  the  perceived  environment)  or  give  no  evidence  of
discontinuity (in either respect) with what is already included in that
sequence.)
A somewhat different sort of example of a feature that would make the
totality of the perceptual deliverances of a subject's senses and memory
incoherent, and would, therefore, make it reasonable for the subject to have
confidence in none of them, is the following. The subject has strong
memory-impressions of a life in which he has become a neuro-physiologist
and, by much study and experiment and with the help of colleagues, he has
discovered and demonstrated that certain complex, delicate operations on a
normal adult human brain will cause its possessor to have, over a certain
period, memory-impressions and sensations whose perceptual deliverances,
though extensive and coherent, are all false. They are even able to cause a
delusive but coherent set of sense- and memory-deliverances that justify a
subject in being confident that he has been a neurophysiologist who has
developed  the  means  to  cause  people  to  have  extensively  delusory
sensations and memory-impressions. This person now seems to perceive
himself lying in a hospital room and feels as if he has just awakened from
deep sleep, and he has a strong memory-impression that the last thing that
he  experienced  before  becoming  unconscious  was  that  his  fellow-
neurologists strapped him to an operating table and told him that they were
about to perform on him the same sort of total-delusion-causing operation
that they had performed on others. Here, the perceptual deliverances of the
subject's memory and senses that support the proposition that such an
experiment has indeed been performed on him might be so extensive and
continuous with others of his perceptual deliverances that it would be
arbitrary to doubt only those and maintain confidence in all the rest. Yet,
for him to be confident of those would, paradoxically, be for him to have
reason to doubt them all, including those. It seems that as reasonable a
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feeling that he cannot be sure of anything, at least as far as concerns his
past and present perceptions and propositions inferred therefrom.
7.   Here is as good a place as any to remark upon an intuition concerning
perceptual deliverances that I share with some other philosophers. For
some among those perceptual deliverances of a normal person's senses and
memory at a given time that are not, in what they imply about the subject's
direct  perceptions,  incoherent  with  any  others,  the  justification  of
confidence is even stronger than it is for others (where it is still justification
for confidence). Malcolm (1952) has argued that one may know such truths
as that one sees an ink bottle before one in an especially "strong sense". In
one place he explains this claim in this way: "When I use 'know' in the
strong sense.... I do not concede that anything whatsoever could prove me
mistaken" (p. 64,6 my emphasis). This suggests that, given an S who
knows that p and knows that q, where p and q are perceptual deliverances
of S's memory or senses, one way in which the subject's justification for
claiming to know that p could be stronger than S's justification for claiming
to know that q is this: the totality of the perceptual deliverances of S's
senses and memory is such that the most that any possible further addition
to those deliverances (with no loss) could do by way of weakening S's
justification for confidence that p would be to create a position in which S
should be uncertain or doubt or withhold belief that p; whereas some
conceivable further addition without any loss would create a position in
which S would be justified in being confident, or at least believing, that q is
false.
It does seem that, although I seem to remember seeing recently what
looked as would a large tree growing in the middle of a certain yard, if my
seeing today at the same spot nothing that looks as would a tree or the
remains of one, my wife's testimony that she passed the same spot a few
days ago and saw nothing looking like a tree in that yard, plus, if you like,
the testimony of the residents of the houses on that street that they have
never seen anything in that yard looking like a tree, if all this (or the
strongest possible perceptual evidence of it) were over a period added to
the perceptual deliverances of my memory, and nothing were taken away, I
would then have a totality of perceptual deliverances that would justify me
in being sure that I did not recently see something that looks as would a
tree in that street, despite my continuing memory-impression that I did.
Whereas, it does seem that no matter what happens, as long as I retain the188 CHAPTER VIII
very extensive memory-impressions I now have of having seen what look
like trees, I can be justified at most in doubting, being uncertain of, my
memory's deliverance that I have seen such things. No possible mere
addition, without loss, to the present totality of my memory-impressions
could make one that would justify my being confident that I have never
seen things that looked like trees despite the great mass of my contrary
memory-impressions.
I doubt that any perceptual proposition tied to a limited time period
could have this sort of security from being shown false. For what seems to
give a memory-deliverance this status is the fact that if it were false then a
large amount of the direct perceptual deliverances of the subject's memory
would either have to be false or else have to have an explanation against
which his memory and senses deliver massive evidence. (I must, however,
confess to an intuition that one's confidence in a present tense perceptual
proposition is naturally more insistent, or less easily shaken, than one's
confidence in a comparable past-tense perceptual proposition, even where
both are completely coherent with all the rest of the perceptual deliverances
of one's senses and memory. For example, though I am entitled to be
confident and claim to know that I saw yesterday what looked as would
large blooms on a lilac bush immediately before me, I seem to be even
more strongly justified in claiming to know that I now see what look as
would large blooms on a lilac bush immediately before me. I would feel
more justified in maintaining confidence in the face of certain sorts of
contrary evidence (for example, testimony of others) in the latter case than
I would in the former. Two things occur to me that might make this
plausible: (1) there are more alternative ways in which my memory-
impression that I saw what looked as would... etc. could conceivably be
delivering falsely: it could be either my memory that is at fault or else the
original putative perception and not my memory; whereas my present
perceptual  sensation  is  not  thus  doubly  vulnerable  to  error  in  its
deliverance; (2) since a deliverance of a present perceptual sensation
concerning one's present environment ordinarily would have a greater
bearing on one's current practical concerns than a comparable memory-
deliverance concerning one's past environment, it is easier to alter or
weaken one's conviction about the latter: doing so ordinarily entails less
practical concern or adjustment than would altering one's conviction with
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In another place Malcolm gives his "strong sense" of 'know' a stronger
explanation. He says that a person who thinks he knows that p in the strong
sense "would look upon nothing whatever as evidence that p is false" (p.
62) and would not admit "that any future investigation could refute it or
cast  doubt  on  it"  (p.  64,  last  emphasis  mine).  This  suggests  that  a
perceptual deliverance might be such that no possible addition without loss
to the totality of perceptions delivered by the subject's senses and memory
could even weaken his position to the point where it would no longer
justify confidence in that deliverance.
7 I very much doubt that a person can
ever be so strongly justified in claiming to know a contingent, perception-
implying deliverance of his memory or senses.
Consider my memory's deliverance that I have seen things looking like
trees. It is perhaps true that if one other person were now (when I happen to
be  perceiving  nothing  looking  like  a  tree)  to  tell  me,  with  apparent
sincerity, that he has never seen anything looking the way I describe and
draw  trees  as  looking,  that  bit  of  testimony  will  be  overwhelmingly
outweighed by the extent of my memory-impressions of having countless
times seen what looked like trees. But suppose that I then go outdoors and
the environment I seem to perceive is very different from what I seem to
remember perceiving the last time I was outdoors, in that no matter where I
look there is nothing that looks as would a tree; every person I seem to see
and to ask 'What happened to the trees?' seems to look blank and say,
'Trees? What do you mean by 'trees'?'; and ,when I describe or draw for
them how trees look, seems to say, "I have never seen any such thing".
Then I ought to wonder whether (though not to believe that) my memories
of having seen trees are all delusory, to be less than certain that I have seen
such things. (Indeed, this may be another example where I should not fully
trust any of the perceptual deliverances of my senses or memory, since
perceptions of trees have been so pervasive in my previous experience as I
remember it.) If we can imagine future developments in my experience that
would (even though I continue to remember the experience I remember
now)  put  me  in  a  position  where  I  ought  to  lack  confidence  in  the
proposition that I have seen things that look as would trees, then surely we
could  do  it  for  any  perceptual  deliverance  of  my  memory  or  any
deliverance  whose  original  justification  would  have  to  have  been  by
inference from perception.190 CHAPTER VIII
8.    In Section 6 I pointed out that a person who satisfies (3) of the
conditions  of  non-inferential  perceptual  knowledge  (p.  140)  has
justification for being confident that (A*) (2) (pp. 176-177) is true of him. I
hope it is equally clear that a parallel claim holds concerning condition (3)
of memory knowledge (p. 154) and (A*m) (2) (p. 187).
The remaining part of my claim regarding (A*) (or (A*m)) is that a
person who satisfies the conditions of non-inferential perceptual knowledge
(or memory knowledge) has justification for being confident that the
conditional (A*) (1) (or (A*m) (1)) is true of him. This holds because a
person always has justification for being confident of that conditional no
matter  what  the  current  deliverances  of  his  senses  and  memory.
Justification for confidence that (A*) (1) (or (A*~m) (1)) holds in one's
own case is something that one has non-inferentially and a priori. How else
could one have it?
Not by any sort of inference ultimately from what one's perceptions are
or have been, since it seems clear that as long as it is in question whether
(A*) (1) (or (A*~m) (1)) holds of oneself it will also be in question
whether any of the perceptual deliverances of one's memory or senses are
true. It would seem highly arbitrary to pick some of those that satisfy the
antecedent of (A*) (1) (or (A*~m) (1)) and not others in which to place
one's confidence. What could justify the selection? And it would seem even
more perverse to select only some that do not satisfy that antecedent. Why
do that?
Nor could one's confidence in (A*) (1) (or (A*m) (1)) arise from a
priori demonstration, since it is not a necessary truth. Its consequent does
not follow from its antecedent, nor from any other proposition merely
about  the  intrinsic  nature  of  one's  current  memory-impressions  and
sensations (nor from any other fact directly recognizable to one). No matter
what sort of totality of sense- and memory-deliverances we suppose a
person to have, it is conceivable that all their perceptual members (or
perceptual implications) should be false. It is conceivable, for example, that
a person should suddenly, at one stroke, lose entirely his memories of
earlier experience and acquire new but delusory memory-impressions as to
what his experience has been. If the memory-delusion were extensive and
coherent  enough  and  were  retained  while  he  went  on  to  have  total
perceptual hallucination for a period, it would then be the case throughout
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deliverances were false but he would have no reason to suspect any falsity
in them at all.
One  might  think  that  such  an  extensive,  comprehensive,  coherent
delusion, undetectable to its victim is not possible. One might think that its
impossibility follows from certain considerations about what is necessary
in order for a person's belief or expression or thought to have reference to
the  past.  Malcolm  argues  that  a  person's  having  memory-beliefs  or
memory-impressions requires that he be able to express beliefs or make
statements about the past and his ability to do this presupposes that the
statements he makes by uttering ostensibly past-tense sentences are mainly
true when so interpreted.
8 According to Shoemaker, it is a necessary truth
that a person's memory beliefs are generally true and also necessary that his
sincere memory statements are generally true.
9
Behind these various and somewhat unclear claims'
0 there is a sound
idea that I would put as follows. Any way of selecting a set of behavioral
and mental acts in the life of a person as the set of all the formulations of
propositions about the past that he ever makes (whatever his epistemic
attitude towards the propositions at the time of formulating them) must
yield the result that some significant portion (not necessarily most) of the
proposition formulated in all those acts, or the propositions implied by
those propositions, are true of the past. Otherwise there could be no basis
for construing those acts as intended by their subject to have reference to
the past. But from this principle we cannot get the consequence that a
person's memory-impressions at a given time could not be entirely (though
coherently) delusory with respect to what their deliverances imply about
the subject's past perceptions. It is easy to conceive cases of wholesale
memory and perceptual delusion that do not violate the above principle
(but do violate, and therefore constitute counterexamples to, Malcolm's and
Shoemaker's stronger principles).
Consider the following three cases, in order of the increasing extent of
the subject's memory-delusion.
(1) A normal adult whose native language is English suffers a severe
blow on the head. For a considerable period after he regains consciousness
the utterances he makes sound like English but if they are so construed they
are  all  false  in  their  first-person  present-  or  past-tense  perceptual
implications. In addition his non-verbal behavior is appropriate, not to his192 CHAPTER VIII
actual environment, but to one such as is implied by the propositions that
are expressed by his apparently English utterances if they are English. It
would be reasonable to say of such a person, on the basis of his behavior
and circumstances both before and after the blow, that the only knowledge
(or  true  belief)  of  his  that  has  survived  the  blow  on  his  head  is  his
knowledge of how to speak English and some very general knowledge as to
what sorts of things are to be found in the world. His beliefs as to what
particular things he has perceived or is perceiving are all false. He now has
an extensive and coherent delusion about his past and present environment
which he has no reason to suspect to be such.
(2) A normal adult whose native language is German and who has never
encountered any other language receives a blow on the head even stranger
in its effects: his behavior upon recovering consciousness exactly fits the
description of post-blow behavior that we gave in case (1). That is, this
person makes utterances which all sound like English and which, if so
construed, express assertions that imply a coherent set of false beliefs about
his past experience and what he presently perceives, which false beliefs
seem to fit with the subject's non-verbal behavior which is inappropriate to
his actual environment. Here the only true memory beliefs expressed by the
subject's acts (or that are implicit in beliefs his acts express) have to do
with general facts about the sorts of things that are to be found in the world.
The correct memory of how English is spoken, attributable in case (1),
drops out in this case (though the subject has correct beliefs as to how it is
spoken).
(3)  A human being, looking like a normal adult, simply materializes
before our eyes, from out of nowhere — or perhaps he is synthesized by a
highly advanced biological technology — and proceeds to behave in a way
that satisfies the description of post-blow behavior given in case (1). Of
such a creature we can say that at his unusual beginning, though he has true
beliefs as to how English is spoken and as to what sorts of things there are
in the world, he has no true memory-beliefs at all but only false ones, since
he has no past whatever to remember. All the memory-impressions that he
formulates in his behavioral or mental acts, impressions that he has done or
experienced or come to ,know various things, must be delusory. But how
then could any of his behavior or mental acts near his beginning express
memory-beliefs? What could there be that would show that any of his
(internal or external) acts near his beginning were intended to refer to the
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be such things as how his later use of what are ostensibly English past-
tense utterances correlates, when so construed, with the hallucinatory
perceptual experience that he has previously seemed to be expressing and
with the interpretation of it implied by the memory-beliefs he has seemed
to be expressing. If a suitably significant portion of the later utterances
construed as English expressions of memory-beliefs (or of his mental acts
construed as expressions of memory-beliefs) turn out to express or imply or
pre-suppose  truths  as  to  what  his  earlier  sense-deliverances  and  his
inferences drawn therefrom have apparently been, then there is a basis for
saying that he generally uses (is disposed to use) the ostensibly English
past-tense locutions that he utters in the same way that they are used in
English (or he uses the symbols involved in his mental acts in the way
implied by the construal of them as expressions of thoughts or beliefs about
his past) and was so using them at his beginning. And thus there is a basis
for saying that he began his existence with true beliefs about the correct use
of English and with an extensive set of delusory memory-impressions.
So that which is necessary to make mental or behavioral acts formulate
propositions that refer to the past is compatible with the possibility that a
subject  might  have  a  normal  sort  of  totality  of  memory-  and  sense
deliverances that are entirely or mostly false, at least in their perceptual
implications. That this is a possibility means that the consequent of (A*)
(1)  (or  of  (A*m)  (1))  cannot  follow  from  any  proposition,  like  its
antecedent,  that  is  merely  about  the  intrinsic  nature  of  the  subject's
memory-impressions and sensations. It also means that there can be no a
priori demonstration that it is necessary that the consequent is highly
probable relative to the antecedent, that is, necessary that the vast majority
of those of a person's perceptual deliverances that satisfy the antecedent
must be true. There simply are contrary logical possibilities.
We have, of course, plenty of a posteriori evidence that such wholesale
perceptual and memory-delusion does not occur and would be practically
impossible to cause, and also that what perceptual hallucination does occur,
being  the  result  of  rather  haphazard  interference  of  physical  and
psychological forces in the normal process that correlates sensation with
environment in a regular way, almost always delivers perceptions that are
severely anomalous. And we can see a priori that in one's own case it
would be impossible to have a posteriori (perceptual) evidence of the
falsity of anything but incoherent (anomalous) parts of one's perceptual
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9.   Could the justification for (A*) (1) (or (A*m) (1)) be by non-deductive
inference from some other intrinsic features of the totality of one's sense
and memory-deliverances? I don't see how. What other features could
make  the  consequent  of(A*)  (1)  (or  of  (A*m)  (1))  a  more  attractive
proposition than those specified in its antecedent? I cannot see any (aside
from mere size of the total ostensibly remembered history of perceptual
deliverances referred to in the antecedent: perhaps the larger that is the
more attractive is the consequent, up to a point that any normal non-infant
person has passed).
There is nothing left but the intrinsic appeal of (A*) (1) (or of (A*~m)
(1)). When a perceptual deliverance of one's memory or senses is as
attractive  as  the  intrinsic  features  of  the  totality  of  the  perceptual
deliverances of one's memory and senses can make it (which is to say, as
attractive as one's directly recognizable position can make it) — that is,
when it satisfies the antecedent of (A*) (1) (or of (A*~m) (1)), is a member
of the coherent part relative to the totality — then it is so attractive as to
'win hands down' over any competing logically possible alternative.
We who understand the proposition that is the consequent of (A*) (1)
have a fundamental impulse, a desire, to respond to the situation specified
in the antecedent with confidence in that proposition. This is a desire that
does not derive from any other desire for a further end; it is brute.  Some
philosophers have suggested that there are further features of a proposition
like (A*) (1), that explain or justify its cognitive appeal.
It is something like this proposition (that the coherent part of the totality
of  his  perceptual  deliverances  is  true)  concerning  which  Descartes
maintains (in the Sixth Meditation) that, given his strong natural inclination
to believe it, if it were false then God must have intended to deceive him. I
maintain that, even if his premiss as to its divine cause were taken away,
Descartes could still appeal to this strong inclination.
Brandt (1955) suggests that such a proposition (plus further propositions
about the world that can be properly inferred from it) offers by far the best
explanation  we  have  thought  of  for  one's  memory-impressions  and
sensations being what they are. I suppose that this is true, but even if one
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the  nature  of  one's  memory-impressions  and  sensations  equally  well
(perhaps even by kinds of mechanisms we know of) it would not have
anything like the same appeal; it would in fact be no more appealing than
the hypothesis that all of one's memory-impressions and sensations at a
given time are just brute facts that have no explanation in terms of facts
beyond them. (Of course, no contrary hypothesis could be devised that
explains one's sensations and memory-impressions equally well if 'explains
equally well' requires that it have as much intrinsic appeal to our intellects.)
Slote (1970) suggests that belief in the external world delivered by the
coherent part of one's perceptual deliverances, rather than any contrary
hypothesis, is recommended by what he calls the "Principle of Unlimited
Inquiry'. This is "the principle (a) that it is scientifically unreasonable for
someone to accept what (he sees or has reason to believe) is for him at that
time an inquiry-limiting [i.e., further-explanation-blocking] explanation in
favour  of  an  acceptable  non-inquiry-limiting  explanation  of  a  certain
phenomenon, other things being equal; and (b) that there is reason for such
a person to reject such an explanation in favour of an acceptable non-
inquiry-limiting explanation of the phenomenon in question, if he can find
one."  (p.  67).  I  doubt  that  its  giving  more  scope  for  finding  further
explanations is really the reason for the greater appeal of the hypothesis
that one perceives an external world (at least in the coherent part of one's
perceptual deliverances); because, though it is far from clear to me that no
possible  contrary  hypothesis  could  offer  the  same  scope  for  further
explanations, it is clear to me that if some contrary hypothesis did do so it
would still not begin to have the appeal of the ordinary 'hypothesis'. It also
seems clear that people who markedly lack interest in scientific explanation
of the world that we all perceive would nevertheless find it impossible to
believe some wholly contrary hypothesis that would be no more frustrating
to their desire for further explanation.
The compelling and over-riding appeal of the ordinary 'hypothesis,'
represented by (A*) (1), even as compared with contrary alternatives that
would explain one's memory-impressions and sensations equally well or
would offer the same scope for further explanation is, as far as I can see, a
fact with no further, deeper explanation or justification. In its bruteness it is
like the appeal of simplicity in theories and explanations:  we just prefer the
simpler  of  competing  explanations  or  theories,  other  things  (like
explanatory power and scope for further explanation) being equal, and we
have no more ultimate preference that is our reason for doing so. The196 CHAPTER VIII
justification of our liking what we like, in matters of belief as in other
matters, has to end somewhere.
In any case, I think that what needs to be pointed out is not so much
what features of the ordinary 'hypothesis' give it the overwhelming appeal
it has, as compared with any possible contrary one, as that this appeal
justifies our unquestioning confidence in it. To refrain generally from
confidence in the sort of perceptual proposition that is the consequent of
(A*) (1) when in the sort of situation specified in the antecedent would be
too intolerably frustrating to be borne and in practice impossible. To refrain
occasionally or even once would be no mean feat and would be no less
lacking in motive. This is the situation in which we find ourselves, or the
nature that we find in ourselves, which we can do nothing about and for
which we are not responsible. Given a normal sort of totality of perceptual
memory- and sense-deliverances, one wants a strong motive to resist the
strong appeal to one's belief of any of them; and we find such a motive
only in the conflict of other such appeals, in other perceptual deliverances
being incoherent with it. We do not find it in the mere realization that
something contrary is logically compatible with our directly recognizable
position, which by itself gives the hypothesis of something contrary no
belief-appeal at all.
I would not deny that disbelief in the ordinary 'hypothesis', or even
belief in some contrary hypothesis, in one who has a normal sort of totality
of perceptual deliverances of his memory and senses, may be possible.
Such a thing might even be motivated, conceivably, by some specious
philosophical reasoning. Nor should it be denied that belief in some of the
hypotheses  thoroughly  contrary  to  the  ordinary  one  might  (although
completely unjustified and crazy) make no practical difference in the
subject's behavior. If I were to believe that all the perceptual deliverances
of my senses and memory are false but also that they have been and, no
matter how I will to move my ostensible body, will continue to be coherent
and of the sort I am used to, then presumably I will make my bodily
volitions (which I must regard as producing only hallucinations of the
effects that in making them I pretend to bring about) the same as I would if
I had normal convictions. Still, this belief that none of what my senses or
memory delivers is genuine perception, if I really have it and do not merely
occasionally  entertain  the  proposition  with  a  certain  philosophical
seriousness, would have to make a radical and pervasive difference to my
thinking, to  my attitude towards my experience. Indeed, the differenceWHEN AND WHY TO TRUST ONE'S SENSES AND MEMORY 197
would be so great that I am unable to imagine what it would be like. It
would, I suppose, be something like, only much more extreme than, having
the insane conviction that the dominant motive guiding everyone else's
actions is to harass and fool me in subtle and devious ways and, of course,
to conceal this intention from me (which is, after all, a logical possibility
compatible with all my actual direct perceptions), and at the same time
following the policy of never letting others suspect that I know of their
malevolent aim.
I would deny, however, that we can make sense of the suggestion that
there  might  be  a  person  who  understands  all  the  same  perceptual
propositions we do, has had and remembers a normal sort of history of
perceptual sensations for an adult human being, but has always completely
lacked any impulse to believe the consequent of (A*) (1) when satisfying
its antecedent. The lack of any impulse to perceptual belief in those
circumstances would mean the absence of the criteria that we employ for
the kinds of perceptual sensation that a subject has, criteria that determine
our concepts of those kinds. As I have argued elsewhere," following
Wittgenstein, our concepts of kinds of anything must have criteria, and our
concepts of kinds of sensations must have criteria that lie in the subjects'
reactions to their sensations or in what their reactions would be if other
conditions were present. The subjects themselves can appeal to no other
sort of criteria for the kinds of their sensations. The kinds into which a
subject's sensations fall are essentially linked to such (possibly conditional)
reaction-criteria. As was pointed out earlier, in Chapter V, Section 3, the
reactions that are in fact our criteria for kinds of perceptual sensations —
the only reactions we make that could serve the purpose of discriminating
and identifying all the kinds that we do discriminate and identify — are our
direct perceptual beliefs (our beliefs that we perceive things of certain
directly specifiable appearances) or our inclinations thereto. If a person has
a sensation but in no circumstance whatever would he be disposed to react
to it by having at least an inclination to believe that he was seeing, say,
something that looks as would a square red surface a short distance away
against a blue background in good light (or at least the thought that as far
as his visual sensation goes it is possible that he is seeing that), not even the
circumstance that he understands that perceptual proposition, then that
person cannot possibly be having the kind of sensation that we specify by
speaking of a visual sensation as if seeing a square red surface ... etc. We
have stipulated the absence of the only fact that could make it that kind of
sensation. The kind of visual sensation that we can specify with some198 CHAPTER VIII
particular phrase of the form 'as if seeing y in 0' (direct specification) is
necessarily the kind to which a subject would react, if he satisfied the
antecedent of (A*) (1), with at least an impulse to believe that he sees
something that looks as would y in 0 (if he understands that proposition).
So a person who has and remembers a normal sort of totality of perceptual
sensations and understands what would be the ordinary 'hypothesis' about it
must have at least an impulse to believe this hypothesis.
In fact, of course, we all continually feel sure of such propositions as the
consequent of (A*) (1) (or of (A*m) (1)). And what prompts us to do so is
a directly recognizable position that satisfies the antecedent, the fact that
that sense-deliverance (or perceptual memory-deliverance) belongs to the
coherent majority of the totality of direct perceptions delivered or implied
by our senses and memory. The disposition to be prompted to that attitude
by that situation amounts to being confident of (A*) (1) (or of (A*~m) (1))
in one who understands it. It is tantamount to being confident of it in one
who does not understand it, falling short only by that lack of understanding.
Everyone acts and thinks in a way that manifests confidence in (A*) (1) (or
in (A*m) (1)) or would manifest confidence in it if he understood it.
It is not that we want to be confident of (A*) (1) (or of its consequent
when we satisfy its antecedent) because we want it to be true in order that
certain  further  desires  of  ours  will  be  satisfied.  Our  justification  for
confidence in (A*) (1) is not an interested one. We simply want to be
confident of it.
'Want'  is  too  weak  a  word.  Our  wanting  to  react  to  the  situation
specified in the antecedent of(A*) (1) by being confident of its consequent
— our wanting to act confidently as if(A*) (1) is true — is like wanting to
react to touching an extremely hot surface by quickly drawing the hand
away, only more so. A powerful motive is needed even for slight restraint.
And even if, by some crazy, Herculean effort, one could resist, why should
one? Certainly not because we recognize that it is logically possible that the
consequent be false even when the antecedent is true. That recognition
simply will not move us in that way, any more than the recognition that it
does not follow with logical necessity from anything that has happened in
the past that I would suffer pain if I were now to thrust this letter opener
into my hand moves me in the slightest to doubt that I would. We just do
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positions, the facts directly recognizable to us, can entail and we find no
real inducement to refrain from doing so.
One should trust the direct deliverances of one's senses, or the direct
perceptual deliverances of one's memory, when they belong to the part that
is coherent relative to all that their deliverances imply about one's direct
perceptions. Why should one do this? Why not?
NOTES
1.  'I see d’ is a perceptual deliverance of my visual sensation just in case that sensation is as if seeing d,
and it is a direct perceptual deliverance just in case it reports a direct perception. 'p' is one of my memory-
deliverances just in case I have a strong memory-impression that p.
2.  Compare Berkeley's idea, in Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, that the perceptions of touch are
the real perceptions of external objects and the ideas of sight come to be mistakenly regarded as
perceptions of objects in space only through their correlation with, and hence reliability as indicators of,
available perceptions of touch.
3.  Berkeley remarks (in Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, sec. 59):
We regard the objects that environ us in proportion as they are adapted to benefit or injure
our own bodies, and thereby produce in our minds the sensations of pleasure or pain. Now,
bodies operating on our organs by an immediate application, and the hurt or advantage
arising there-from depending altogether on the tangible, and not at all on the visible, qualities
of any object: This is a plain reason why those should be regarded by us much more than
these.
4.  Further complications would be required to obtain a proposition that would have the same relation to
the  conditions  for  memory  knowledge  in general (of any sort of proposition) that (A*) has to the
conditions for direct perceptual knowledge. The relation of incoherence would have to be understood to
include logical incompatibility (a relation that could not obtain between the direct perceptual deliverances
of different sensations). The class of propositions to which the relation of incoherence applies would
include, besides direct perceptual deliverances, (a) memory-deliverances that merely imply something,
however vague and inspecific, about what the subject's perceptions have been (such as the deliverance
that he  has  come to  know  a  certain general proposition through  experience or  through  reading it
somewhere), (b) memory deliverances that knowledge of certain necessary truths has been obtained by a
priori demonstration, (c) self-evident truths of which the subject has infallible knowledge, and (d) truths
about his current conscious mental states or acts and memory-deliverances as to what his conscious
mental states or acts have been. The incoherence of members of (a) would be a matter either of their
logical incompatibility with other deliverances or of their perceptual implications being incoherent in
other ways with perceptual implications of other deliverances. Only the memory-deliverance members of
(d) could be incoherent and incoherence of them would be a matter of evidence from other deliverances
of memory-delusion. Members of (c) could not be incoherent at all, and if a memory-deliverance were
self-evidently  incompatible  with  a  necessary  truth  self-evident  to  the  subject  then  that  memory-
deliverance would be intrinsically anomalous.
There is some similarity (and this is not, I believe, an accident) between the criterion I am suggesting
for non-inferential trustworthiness of a memory-deliverance and the rule suggested in Brandt (1955) for
determining "justifiable attitudes towards our memory beliefs." Brandt's rule (p. 88):
(a) Accept as a basis for action and for accepting other beliefs all your clear recollections
except those (but not more than a few) of which the system (laws, theories, etc.) of beliefs
supported by the vast majority of your recollections requires rejection or makes rejection
convenient. (b) Believe (disbelieve) any particular recollection more firmly and confidently200 CHAPTER VIII
corresponding to the degree of support by (seriousness of conflict with) the system which can
be erected on the base consisting of the vast majority of your recollections.
5.  Ayer (1956), p. 38, says, "... no judgments of perception would be specially open to distrust unless
some were trustworthy". He goes on, pp. 38—39, "but this is not a proof that we cannot be mistaken in
trusting those that we do.... From the fact that our rejection of some of them is grounded on our
acceptance of others it does not follow that those that we accept are true. Nevertheless the argument does
show that these general forms of skepticism can find no justification in experience."
6.  My page references in this paragraph and in note 7 are to the reprinted text in
Malcolm (1963).
7.  This is what Malcolm's remark suggests but I am not sure that this is what he meant.
I am puzzled by his further remark (p. 68):
In saying that I should regard nothing as evidence that there is no inkbottle here now, I am
not predicting what I should do if various astonishing things happened.... That my present
attitude towards the statement that here is an ink-bottle. It does not prophesy what my
attitude would be if various things happened... no imaginable future occurrence would be
considered by me now as proving that there is not an ink-bottle here.
Either these remarks have no implications at all for the crucial epistemological question of what the
attitude of one who claims to know in the strong sense ought to be if and when various things were to
happen; or they imply (what I think false) that sometimes a subject would be justified in taking the
attitude described, whatever attitude he actually does take; or else they are impenetrable to me, seeing a
difference that I cannot see between saying that I am justified now in thinking 'No matter what sensations
and memory-impressions are in the future added to those I now have I will not be in a position to be
uncertain that p' and saying that no matter what sensations and memory-impressions are in the future
added to those I now have I will not then, with that new Jot, be justified in thinking 'It is uncertain that p'.
8.  Malcolm (1963), 'Memory and the Past', pp. 195—198.
9.  Shoemaker (1963), pp. 201, 230, 235.
10.   Malcolm's claim that a person's past-tense  statements  must  be  mainly  true  is  stronger  than
Shoemaker's claim that most of a person's sincere  memory  statements must be true. A child  who
persistently tries to kid us about the past, who thinks that making obviously false assertions about the past
is a very funny thing to do, might satisfy Shoemaker's requirement while failing to satisfy Malcolm's.
And Shoemaker's claim that most of a person's sincere memory statements must be true is not equivalent
to his claim that most of his memory beliefs must be true. An extremely taciturn person who verbally
expresses very few of his memory beliefs and these happen to be mainly false ones might satisfy the
second requirement while failing to satisfy the first. In all these claims there is a lack of precision as to
just what class of statements, or sincere statements, or beliefs, must be mainly true if all members of the
class are to be past-referring memory statements or beliefs. Is it all the past-tense statements so far made
by a person at any point in his existence, or all that he ever makes? Is it all his memory beliefs at a given
time, or up to a given time, or throughout his entire existence?
11.  Ginet (1968).BIBLIOGRAPHY
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